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Abstract
Faced with the problem of growing economic inequality in America and the threat
posed to democracy, a number of planning scholars have put forth the idea of building
progressive civil society capacity in the economic sphere to broaden stakeholder control
and accountability of capitalist markets. Yet actual empirical accounts of community and
civic organizations spearheading the task of framing and carrying out prescriptive
economic programs, complete with alternative modes of production and exchange, have
sparsely materialized. Moreover, the dominant planning perspective on the topic of
building civil society to strengthen economic democracy views race as a secondary issue
that may have cultural and political significance but is essentially a divisive mechanism that
stymies the more important economic programs of class-based movements.
In contrast, the theoretical framework underlying this study incorporates W.E.B.
DuBois' notion of double consciousness along with Mikhail Bakhtin's formulations on
dialogic exchange to explore how centralizing the perspectives and experiences of "racial
others" might enhance critical reflection and dialogic exchange in civil society- led
economic planning projects as to fortify progressive coalitions and direct their policy
visions towards the deepest problems hindering democratic society. Focusing on the
emerging energy efficiency sector and the green economy more generally within the
context of the contemporary American city, I use two critical and emblematic cases-the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative in Cleveland and the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program- to build theory at the intersection of race, place, and economic
democracy. Each case study is grounded in historical analysis that explores to what extent,
in what ways, and how race played a role in managing the tensions and contradictions
between capitalism and democracy at the local level. In turn, the case studies investigate
the process by which progressive coalitions incorporated the experiences and perspectives
of low-income inner city communities of color into their respective green economic and
workforce development programs.
At the substantive and normative level, my findings indicate that creating inclusive,
transparent, but also flexible spaces for critical reflection and dialogic exchange are
essential to building strong coalitions and forging policy visions that get at some of the core
problems arising from privatistic urban policy and local economic development and form
the stuff of economic democracy. Whether the initiation of such processes and ensuing
economic projects occurs in a manner that is "top down" or "bottom up" might be less
important to their transformative potential than the depth of critical analysis, reflective
thinking, and mutual engagement in policy design and planning discourse. Where economic
democracy is a perpetual process of becoming, it entails actors balancing the use of
external resources with principles of self-determination and the achievement of project
deliverables with leadership development and movement building goals. At the descriptive
level, the cases demonstrate the limits of neoclassical economic theory along with its
premises of rational choice theory and methodological individualism in explaining
observed modes of economic action and local economic development. I incorporate
insights from recent multidisciplinary studies on cooperative human behavior along with
pragmatist action theory in posing an alternative analytical framework for explaining
economic action.
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"How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to
him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it."
-Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759
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CHAPTER 1: American economic democracy unrealized
1.1 Introduction
Observers of resurging privatist ideology and growing economic inequality in the
United States over the last forty years may be surprised to learn that by some measures,
American capitalism has become increasingly socialistic over time (Drucker, 1976). In The
Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels distinguished between the
bourgeoisie, or "the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production
and employers of wage labor," and "proletariat, the class of modern wage laborers who,
having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in
order to live" (Marx & Engels, 2006, p. 79). It so happened that around the time of Marx's
death in the 1880s, railroad, banking, and public-utility firms in the United States began to
issue employee pension plans as a form of deferred compensation paid to long-term
employees upon retirement. As industrial corporations reached unprecedented size and
complexity in the first decades of the 20th century, federal policy makers and courts
responded to popular pressures for business regulation. Among the results, the New Deal
institutionalized social security, complete with minimum retirement benefits for qualified
workers, while corporate tax policy incentivized the provision of supplemental retirement
benefits by offering tax deductions for employer contributions to qualified pension plans.
The birth of the first modern pension fund shortly came in the 1950s, when General
Motors' (GM's) CEO Charles Wilson proposed to the United Auto Workers (UAW) that
pension funds get invested in a diverse portfolio of common stocks beyond GM and
government securities for greater margins (Drucker, 1976). Over half a century after the
UAW agreement, workers' pension fund savings represent the single largest source of
capital in the world, accounting for about half of corporate shares traded on the New York
Stock Exchange (Blackburn, 2002; Fung, Hebb, & Rogers, 2001).
As radical as it may sound, the idea of "pension fund socialism" remains "an exercise
in political rhetoric rather than reality," as put concisely by economic geographer Gordon
Clark (Clark, 2000, p. 43). Proponents of "pension fund socialism" in the 1970s and
"investor capitalism" in the 1990s expressed hopeful optimism that public employee and
union controlled pension funds, by building bridges with mutual funds and other
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institutional investors, could play a significant role in shaping corporate decision-making to
become more publicly accountable. Not only did such an outcome fail to materialize,
private equity firms managed to gain control over public pension funds and put them to use
towards the enrichment of a minority of private financiers and their high profile clientele.
According to William Domhoff, between 1980 and 2007, pension fund investments by
private equity firms grew a thousand fold from $200 million to $200 billion (Domhoff,
2009). During this time, "many of the public pension funds themselves became money pots
for the biggest risk takers on Wall Street, who carried out hostile corporate takeovers and
corporate buyouts in the 1980s with their help, then bundled mortgages-including
subprime mortgages-into new kinds of 'securities' in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
which they sold to naYve pension fund managers caught up in the excitement of the housing
bubble" (Ibid.). Where private financiers received more than $17 billion from the nation's
ten largest pension funds between 2000 and 2009 (based on a 2 percent management fee
plus 20 percent of profits) (Anderson, 2010), paying off public officials, pension fund
managers and political operatives, and committing securities fraud appeared a small price
to pay for supernormal profits (Domhoff, 2009). As for the workers who paid into the
pension funds and thus absorbed the bulk of losses, many postponed retirement and took
up second jobs, while the less fortunate swelled the ranks of the unemployed.
How might we understand and resolve the gap between the democratic,
transformative potential inherent in worker control of corporations through pension fund
investment and the reality whereby American workers see the dissolution of their hard
earned retirement savings at the hands of pension fund managers and private financiers?
Perhaps we can cull lessons from the ongoing project of political democracy in America.
American political theorists have argued that the creation of the U. S. Constitution in 1789
served as a foundational piece for American democracy but by no means guaranteed civil
liberties to the vast majority of the public (Alexander, 2008; Morone, 1998; Smith, 1999).
Universal white male suffrage only came about during the first half of the 19th century
through contestations of property qualifications for voting by the Jacksonian movement.
Likewise, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the passage of the 14th and 15th amendments
guaranteed African American civil and political rights. Rather, the transformation of racial
politics in America followed sustained efforts to build an independent Black civil society,
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which encompassed the establishment of African American religious institutions by slaves
and free blacks, abolitionist movements in Western Europe and the Americas, the launch of
the Niagara Movement by W.E.B. DuBois and William M. Trotter as a challenge to Booker T.
Washington's ideals of accommodation, the subsequent founding of independent African
American organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), National Urban League, and Universal Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA), and 20th century movements for global anticolonialism, civil rights, and Black
power. In turn, the abolitionist movement inspired the early movement for Women's
Suffrage, while the civil rights movement spun off a series of modern movements for equal
rights and recognition, ranging from the feminist and gay liberation movements of the late
1960s to the present day immigrant youth movement. In other words, iterative attempts at
grassroots organizing, mass mobilization, and public discourse and debate-or continual
social practice-led to an alternative political formation. Likewise, active intervention on
the part of knowledgeable, organized, and politically efficacious civil society actors might
prove the essential ingredient to achieving democratic control and accountability of
capitalist markets.
This dissertation explores the practical challenges and opportunities presented by
race in activating civil society in the service of economic democracy by which I mean a
"recipe for collective problem solving" in the economic sphere as opposed to a contest for
influence on matters of economic policy or a deliberative, participatory process in and of
itself (Briggs, 2008; Dewey, [1927]1954).1 Focusing on the emerging energy efficiency
sector and the green economy more generally within the context of the contemporary
American city, I use two critical and emblematic cases to investigate the process by which
civil society, as a "third sector" or realm of voluntary association distinct from the state and
the market, might launch alternative modes of economic action and local economic
development that challenge the hegemonic neoclassical paradigm. In particular, I am
interested in the variable of race, along with its relation to space, as it manages the tensions
and contradictions internal to market democracy at the local level but also carries the
1 So it's about drilling down to the deep dilemmas at the intersection of markets and democratic society and
working from there so that we not only raise the bottom but regenerate the entire system, in part by
approaching it with different sets of eyes and combining collective resources and capacities.
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potential to serve as a diagnostic, dialogic, and democratic power building mechanism in
doing so. Hence the dissertation examines how the progressive coalitions at the center of
my cases studies are incorporating the perspectives of inner city communities of color with
other available resources in planning their respective community-based green economic
development initiatives along with some of the dilemmas that surface in the process of
implementation. At the descriptive level, my cases demonstrate the limits of neoclassical
economic theory along with its premises of rational choice theory and methodological
individualism in explaining observed modes of economic action and local economic
development. I incorporate insights from recent multidisciplinary studies on cooperative
human behavior along with pragmatist action theory in posing an alternative analytical
framework for explaining economic action. At the substantive and normative level, my
findings indicate that creating inclusive, transparent, but also flexible spaces for critical
reflection and dialogic exchange are essential to building strong coalitions and forging
policy visions that get at the core of urban economic problems and form the stuff of
economic democracy. Where economic democracy is a perpetual process of becoming, it
entails actors balancing the use of external resources with principles of self-determination
and the achievement of project deliverables with leadership development and movement
building goals.
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the dissertation beginning with
a discussion of the relationship between civil society and democracy and the growing
attention among planning scholars to the idea of building progressive civil society capacity
at the local level to further economic democracy. In part situating this position vis-a-vis
previous thinking on economic democracy, the next section discusses the rise and fall of the
"postcapitalist vision," which previously dominated social liberal thought on the evolving
nature of economic and social organization and reformist policy for over five decades
during the 20th century. I attend to the former's extrication of "the social" from the
economic sphere and neglect of the political economic as well as cultural-ideological
dimensions of race, which in turn sowed its susceptibility to changing economic and
political fortunes in the late 1960s. Following, I trace the rising influence of neoclassical
economic theory in planning along with political economic critiques. In contemplating the
shortage of planning accounts in which civil society actors drive prescriptive economic
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policies and programs, I overview broader economic trends along with the trajectory of
urban policy and local economic development programs since the 1970s. I also discuss the
rise of urban social movements culminating in the passage of the Stimulus Act of 2009 and
the emergence of the green economy. In considering how civil society actors might use
energy efficiency or green economic and workforce development more generally to
develop a clearer and deeper understanding of the nature of the modern economy and
their implication in it along with an alternative vision and impulse for transformative
action, I next discuss the role of cities and the issue of race. Moving on to critique
majoritarian and universalistic planning approaches to the problem of race in relation to
the project of economic democracy, I borrow from DuBois' notion of double consciousness
and Bakhtin's formulations on dialogic exchange to propose an alternative theory of local
economic development. The final section presents an overview of the remaining chapters.
1.2 Theoretical framework
1.2.1 An economic conception of civil society
Originating with Hegel but only entering mainstream American political discourse
from the late 1980s with the rise of democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe,
the concept of civil society has given rise to varying definitions and forms at the employ of
both the American right and the left. Right of center thinkers and libertarians interpret civil
society as "a mandate to deconstruct many of the powers of the State and replace them
with intermediary institutions based on social voluntarism," while social liberals tend to
see civil society, at times mobilized as social movements, as playing a reformist or
complementary role with respect to the state (Seligman, 2001, p. 13). Regardless of the
political ends, American political philosopher Michael Walzer associates civil society with
innovative tendencies, given "the associational world is a kind of 'home' for oppositional
tendencies and a guarantee that there will always be alternatives to any political
establishment" (Walzer, 2001, p. 39). Specifically reflecting on the democratizing effects of
associational life, he writes, "No significant move toward greater equality has ever been
made without state action, but states do not act in egalitarian ways unless they are pressed
to do so by mobilizations that can take place only in civil society-and that already
represent a move toward greater equality" (Ibid.: 43). Elsewhere, a long line of social
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commentators and scholars extending from Alexis de Tocqueville to Robert Putnam have
discussed the different ways in which associational life can further democracy (Cohen and
Rogers, 1995; Putnam, 2001; Rosenblum, 2000; Skocpol, 1997; Warren, 2000). At the
individual level, associational life may enhance one's sense of political agency or efficacy
and access to information as well as instill political skills, capacities for deliberative
judgment, and civic virtues. With respect to the public sphere, associations may provide the
social infrastructure of public communication and deliberation as well as provide voice to
minorities and underscore common humanity and shared human risks among otherwise
disparate groups. Finally, associations may contribute to the democratic functioning of
institutions of governance by providing broader representation, organizing political
processes, facilitating cooperation, enabling pressure and resistance, and serving as
alternative venues for governance.
Reflecting on the problem of growing economic inequality in America and the threat
posed to democracy (Hacker & Pierson, 2011), a number of planning scholars have put
forth the idea of building progressive civil society capacity in the economic sphere to
broaden stakeholder control and accountability of capitalist markets (Alperovitz, 2011a,
2011b; Alperovitz & Daly, 2009; Fainstein, 2000; Fainstein, 2011; Gendron & Domhoff,
2008; Imbroscio, 2010; Sayer & Walker, 1992; Williamson, Imbroscio, & Alperovitz, 2003).
Political economist and activist Gar Alperovitz argues that policy innovations like social
security and worker pension funds are necessary but insufficient conditions for greater
economic democracy (Alperovitz, 2011a, 2011b; Alperovitz & Daly, 2009; Williamson et al.,
2003). Boldly asserting, "one thing is certain: traditional liberalism dependent on
expensive federal policies and strong labor unions is moribund," he advocates a "non
statist, community building, institution changing, democratizing strategy" (Alperovitz,
2011a, pp. 63-64). While contemplating future directions for progressive coalitions of civic
groups, businesses, and other stakeholders in The Leftmost City, urban growth coalition
theorists Richard Gendron and William Domhoff speculate, "It may be that markets could
be reconstructed by a progressive coalition to make it possible to plan for a more
cooperative and egalitarian economic future" (Gendron & Domhoff, 2008, p. 211). Susan
Fainstein also problematizes the privatist or neoliberal local economic development model
while identifying the market as an arena for progressive civil society actors and their allies
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to build out alternatives. Exclaiming, "the left must find ways of tapping into their economic
power rather than dismissing them on moral grounds," she identifies employee-owned
firms, new kinds of credit institutions, and innovative public-private partnerships as
potential vehicles (Fainstein, 1996, pp. 119-120).2 Meanwhile actual empirical accounts of
progressive coalitions spearheading the task of framing and carrying out prescriptive
economic programs, complete with alternative modes of production and exchange, have
sparsely materialized.
1.2.2 The rise and fall of the postcapitalist vision
The novelty and significance of this position becomes clearer when placed in
juxtaposition to what historian Howard Brick refers to as "the postcapitalist vision," which
dominated social liberal thinking on the evolving nature of economic and social
organization as well as reformist policy from the 1910s through the early 1970s (Brick,
2006). Writing in a time of growing corporate consolidation, bureaucratic administration,
and technological change as well as government intervention in the economy ranging from
wartime production to Keynesian growth policy, many of the postcapitalist visionaries
rejected the salience of capitalism as a conceptual category characterizing contemporary
Western societies and their logic of development (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Parsons, 1949,
1951; Riesman, 1952, 1963). Where they offered policy prescriptions for economic reform,
whether to promote balance and continuity (Collins, 1981; Keynes, 1937; Samuelson,
1955) or facilitate democratic transformation (Arrow, 1950), the actual results frequently
entailed higher-level state action such as infrastructure investment, social welfare
spending, income redistribution, and regulation of oligopolies. As for the question of
building the scope and capacity of civil society, the postcapitalist vision tended to separate
out and deemphasize the economy as a sphere for action relative to social and cultural
arenas of modern life (Brick, 2006, p. 154). Buoyed by the sense of postwar material
abundance and economic prosperity, Talcott Parsons and his colleagues at Harvard
advocated a "shift away from economics" in favor of new social sciences including social
2 In addition, she highlights the need for "progressive local forces" to attend to the national context, including
ideological, institutional, and fiscal factors in driving institutional transformation at the local level (Fainstein,
1996, pp. 119-120).
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psychology and cultural anthropology attending to issues of social roles, deviance, and
control (Parsons et al., 1951). At the University of Chicago, sociologist David Riesman
explored topics at the nexus of personality and culture, advocating recreational resources
and leisure to relinquish vanity and conformity in an age of mass production and
automation (Riesman, 1952, 1963).
Contemporaneously, Black radical thinkers such as C.L.R. James and W.E.B. DuBois
embraced an alternative approach to economic and social transformation that departed
from the majoritarian, universalist, and reformist perspectives of the postcapitalist
visionaries in combining race, class, and nation-based analyses (DuBois, [1935]1999;
James, [1938]2001; Kelley, 1996a; Robinson, 2000). For midcentury scholars such as
Talcott Parsons viewing the capitalist political economy from a majoritarian perspective,
statism and managerial authority rather than civil society engagement in economic matters
might have appeared an ideal recourse for stabilizing and governing the economy,
particularly in light of unparalleled economic growth and rates of scientific and
technological progress from the 1940s. On the other hand, Black experiences of capitalism
were more likely to embody the more coercive and contradictory dimensions, including the
state's implication in systems of slavery and peonage and other violent suppressions of
labor as well as capital's global tendency and predilection for entrenched postcolonial
orders (Jones, 1998; Marable, 2000). Accordingly, Black civil society became the primary
vehicle for economic betterment and racial uplift, with efforts to ameliorate economic
oppression surpassing the bounds of the workplace to additionally permeate issues of
health care, social security, housing markets, and access to capital and education. Hence the
postcapitalist visions of C.L.R. James and W.E.B. DuBois centered on students, intellectuals,
trade unionists, and political activists from Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, and the United
States building a global movement against racial capitalism and worker exploitation
(Eschen, 1997). While placing Black experiences, spanning multiple continents and
variants of capitalist production alongside intra-class enmities on the part of white workers
17
at the center of labor and economic history, they saw class conscious, multiracial alliances
as key to challenging capitalist domination and fending off regressive political forces. 3
Where many of the postcapitalist visionaries arrived in the United States during the
1930s and 1940s to escape Nazism and other perilous outcomes of mass mobilization in
Germany and Russia, they failed to embrace movements for racial equality and justice
beyond a moralistic basis (Brick, 2006). Thus for all the optimism of the postcapitalist
vision, the ensuing policy of corporate liberalism that came to dominate American
economic life into the 1960s unfolded along racially stratified foundations, ultimately to the
benefit of conservative reactionaries and oligopolistic interests. While maintaining a
majority status for all but four years between 1933 and 1969, the Democratic Party
succumbed to political wrangling by Southern congressmen to disproportionately exclude
African Americans from accessing New Deal and Fair Deal benefits (Farhang & Katznelson,
2005; Katznelson, 2005).4 Shortly thereafter, capital migrated from traditional American
industrial centers in the Northeast and Midwest to the South, enticed by the low wages and
lack of worker protections. As the civil rights movement made national headway from the
late 1950s, leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. directly appealed to the AFL-CIO to forge a
unified movement for economic justice; in response, AFL-CIO president George Meany
committed to a series of token policies and programs while continuing to prioritize bread
and butter issues (Frymer, 2008; Jackson & King, 2007). At the same time, the
consolidation of black voting strength through mass migration out of the South and civil
rights organizing helped secure the passage of civil rights legislation along with Great
Society social reforms. Where encroaching deindustrialization and economic stagnation
3 Offering Black Reconstruction in America (1935) as a cautionary tale, DuBois wrote about a revolutionary
period in the history of world capitalism in which the black proletariat fought for their freedom as well as
social rights for the broader American working class to encounter resistance from white reactionary forces
(Ferrucio, 1983). Applying Marxian analysis on critical and independent terms that incorporated an
international, postcolonial perspective (Robinson, 2000), he connected the exploitation of "that dark and vast
sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas, and all Africa [and] in the West Indies and Central
America and in the United States" with that of white workers, whose limited conceptions of "the social"
alienated them from their colored counterparts as to enhance their vulnerability to capitalists (DuBois, 1935:
15).
4 The Democratic Party struck a deal with its Southern congressmen whereby agricultural workers and
maids-occupational categories in which African Americans were disproportionately represented-were
excluded from New Deal social legislation; in the postwar years, Fair Deal social welfare provisions such as
veterans' benefits and cash assistance to the poor became administered through state and local channels as to
uphold racial mores (Farhang & Katznelson, 2005; Katznelson, 2005).
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threatened the ever-fragile privileges of the white working class, the gains of the civil rights
movement bred resentment and violent resistance. Translating the racial biases of the
white majority into ammunition, the burgeoning conservative movement won back
Congress and used racial politics to manufacture a "welfare crisis" that contested the
government's role in remedial social provision (Cowie, 2011; McGirr, 2001; Phillips-Fein,
2009; Stein, 2010). As successive waves of recession simultaneously brought soaring
unemployment and inflation in the early 1970s to test the limits of Keynesian
macroeconomic policy, conservative free market forces seized the opportunity to displace
the managed economy with a tightened monetary supply and dismantled New Deal
institutions and norms (Frymer, 2008; Levy & Temin, 2007). In sum, mid century social
liberalism missed the great opportunity of building a multi-racial movement for economic
democracy.
1.2.3. Neoclassical economic theory and planning
Four decades later, conventional economic thinking remains captive to a
neoclassical consensus that limits state intervention in the area of constructive social and
economic policy as well as considerations of how to build civil society capacity in the
economic realm to further democracy (Beckert, 2002; Foley, 2008; Harvey, 2007). Writing
at the turn of the century when classical political economy, concerned with issues of power,
change, and evolution, retained a hegemonic status with respect to economic thinking,
Thorstein Veblen coined the term "neoclassical economics" to refer to efforts by
"marginalists" like Alfred Marshall to use mathematics and deductive reasoning "to remove
the question of morality altogether from economic life, [the latter represented] as governed
by objective laws which we have no choice but to follow exactly in our 'freedom of choice"'
(Foley, 2008, p. 158). Over a century later, neoclassical doctrine dominates both the
economic discipline and policy thinking. Among its core elements, rational choice theory
asserts that actors choose courses of action that best allow them to maximize utility or
profits (Beckert, 2002); in other words, homo economicus is a self interested, outcome-
driven individual with set preferences that he himself is aware of. In turn, the
accompanying notion of the invisible hand postulates that unencumbered competition or
exchange among self-interested individuals leads to socially optimal outcomes. In short, the
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private sector is the primary actor in the economic sphere, while the role of government is
to facilitate private capital accumulation by property owners and entrepreneurs. Finally,
the axiom of methodological individualism posits, "all social phenomena-their structure
and their change-are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals-their
properties, goals, beliefs, and actions" (Elster, 1985, p. 5). Accordingly, society-civil or
otherwise-is but a nominal aggregate of individuals.
According to urban historian Sam Bass Warner, the salience of liberal capitalism as
an American cultural ideology is nothing new; while by no means the only cultural tradition
in the country, distinctly American, or internally consistent when translated into practice,
laissez faire has persistently influenced the mode of city building and living in the United
States since the Revolutionary era (Warner, 1987). Warner coined the term "privatism" in
the economic boom years of the 1960s as a sort of warning signal about the unstated
cultural consensus increasingly governing urban constructions and remaking in the United
States. Despite continuing shifts in content (e.g. accommodation of greater state
intervention in social and economic policy during the New Deal and postwar eras), the
essence of privatism:
lay in its concentration upon the individual and the individual's search for wealth.
Psychologically, privatism meant that the individual should seek happiness in personal
independence and in the search for wealth; socially, privatism meant that the
individual should see his first loyalty as his immediate family, and that a community
should be a union of such moneymaking, accumulating families; politically, privatism
meant that the community should keep the peace among individual money-makers
and, if possible, help to create an open and thriving setting where each citizen would
have some substantial opportunity to prosper (Warner, 1987, pp. 3-4).
The re-labeling of liberal capitalism as such served to draw a distinction between "the
totality of an urban society" and the market, the author problematizing the encroachment
of economistic thinking upon the former while taking capitalistic markets as a point of
departure. Where as Warner focused on historical developments before the Great
Depression and New Deal, a new generation of planning scholars writing amidst the rising
tide of conservatism in American culture and electoral politics in the 1980s found
increasing salience of the privatism concept (Barnekov, Boyle, & Rich, 1989; Eisinger, 1988;
Frug, 2001; Levine, 1987, 1989; Squires, 1996). The prevalence of inter-local competition
and public-private partnerships amidst economic restructuring and deepening federal
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retrenchment from urban affairs further imbued the notion of privatism with fresh
meaning and significance.
Amidst the resurgence of privatistic urban policy and local economic development,
Paul Peterson extended the premises of neoclassical economics into the realm of public
management to advance public choice theory in his 1981 book, City Limits, which quickly
became a modern day classic. In Peterson's view, the circumstances of capital mobility and
inter-spatial competition confronting cities limit local political choice to the single option of
pursuing developmental policy. Given cities need to maintain an economic base in order to
deliver municipal services, keep up municipal infrastructure, and meet the needs of
citizens, the interest of the city are best promoted through the pursuit of growth policy
(Peterson, 1981, p. 147). Where developmental policies are assumed to attract residents
and capital investment, redistributive ones presumably raise the costs of doing business
through progressive tax policies. In other words, local competition over capital investment
is akin to an unfettered market where actors try to maximize their benefits and minimize
their costs, thus locating businesses based on the best tax-to-services ratio. Besides
denying the significance of local politics in shaping urban policy, Peterson also narrows the
conception of local economic development to place ultimate value on real estate
investments as a means to generate property and income tax dollars and multiplier effects,
given his definition of the public interest in terms of aggregate wealth figures. Further, he
upholds a clear division of labor where the private sector is the primary actor, the city
courts and responds to the demands of capital, and residents consume services and
commodities including real estate.5
Inserting a political economy perspective, Marxian urbanists, growth coalition
theorists, and urban regime theorists have contested public choice theory's conflict-free
story of local economic development, primarily by highlighting collective struggles over
urban land use. In extending the capital-labor conflict dichotomy into urban contexts,
Marxist urban scholars have typically focused on the clash growing out of capitalist
interests to promote the exchange value of real estate and working class dependence on
s Perhaps more significantly, in focusing singularly on the status quo and propelling an economic determinist
argument, he fails to consider whether what cities actually do in the name of development policy actually
work as well as the possibility that alternative economic development policies may generate economic
vitality in cities (Elkin, 1987; Imbroscio, 2010; Sanders & Stone, 1987).
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the same places to satisfy the essential needs of life (Castells, 1979a, 1979b; Harvey, 1973,
1985, 2012; Lefebvre, 1992). On the other hand, growth coalition theorists tend to draw
urban battle lines between pro-growth interests including the real estate industry, building
trade unions, local business owners, and utility companies (as opposed to a monolithic
capitalist class) and neighborhood-based used value coalitions, also cutting across class
(Clavel, 2010; Friedland, 1983; Gendron & Domhoff, 2008; Logan & Molotch, 2007;
Mollenkopf, 1983). Whereas the latter avoids the economic determinism of the former,
both theories still subscribe to the rational actor model in attributing fixed preferences to
various stakeholders. In contrast, regime theorists define actors less by their willingness to
do battle over the distribution of costs and benefits of urban redevelopment and more in
terms of the practical concerns that bring them to create and maintain cooperative
arrangements with others (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Stone & Clarence, 1987, 1993). While
this leaves room for civil society actors to comprise the private side of the public-private
partnership (Stone, 1993; Thompson, 2011), the literature "remains deeply grounded in
philosophical liberalism," as to treat "the market (or economic) side of the division as a
given" (Imbroscio, 2010, p. 35). Nevertheless, the above perspectives highlight the role of
cities in struggles against global capitalism and the role of planning in bringing civil society
groups into the process of city making on the basis of shared territorial or spatial
commitments.
1.2.4. From privatist urban policy and local economic development to the green economy
Perhaps the relative shortage of planning accounts in which civil society actors drive
prescriptive economic policies and programs results from a shortage of opportunities
facing civic and community organizations over the past several decades. In the aftermath of
Keynesianism and the postwar economic boom, urban policy and local economic
development in American cities took a turn that appeared inhospitable to their
engagement. As the intensified global flow of capital, goods, and services exacerbated the
mass relocation of manufacturing production from historic American industrial centers to
more peripheral areas from the late 1960s, state and local governments struggled to
maintain an integral position in the evolving global economy (Porter, 1998; Sassen, 2001;
Scott, 1997). By the 1990s, a growing trend among both existing and aspiring "global cities"
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was to undertake processes of spatial reorganization to promote transition towards
corporate command and control services, high tech industries, and cultural and creative
activities. In the so-called new era of "hypermobile capital," the process of urban remaking,
as it unfolded in the United States, entailed inter-jurisdictional competition and place
marketing (Bennett & Spirou, 2006; Brenner et al., 2010; Eisinger, 1988; Hackworth &
Moriah, 2006; Markusen, 2007). To enhance their respective competitive advantages in
attracting private sector investment, local governments commonly turned to tax
abatements, public subsidies, and other incentives (Barnekov et al., 1989; Squires, 1996).
Discussing the evolving capacities of civil society in American urban areas, Robert
Putnam's Bowling Alone (2000) laments the "civic malaise" that has overcome Americans at
the end of the 20th century in the face of growing diversity. On the other hand, critics such
as Barbara Arneil have put forth an alternative story of progressive social change on the
part of women and racial minorities marginalized by America's civic past (Arneil, 2006).
Earlier, I touched on how New Deal and Postwar policies facilitated racially differential
access to home ownership, good jobs, and college education (Katznelson, 2005; Oliver &
Shapiro, 1995). In addition, federally subsidized urban renewal, highway and road
construction, and suburbanization of housing, commerce, and industry exacerbated racial
segregation and inequality. While the white working class made a mass transition into
postwar suburban living, complete with Putnam's venerated bowling leagues, the inner city
became home to a disproportionate number of low-income communities of color and other
historically marginalized populations (Jackson, 1985). At the same time, the civil rights and
black power movements helped confer upon urban minority communities some degree of
electoral and political power, democratic consciousness, and organizing repertoires.
Moreover, the civil rights movement touched off immigration reform, which brought the
arrival of new immigrant groups, including from Latin America, often with organizing and
political experience from their countries of departure. It further inspired the birth of
modern environmentalism complete with urban movements for sustainability and
environmental justice (Gelobter et al. 2005). While sustainability became institutionalized
within public policies and bureaucratic structures in the first decade of the 21st century, the
environmental justice movement seeded the emergence of a green collar jobs movement
around 2005, which inserted a racial justice frame into the proliferating public discourse
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on "green jobs" (Jones, 1998; Pinderhughes, 2004, 2006). Referring to workforce
opportunities arising from preserving or restoring environmental quality, green jobs had
previously fallen under the domain of labor-environmental coalitions.
Amidst the deepening economic recession, President Barack Obama signed the $787
billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 into law, complete with funding
for energy efficiency programs, renewable energy technology, public transportation
projects, and green workforce training. The Stimulus Act offered local governments grants,
loans, and other financial incentive programs to explore more place-based, sustainable
economic development strategies. It additionally included provisions that expanded
opportunities for civic and community organizations to engage in the planning and
implementation of local policies and programs (Fine, 2011), a direct result of organizing
and lobbying by community-labor-environmental coalitions. Such provisions helped
promote social inclusion and public accountability in addition to addressing challenges
specific to emerging sectors in the green economy. For instance, in the case of building
energy efficiency retrofits, less than 1 percent of utility customers adopt efficiency
measures (Michaels et al., 2010), partly due to high transaction costs, information barriers,
financing challenges, and split incentives (Jay et al., 2009). The barriers only compound at
the aggregate level as to require significant planning and coordination for executing
building energy efficiency retrofits at neighborhood or city scale.6 Beyond uneven public
awareness about energy efficiency programs and uncertainty about the exact savings
flowing from energy efficiency measures, hiring and training a local workforce that can
skillfully carry out the work of energy efficiency can prove an extra challenge, as can
coordinating materials supply chains (Fitzgerald, 2010). Moreover, energy efficiency
programs, particularly those receiving federal funding, need to find ways to be sustained
beyond the life of the Stimulus. Hence civil society groups with expertise in social
marketing, community mobilization, workforce development, community development,
innovative financing models, and other such areas offer tremendous value.
6 Industrial relations scholar David Weil has observed that the building energy efficiency production process
"does not lend itself easily to a cookie cutter approach," which in turn "makes gaining economies of scale
more difficult" (Weil, David, 2010, p. 10). In accordance, the private sector, acting on its own, has largely
failed to transcend the building-by-building approach even as market incentives have soared over the past
few years.
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1.2.5 The green economy and the question of economic democracy
With the help of Stimulus funding and state-level energy legislation, a growing
number of civic and community groups across the country have begun to confront the
overlapping economic, social, and environmental crises facing their communities through
energy efficiency planning. As observed by Daniel Villao and his colleagues at the California
Construction Careers Academy et al., 2012), in the process, "practitioners have also begun
to realize that there are many shades of green. Initiatives have largely focused on basic
weatherization. Yet these efforts have tended to generate short-term, temporary jobs
without making significant long-term environmental and economic impacts" (Villao et al.,
2012, p.2). According to urban planner Joan Fitzgerald, the transition to a clean energy
economy could create numerous well-paying jobs in areas such as building design and
construction, energy production and use, water supply and management, waste
management, land-use, transportation, and sustainable food systems, particularly in dense
urban areas (Fitzgerald, 2010). But to be clear, there is nothing inherent about the green
economy that lends itself to spinning off good jobs or regenerating ailing urban economies.
It falls upon progressive coalitions to strategically deploy collective assets and leverage the
Stimulus and other policy and funding opportunities, influence key decision makers, and
set up specific policy structures that reallocate resources and decision-making power (Fine,
2011). In short, if the aim is to additionally generate some degree of transformative
thinking and practical action that breaks with the prevailing mode of economic production
and exchange, the question is not simply whether civil society is engaging in energy
efficiency; in fact, it appears that more often than not, civic and community groups defer to
utility companies, energy auditors, contractors, and public agencies. The more significant
question is how they are connecting the planning and coordination of building energy
efficiency programs to broader efforts to transform capitalistic markets beginning with
privatistic urban policy and local economic development.
Referring back to the pervasiveness of the neoclassical economic worldview and the
dominance of privatism as an American urban tradition, the barriers confronting civil
society groups in undertaking community-based green economic development programs
might not only be structural or institutional but also cultural and ideological in the form of
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prevailing beliefs, expectations, and habits around the economy. Marx first used the term
"reification" to refer to instances where things or phenomena resulting from human action
are stripped of their relation to human action or political content to become reduced into
objects that are seemingly natural and inevitable (Marx, [1867]1992). The Hungarian
philosopher Georg Lukacs further refined the concept to define reification as arising where
"a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom
objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal
every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people" (Gottlieb, 2005, p. 64).
A Marxist humanist, he also suggested the potential for human activity to alter objects or
circumstances appearing as external reality where actors had knowledge of their direct
implication and were willing to act on it. What of rectifying the modern day reification of
the economy among civic and community groups? How might civil society actors use
energy efficiency or green economic development more generally to develop a clearer and
deeper understanding of the nature of the modern economy and their implication in it
along with an alternative vision and impulse for transformative action? What role might
cities play in such a process? Further, how might the issue of race relate to the task of
building a green economy and furthering economic democracy?
1.2.6 The role of cities
The traditional environmentalist focus on preserving or conserving wilderness
conditions and biodiversity translated into a bias against cities and urban living, casting
urbanization and the natural environment in a zero sum game. For instance, Sierra Club
founder John Muir "distinguished between the urban 'lowland' and the wilderness high
ground, which provided a kind of spiritual replenishment for daily life" (Gottlieb, 2005, p.
64). Founding figures of modern planning such as Lewis Mumford, Jane Addams, and
Patrick Geddes also eschewed the environmental hazards associated with the "industrial
city," including contaminated water supplies, waste dumping, and air pollution. Once
westward expansion and capitalist urbanization completely transfigured the American
landscape and suburban sprawl became the standard pattern of urban growth, planning
thought on the ecological implications of cities began to carry more positive overtones. In
his 2011 bestseller Triumph of the City, economist Edward Glaeser declares,
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If the environmental footprint of the average suburban home is a size 15 hiking boot,
the environmental footprint of a New York apartment is a stiletto heel size 6 Jimmy
Choo. Traditional cities have fewer carbon emissions because they don't require vast
amounts of driving... New York State's per capita energy consumption is next to last in
the country, which largely reflects public transit use in New York City (Glaeser, 2011,
p. 14).
In the realm of practice, the "green cities movement" has most recently harnessed and
activated such sustainable urban tendencies, with "thousands of urban areas around the
world all striving to lessen their environmental impacts by reducing waste, expanding
recycling, lowering emissions, increasing housing density while expanding open space, and
encouraging the development of sustainable local businesses" (Earthtalk, 2009).
Cities have likewise become central to workforce organizing strategies amidst
economic globalization, technological change, decentralization of production, and the rise
of flexible manufacturing (Fine, 2003). The classic "home-work divide" thesis that governs
thinking among American political scientists on the historic separation between politics of
work and community in the United States largely confines economic and labor market
organizing to the workplace (Katznelson, 1982). In City Trenches (1982), Ira Katznelson
provides the example of blue-collar workers in South Chicago who might have been
militant laborites within the walls of the steel plants where they worked but then came
home to subordinate their class identity to the politics of ethnicity, Democratic Party
patronage, and services. Of course, for workers of color who were disproportionately
excluded from unions along with New Deal and postwar housing, welfare, education, and
other "social" policy carrying deeply economic implications, experiences of economic
oppression transcended the home-work divide as did their oppositional struggles.
Katznelson's account also leaves out the ways in which white supremacy, a political
construct, cut across the home and the workplace-for whites as well as blacks. Focusing
on more recent decades, Janice Fine argues that the proliferation of community unions
beginning in the 1980s bridged the traditional work/home divide in organizing workers
around class and ethnicity both at their workplaces and in their communities (Fine, 2003).
The tendency among low wage service sectors (e.g. janitorial work) to scatter work sites
throughout the city and incorporate layers of absentee owners, subcontractors, and
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managers have rendered more conventional shop floor organizing approaches targeted at
single employers less effective. Hence community unions are "more inclined to rely upon
local community organizing and coalition building with organizational allies to pressure
employers as well as upon passing local living wage and other pieces of legislation that
compel employers to make improvements" (Fine, 2003, p. 25). Successful demonstrations
of the approach include the movement for living wages, which has enacted policies to raise
low wages in over 100 localities in the United States (Freeman, 2005), along with the SEIU
Justice for Janitor campaign, which has grown to encompass 225,000 janitors in almost 30
cities in the United States and four cities in Canada (Erickson et al., 2002).
Lying at the nexus of the green cities movement and community unionism-type
approaches to local economic reform and development, the green collar jobs movement
has placed cities at the center of an alternative economic development paradigm. As in the
case of community unionism, it responds to broader economic changes by broadening its
focus from the level of the firm to territorial or spatial units of economic production such as
neighborhoods, localities, and regions. Moreover, the spatially dispersed nature of
economic production in urban space elicits the involvement of a broader base of
stakeholders including civil society actors and local government; it also translates into
opportunities for community organizing and coalition building as well as policy and
planning processes to shape markets and employment arrangements, particularly in the
nascent stage of development with respect to clean energy sectors. Therefore, where
community unionism is reactive in its aim to ameliorate negative economic conditions such
as low wages and poor working conditions, the green collar jobs movement is more
prescriptive in framing and carrying out alternative economic programs. Cities again play a
critical role in that process by facilitating an empirically-based understanding and critique
of the prevailing mode of capitalist economic development. For example, the pervasive
phenomenon of "throwaway" cities, complete with sunk private and public investments in
infrastructure, housing, commercial buildings, education, utilities, and other public goods
along with increased poverty, unemployment, and related social problems (Williamson et
al., 2003), stands testament to the negative repercussions of global capitalism on
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communities. At the same time, the pressing nature of urban problems generates an
impulse to find creative solutions.7
1.2.7 The variable of race
To the extent the development of the green economy (as well as sustainability policy
more generally) is based in cities, it will inevitably unfold in a racialized metropolitan
landscape and labor market, meaning one where actors are differentiated on the basis of
racial categories or groupings. Historically, racial divisions fueled suburbanization and
urban disinvestment, not only through New Deal and Fair Deal policies, but also in the form
of "white flight" from growing minority presence and deteriorating public infrastructures
in cities. More recently, urban revitalization projects and changing lifestyle preferences
have brought white professionals and other members of the middle class back into
downtown areas, but often at the cost of gentrification and displacement. Despite some
trends of suburbanization, African Americans and Latinos remain largely segregated in
impoverished, declining inner cities and inner ring suburbs, where career paths too
frequently begin with failing schools and lead to low paying, dead end jobs (Dreier et al.,
2004; Fishman, 2000; Goldsmith et al., 2010; Squires, 2002; Thompson, 2008). Such spatial
patterns of racial stratification raise troubling questions for green economic development
efforts aimed at promoting environmental, economic, and social sustainability (Thompson,
2011). In the energy efficiency sector, the standard approach of offering consumer rebates
for efficiency measures disadvantages low-income minority households, which lack the
necessary upfront capital and live in older, substandard housing requiring basic
improvements even before energy retrofits. Moreover, the engagement of the building and
construction trades on the employment and workforce development side of energy
efficiency touches off uneasy feelings on the part of minority communities in light of their
historical experiences of exclusion and continuing challenges in meeting union pre-
apprenticeship standards given the poor quality of urban public schools.
7 Hence some municipalities and civic coalitions have adopted strategies for urban regeneration and job
creation that harness a fuller spectrum of talent, capital, and other assets at their disposal to create dense,
interlocking networks of industries and firms at the local or regional level as once envisioned by the likes of
E.F. Schumacher and Jane Jacob (Jacobs, 1970, 1985; Schumacher, [1973]2010).
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Thus, the variable of race allows us to see that the expansion of the energy efficiency
sector, if proceeding as is, might actually undermine social and economic sustainability, as
the uneven distribution of cost savings and green jobs combines with rising energy costs to
exacerbate existing conditions of "intra-generational inequity." It further suggests the
difficulty of achieving environmental sustainability so long as communities of color find no
reason to join the cause of carbon reduction and fighting climate change. Beyond the
contribution that minority communities can make through implementing energy efficiency
measures, changing their consumptive behavior, and joining the green workforce, political
support is essential to enacting environmental legislation and ensuring their enforcement,
especially given demographic trends (according to the US Census, minority babies are now
the majority in the US and non Hispanic whites will be outnumbered by 2042). As an
illustration, the Tea Party movement and other conservative groups, in continuing to
mobilize against government taxes, spending, and regulation, blocked passage of the 2010
Homestar Energy Retrofit Act, which would have created a nationwide energy efficiency
rebate program had it won the senate vote (one can imagine how the Homestar program
might have formed the backbone for a more comprehensive approach to energy efficiency).
In sum, we discussed earlier how the implication of cities in green economic development
as envisioned by the green collar jobs movement allows us to imagine more participatory
modes of planning and governance and generates a practical impulse to find new strategies
for urban regeneration and job creation. In turn, the condition of racial stratification at the
heart of contemporary urban formations in the United States provides a glimpse into the
sticky challenges that confront planners and others aiming to connect the planning and
coordination of building energy efficiency programs to broader social and economic
transformation.
To clarify, when we refer to racial problems or racism, we are not speaking of the
old fashioned variety based in the Jim Crow social order and characterized by overt bigotry,
demands for strict segregation, advocacy of government mandated discrimination, and
adherence to the belief that blacks are the categorical intellectual inferiors of whites (Bobo
et al., 1997). Simply focusing on the prejudicial attitudes and intentional, overtly
discriminatory behavior on the part of white individuals or persistence of formal
segregation and discrimination in schools, housing, and other aspects of modern life might
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reveal racism to be in decline in the United States (Schuman et al. 1985; Sears 1988). My
contradictory assessment is based on a structural interpretation of racism that attends to
the "dynamics of economic and social institutions through which racialized groups become
systematically marginalized or excluded" (Stavenhagen, 1999, p. 9). For all the gains of the
civil rights and black power movements, the combined effect of economic globalization,
economic and political restructuring, exclusionary practices by the real estate sector, failing
inner city schools, mass incarceration, and other contextual factors have perpetuated a
unique and fundamental position of cumulative Black disadvantage, complete with
enormous employment differentials, earnings inequalities, wealth disparities, and hyper-
segregation (Bobo et al., 1997; Mullings, 2005). Simultaneously, a new free market or
"laissez faire racism" has heightened "persistent negative stereotyping of African
Americans, a tendency to blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in
socioeconomic standing, and resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate
America's racist social conditions and institutions" (Bobo et al., 1997). In responding to a
prevailing rhetoric of "color-blindness," which claims the end of racism and perverts civil
rights discourse to thwart affirmative action and the like, I take seriously structural,
historical, and ideational dimensions of contemporary racism in accounting for forces and
processes underlying its reproduction and eradication.
1.2.8 Planning theories on race and economic democracy
This brings us to the question of how planners might approach the problem of race
in relation to the project of economic democracy. As far as the dominant planning
perspective on the more general topic of building civil society to strengthen economic
democracy, it tends to downplay the significance of race in assuming a majoritarian
approach (Dahl, 1986; Fainstein, 2011; Putnam, 2001; Skocpol, 2003). For instance, the
pluralist planner Robert Dahl conceptualizes economic democracy as "a system of
economic enterprises collectively owned and democratically governed by all the people
who work in them," his premise being that ownership and control of economic enterprises
is "the most egregious source of political inequality" (Dahl, 1986, p. 91). Dahl notes that
race may have been the greatest source of political inequality among Americans in the
century following the Civil War but assures that what had once appeared to be an
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"unchangeable system of political, social, and economic inequality was transformed
through public policies" (Ibid., p. 54). In terms of the disparities that remain, he largely
attributes them to broader economic inequalities and prescribes worker-owned and
worker-controlled enterprise as the key mechanism for redress. Likewise, Susan Fainstein
designates coalitions based on "distribution" and "broadly appealing benefits" as ideal
vehicles for social and economic justice in The Just City (2011). In her view, race is a
"political formula [that] gives rise to demands for language autonomy and acknowledgment
of particular customs such as holiday celebrations or styles of communication" (Fainstein,
2011, p. 42). Depicted this way-which is to say, stripped of its economic content-race is
a secondary issue that may have cultural and political significance but is essentially a
divisive mechanism that stymies the more important economic programs of class-based
movements. In short, Dahl and Fainstein start with the lowest common denominator of
material conditions while trying to downplay racial differences as a legacy of the past and a
secondary factor in the movement toward economic democracy.
On the other hand, planning scholars like J. Phillip Thompson have questioned the
possibility of engaging civic and community groups to promote economic democracy
without directly confronting the problem of race in American cities. In "The Politics of
Implementation" (2011), he argues firstly that for African Americans, economic oppression
has been as much about race as it has been about class, whether in terms of slavery and Jim
Crow; unequal access to social welfare programs, public education, worker protections,
housing, and business loans; the systematic destruction of vibrant black neighborhoods
and commercial districts through urban renewal; or discriminatory policies by employers
and unions (Marable, 2000). Therefore, "defining race as mainly about cultural status is a
category mistake that has political consequences" in dismissing the diversity and
complexity of experiences (Thompson, 2011, p. 14). Secondly, Thompson raises the
impossible challenge of identifying programs or institutions concerned with distributional
issues that do not grapple with rivalries or identity politics, given that group identities are
an essential part of humans as social beings. Rather than "put a veil over politics" (Ibid., p.
15), he suggests planners more carefully attend to race (along with its spatial
manifestations) in order to understand its role in managing the balance between capitalism
and democracy. In his words,
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No modern economic system can function without government. No government can
survive for long without 'the people.' The tension between degrading people in the
economy and uplifting people in democratic discourse is a profound challenge to
governance. It is in this realm that race has proved invaluable, and also that cities
have proved invaluable. Race allowsfor degradation of minorities, without provoking
a larger legitimacy crisis of democracy. Cities allow for the spatial concentration and
containment of degraded minorities (Thompson, 2008, p. 201).
Hence the above argument, harkening back to DuBois' point in Black Reconstruction in
America (1935), assigns low-income inner city communities of color a unique and integral
role in absorbing the tensions and contradictions internal to a market democracy as well as
facilitating the latter's potential unraveling and regeneration.
To further unpack this revelatory and transformative conception of race and
understand how planners might operationalize such a potential in the service of economic
democracy, we momentarily turn to the opening chapter of DuBois' The Souls of Black Folk
(1903). Here he introduces the notion of "double consciousness," a condition akin to being
confined in...
a world which yields [the bearer] no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself
through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of
measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.
One ever feels his two-ness- an American, a Negro; two warring souls, two thoughts,
two un-reconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois, [1903] 2012, p. 3).
On one hand, DuBois sees double consciousness as a sort of affliction that causes low self-
esteem, disappointment in others, and a "mocking distrust of everything white"; yet he also
associates the burden of "always looking at one's self through the eyes of others" with a
"second sight" into greater facets of the social world (Ibid., p. 2). Invoking the metaphor of
the veil, he differentiates between the view of African Americans and those of the white
majority, the latter being less self reflective or contextual by virtue of their power and
practical impertinence of taking the powerless into account. As interpreted by Manning
Marable: "for DuBois, the centrality of racism was not just a burden for nonwhites, but had
to be openly and unconditionally recognized by white progressives. It was only through the
development of an antiracist politics that the real material needs of all oppressed people
could be addressed. The fight for Black liberation is 'the realizing of democracy for all"'
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(Marable, 2000, p. 11). Therefore, in contrast to Dahl and Fainstein, DuBois treats race and
racism as a deeply "social" condition, meaning one that not only afflicts racially
subordinated groups but also inhibits the capacity of whites to fully comprehend their
social world and develop their various potentialities within it (by opposing a naturalistic
understanding of society as epitomized not only in racist conceptions of human nature but
also in reductionist accounts of human motivation central to neo-classical economics). In
addition, he delineates the outlines of an approach whereby the double consciousness of
"racial others" might enable critical reflection and dialogic exchange in multiracial contexts
as to help fortify progressive coalitions and direct their policy visions to address the
deepest problems hindering democratic society.
In The Miner's Canary, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres operationalize DuBois' notion
of double consciousness within the context of democratic practice. Comparing those who
are racially marginalized to a miner's canary whose "distress is the first sign of a danger
that threatens us all," they recommend the practice of "political race" to "build a movement
for social change informed by the canary's critique" (Guinier & Torres, 2003, pp. 11-12). To
Guinier and Torres, the perspective of racially marginalized groups is a diagnostic device
that reveals system-wide structures of power and inequality and thereby acts as a potential
catalyst for systemic change. In Double Trouble (2005), J. Phillip Thompson advances a
deep pluralist approach to renewing democratic politics that similarly begins with the most
marginalized groups in society. However he adds an extra layer in recognizing the
existence of strong differences and internal hierarchies within marginalized and oppressed
communities. Therefore he advocates going "deep" and working from the "inside out" in
forming interracial and interclass coalitions. In the contemporary American metropolitan
context, this might mean beginning with "unveiling painful internal oppressions and
exclusions within black politics for the purpose of increasing the black community's power
to compel similar unveiling in broader interracial politics" (Thompson, 2005, p. ix).
Another key point is that deep pluralism is a craft to be honed through repeated practice in
a variety of issue areas. While the account in Double Trouble mainly focuses on the arena of
electoral organizing and politics as related to black political candidates, Thompson's
framework applies more broadly to various civic initiatives that deal with substantive
issues affecting low-income families and communities.
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1.2.9 An alternative theory on race, civil society, and economic democracy
Extending DuBois' ideas about double consciousness into the economic arena, how
might we pose an alternative framework for theorizing civil society efforts towards
economic democracy? Again using Susan Fainstein's The Just City as a foil, we might
characterize her approach as universalistic in the sense that she devotes much of the
volume to distilling a set of abstract principles that can move cities closer to justice, namely
equity, diversity, and democracy. In part, she situates her work in contradistinction to the
procedural emphasis in planning theory (e.g. John Forester's deliberative planning model
and Paul Davidoff's advocacy planning model), which pays insufficient attention to the
reality of structural inequality and hierarchies of power as to provide a diversion from the
substance of policy. More generally, Fainstein imposes a dualism between process and
outcome and reacts to what she sees as planning's counterproductive emphasis on the
former at the cost of the latter. While DuBois also values process, he does so not as an end
in and of itself but more so for the purpose of facilitating the kind of systemic
understanding and base building that he sees as essential to achieving a vibrant multiracial
democracy. In transcending the process-outcome dualism as well as attending to prospects
for economic democracy grounded in multi-racial movement building by various civil
society actors, DuBois share certain overlaps with the Russian philosopher and literary
critic Mikhail Bakhtin. Going back to the notion of reification, Bakhtin emphasized the role
of dialogic exchange, or "discussion which does not resolve itself by finding common
ground" (Sennett, 2012, p. 19; Bakhtin, 1982), as a means to break through false meta-
narratives. For Bakhtin, a plurality of voices, styles of discourse, and points of view were
critical to uncovering the multiple facets of a system including its limits and constraints.
Only through their simultaneous expression, complete with mutual engagement,
contradiction, contention, and debate, could actors see the limits of their own views,
expand their understanding of one another, and more fully grasp their social world. Hence,
without drawing a distinction between process and outcomes, Bakhtin focuses on a
learning process by which various actors might overcome their respective conceptual
limitations, weave together different issue areas, approaches, and resources, and thereby
enhance democratic governance and accountability in an iterative, ongoing basis. Such an
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analytical approach avoids defining an ideal planning outcome by the universalist
measures of the theorist's own making, whether boiling down to a formation centering on
worker owned and controlled enterprise or principles of equity, diversity, or democracy.
Rather, it remains attuned to the transient, complex, and historically contingent nature of
societal conditions, complete with their inherent tensions and contradictions, along with
the locally specific, multimodal nature of efficacious policy and planning responses.
Therefore, DuBois and Bakhtin, in combination, help account for the factors of structural
inequality, power hierarchies, and policy content and outcomes missing from procedure-
centric models of planning as well as the issues of human agency and local specificity
neglected by universalistic approaches to economic democracy.
In turn, I borrow from DuBois' notion of double consciousness and Bakhtin's
formulations on dialogic exchange to build theory at the intersection of race, place, and
economic democracy. Where "Double consciousness" accentuates the position of the "worst
off' in illuminating systemic problems, "dialogic exchange" compels us to not simply stop
there but additionally attend to the achieved synergies with other groups working in
alliance. In other words, it rejects "top down" vs. "bottom up" dualisms to instead protect
against potential idealizations of any particular section of society by highlighting the
importance of coalition building and multiple bases of knowledge and expertise operating
in concert. Focusing on the emerging energy efficiency sector and the green economy more
generally within the context of the contemporary American city, the dissertation applies
the DuBoisian-Bakhtinian framework to two critical and emblematic cases-the Evergreen
Cooperative Initiative in Cleveland and the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program. The Evergreen Cooperative Initiative comprises a network of multi-stakeholder
cooperatives whose worker owners come from six of Cleveland's most distressed, inner
city neighborhoods, which grew out of a partnership between the Cleveland Foundation, a
series of anchor institutions, two university-based policy research centers, and the City of
Cleveland. In the case of the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce Program, it emerged
from a partnership between community, labor, and environmental organizations mobilized
under the banner of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the City of Los Angeles. The
resultant municipal building retrofit program incorporates unionized public sector jobs
with career paths targeted at "hard to employ" workers from "disadvantaged"
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neighborhoods. Both initiatives deviate from the privatist economic development approach
of enticing major employers to locate in cities by using tax incentives, lax environmental
regulations, and other public subsidies. Instead, they leverage opportunities availed by the
Stimulus Act and state policy and build on existing collective assets to create jobs more
directly. Further, by anchoring the green economic and workforce development initiatives
in progressive economic institutions, namely worker cooperatives and labor unions, they
seek to create meaningful employment opportunities, broaden wealth ownership in
society, stabilize urban communities, and build a social movement for economic
democracy. Where worker cooperatives and labor unions have traditionally failed to play
such roles, they are altering the structures and practices of these institutions to better suit
their purposes.
At the substantive level, my cases challenge the neoclassical hegemony in economic
practice by lifting up the stories of green economic and workforce programs driven by
community and civic organizations and various allied groups. In doing so, my target
audience not only comprises free market enthusiasts, it more importantly includes
progressive planners and others aligned with the political left. Among the assumptions and
patterns of thought that this dissertation challenges are those related to the segmentation
of community organizing and democratic power building from economic programs (as
spheres of engagement for civil society actors), private sector primacy in the economic
sphere, and "bottom up essentialism" or "grassroots glorification" that limits community
and civic groups from broadening their approaches to coalition building and urban
problem solving to encompass different bases of knowledge and expertise. Hence I not only
problematize the reification of the economy on the part of civil society actors but also the
reification of organizing and movement building repertoires, whether through institutional
inertia or narrow ideological views and boundaries (e.g. exclusive focus on collective
bargaining by labor organizations at the cost of more comprehensive market recovery
strategies that might increase the percentage of work undertaken by contractors operating
under a union agreement).
At the descriptive and analytical level, my cases also expose the shortcomings of
rational choice theory and methodological individualism in explaining observed modes of
economic action and local economic development, complete with much cooperation,
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uncertainty, and innovation and learning (Beckert, 2002). Therefore I derive an alternative
analytical framework for explaining the economic behavior of actors. Among the
conceptual components, there is the question of human motivation; more specifically, what
might cause people to participate in the said green economic and workforce development
initiatives if not for self-interest? How do actors come to be involved in the programs and
what maintains their involvement? Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have drawn upon
experimental and evolutionary theories from the behavioral sciences to develop a model of
homo reciprocans that disputes the assumption of the self-regarding, outcome-oriented
actor (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, 2011; Henrich et al., 2001). Using evidence from an
impressive body of anthropological studies and contemporary experiments, they argue that
people are not purely selfish but rather predisposed to cooperating and sharing with
others beyond the immediate family and other in-groups. They are even willing to punish
those who violate cooperative and other social norms at substantial costs to themselves. 8
Whether people are motivated to be selfish, reciprocal, altruistic, or spiteful appears to
depend on the encountered situation or person, which in turn undermines the assumption
by rational choice theory that actors have set preferences that they themselves are aware
of. In a similar vein, the sociologist and philosopher Richard Sennett devotes part of his
recent volume, Togetherness (2012), to discussing the natural capacity for cooperation
rooted in the earliest stages of human development as well as detrimental effects posed by
current institutional conditions such as impatient capital, vertical disintegration, and
contingent employment.
Secondly, how might we think about preference and goal formation on the part of
the respective progressive coalitions apart from the notion that homo economicus is an
outcome-driven individual with set preferences that he himself is aware of? According to
8 To illustrate, Bowles and Gintis present the example of white Americans opposing social welfare programs,
largely to their own detriment, in order to deny African Americans and others whom they stereotype as being
uncommitted to the work ethic from accessing such benefits. Revisiting the case of the resurgence of the
American conservative movement with this new perspective, we might understand the populist backlash
against the Democratic party and gains of the civil rights movement, not simply as a matter of competitive
behavior on the part of working class whites but rather as resulting from a perverted sense of fairness
stemming from their investment in the American body politic and belief in the notion of American
individualism and equal opportunity. In turn, this suggests a mode of recourse that goes beyond efforts to
subsume race and other "divisive" categories and issues under the banner of class solidarity to more
thoughtfully address taken for granted ideas and beliefs about race and the ways in which they substantiate
and perpetuate profound social inequities.
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John Dewey, process and outcomes or ends and means are in some ways inextricable, and
preferences often form in the field of action. The fact that human activity is continuous
implies "the end is the last act thought of; the means are the acts to be performed prior to it
in time" (Dewey, [1922]1997, p. 31). In other words, what was before an end soon becomes
a means for another "end-in-view" and so on. Further, "the goals of actions are usually
relatively undefined, and only become more specific as a consequence of the decision to use
particular means... only when we recognize that certain means are available to us do we
discover goals which had not occurred to us before. This means not only specific goals, but
they also expand the scope for possible goal setting" (Joas, 1997, p. 154). In turn, desires or
preferences emerge from the problematic situation at hand, depending on what sorts of
ends appear attainable, rather than being fixed within the actor. Hence the Deweyan
formulation speaks to the importance of attending to the varieties of resources at the
disposal of actors, including economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu,
2008; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), along with potential synergies and coordination
between varying forms of capital. We might also choose to pay close attention to
problematic situations encountered by actors, whether at the personal, organizational, or
field level, along with reflective thinking processes spurred by breakages in routines.
Further, we might find that what actors consider program or policy outputs at one. point
become inputs within subsequent initiatives.
In contrast to the Deweyan formulation, which render human action as largely
constituted by the situation, neo-pragmatist Hans Joas introduces the elements of
biographical and sociological context in his theory of the creativity of action (Joas, 1997;
Joas & Kn6bl, 2009). According to Joas, historical circumstances have located the actor in
various field positions, which have in turn incorporated a series of perceptions, actions,
attitudes, tastes, and practices. Consequently, the actor as a bodily entity carries around
certain aspirations and tendencies, along with value commitments, also shaped by self-
formative and transcendental past experiences. These tend to operate in a pre-reflective,
habitual fashion until situations arise where routines no longer suffice as to require
reflection, creativity, and adaptation. At this point, the actor selectively recasts and projects
preexisting aspirations in ways that are relevant to the situation at hand while invoking
preexisting values and ideas as standards. Drawing on such insights, we might explore the
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biographical and social trajectories that incorporated particular aspirations and tendencies
as well as values and ideas in actors, which then led them to the community-based green
economic development initiative at hand. According to Bruno Frere, "the more an
individual is exposed to non-homogenous, complex and diverse social contexts, the more
likely he or she is to possess a variegated legacy of adapted dispositions, habits or abilities
that are non-homogenous and not unified" (Frere, 2011, p. 254). We might tease out to
what extent such inconsistent dispositions, habits, and abilities enable insights into
systemic contradictions and tensions. We may also consider the transformative potential
inherent in cities to bring together actors reflecting considerable racial, ethnic, class, and
cultural diversity.
Finally, with respect to the nature of the economy, if the profit motive is not what is
holding various utility-maximizing individuals together, what might be the purpose of
economic exchange? Where Aristotle thought of the city as "a coming together of people
from diverse family tribes-each oikos having its own history, allegiances, property, family
gods" (Sennett, 2012, p. 4), he viewed commercial exchange as a mechanism for holding
people together across social differences (Henaff, 2010). Where people had varying
occupations and needs, money could facilitate reciprocal exchanges that forged webs of
interdependence and complementarity, in turn promoting political society (Aristotle, 1996,
p. 45). In the words of philosopher and anthropologist Marcel Henaff,
Human recognition of the other, whether person or group, always takes place through
the gesture by which one holds out a mediating object to the other, presenting the
other with something that one is giving as a part of oneself and venturing into alliance
space. This gesture states the following: first, we recognize you as fellow humans;
second, we accept you as possible partners; finally-once relationships have been
established-we wish to remain bonded with you in the future (Henaff, 2010, p. 132).
In other words, money can impart a sense of recognition, express mutual need, instill
dignity, and forge bonds across kinship and ethnic lines as to play a "functional" and
"ethical" role in the function of a city (Ibid., p. 316). Consequently, Aristotle eschewed the
idea of money serving as an instrument of power or end in and of itself, anticipating the
result would be "perverse and perverting" with respect to the aim of building civic
community (Ibid., p. 329). Such a conception of commercial exchange elucidates the
fundamentally cooperative roots of the economy and frames social optimality in terms of
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how well different people live together rather than the profit motive. In doing so, it helps us
disrupt economistic thinking to envision a modern economic democracy rooted in the
American city and identify the seeds of such possibilities within my two case studies.
1.3 Theoretical approach
The aim of this study is not causal analysis- understanding why things happened
the way they did or explaining how the presence of absence of a certain independent
variable explains or accounts for variation in the outcome or dependent variable- but
rather illuminating the process by which community and civic organizations might use race
as a diagnostic and dialogic tool in spearheading the task of framing and carrying out green
economic and workforce development programs, complete with modes of production and
exchange alternative to prevailing privatist models. As noted by planning scholar Xavier
Briggs,
[Causal analysis], a foundation of hypothesis testing in both the natural and
behavioral sciences, is appropriate where achieving a specific outcome is the target of
study, whether that outcome is a social condition or a policy decision. Causal analysis
is feasible and appropriate where the analyst can confidently control on a reasonable
number of confounding factors, beyond the factor to be tested, that might be
associated with the outcome of interest (Briggs, 2008, p. 22).
On the other hand, my two cases exhibit a great deal of historical and institutional variation
so that while I am generally interested in efforts to build civil society capacity in the
economic sphere, which incorporates deep racial analysis, critique, and mediation, at this
stage of research, I would hesitate to call that an explanatory variable for predicting
"better" urban policies and local economic development outcomes. My view is that little can
be said for such components and processes or their economic, social, political, and cultural-
ideological effects beyond the forms they assume and effects they produce in their specific
contexts. Therefore, rather than try to hold variables constant across cases, I instead adopt
Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen's contextualized comparison approach to studying
comparative politics (1993, 1995), which places comparative cases "side by side in order to
highlight the distinctive features of particular systems" (Locke and Thelen, 1995, p. 20).
Where conventional accounts compare "similar" changes across cases without considering
different starting points or varying degrees of valence different issues pose in different
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contexts, Locke and Thelan place "differences rather than similarities at the center of
[their] analysis" to bring into relief how actors in "various contexts are engaged in struggles
that while different in appearance, are nonetheless similar in substance" (Locke and
Thelen, 1993, p. 19). In the co-authors' case, they employ the approach to study how
common international pressures (towards flexibility and decentralization) have provoked
organized labor in different national contexts to reconsider their longstanding political,
economic, and organizational strategies in analytically analogous ways. In turn, I consider
how common pressures stemming from the tensions and contradictions of privatist urban
policy and local economic development practices came to bear around different "sticking
points" in Cleveland Los Angeles given their historical and institutional contingencies. In
other words, I undertake historical and institutional analysis to tease out the originating
factors and conditions for the distinctive features-including the pathways and
accomplishments- of each of the cases. The dissertation research is built around two case
studies that were partly chosen based on the presence of intense racial stratification and
spatial segregation (both falling within the top ten most segregated cities in the United
States by US Census measures) along with the variation in the forms of green workforce
and economic development at the heart of the initiatives, or "sticking points" of the
respective struggles (centering on worker cooperatives and anchor procurement in the
case of Cleveland and unions and the City as an employer and owner/manager of immense
building stock in the case of LA). The fact that the initiatives differ in appearance but are
similar in substance may render them revelatory as a sample.
My unit of analysis includes the respective green economic and workforce
development initiative as well as participating organizations and individuals. Put a
different way, the study consists of an embedded case study design, which attends to
enabling conditions of agency at the field, organizational, and individual levels. To better
understand the process by which community and civic organizations in the case studies use
race as a diagnostic and dialogic tool in spearheading the task of framing and carrying out
green economic and workforce development programs, the dissertation relies on various
forms of data. These include primary data from 89 unique semi-structured in-depth
interviews with representatives of community and civic organizations (including
community, environmental, and labor organizations, workforce intermediaries, and
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foundations), university-based policy research centers, and local government and other
public agencies as well as consultants and other participants in Evergreen and the LA
Green Retrofit Program. I also draw upon notes from direct observations of meetings,
deliberative processes, work sites, and organizational settings conducted between
November 2010 and May 2012. I also draw upon secondary data in the form of program
proposals, reports, and records produced by the various organizations involved in the
respective initiatives as well as issues of sustainability, green/green collar jobs, and green
economic and workforce development more broadly; legislative and regulatory documents;
planning documents; notes of correspondence; newspaper articles and editorials; and
meeting minutes. Further, I anchor each of the case studies in historical analyses exploring
the role of race in managing the tensions and contradictions between capitalism and
democracy at the local level. More generally, I examined secondary sources of historical
data to better understand the local contexts surrounding each of the cases with respect to
their political economy, power structures, systems of government and civic governance,
civil society landscape and capacities, and local demographics and culture as well as major
urban policy and planning initiatives. To cull from the research data evidence expanding on
and testing the earlier propositions, I combined line-by-line coding with conceptual coding,
applying the first approach to a smaller sample to draw out key concepts, which was
subsequently applied on the larger data set. Overlapping data analysis with data collection
allowed a head start in analysis as well as enabled flexibility in data collection and depth in
analysis by allowing adjustments that further probed emergent themes and took advantage
of emergent opportunities. Hence I applied pre-determined criteria for case selection but
also incorporated a grounded theory approach when it came to teasing out the process by
which community and civic organizations might use race as a diagnostic and dialogic tool in
spearheading the task of framing and carrying out green economic and workforce
development programs (Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998).
As this dissertation focuses on the collaborative efforts and dynamics among
community and civic organizations driving the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and the LA
Green Retrofit and Workforce Program, it overlooks a number of important details that are
less central to the purpose of the study. For example, the perspectives of the workers are
largely absent from the accounts, particularly with respect to the LA case study given the
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minimal involvement of the Green Retrofit trainees in planning and implementing the
career academy and other aspects of the program. A direction for future research might be
to conduct a longitudinal study that traces the experiences and outcomes of the
participants in the initiatives in terms of income, assets, civic participation, and cognitive or
behavioral shifts, among others. As stated earlier, the aim of this study is not to identify the
precise reasons why these cases rather than others saw the results of the outcome
variables but rather to suggest that this kind of change is possible and illuminate how such
processes may unfold. However, as another area of future research, causal analysis studies
might help isolate and clarify the effects of certain program components. For instance, one
might incorporate a number of control cases as benchmarks of what a more "standard"
green economic and workforce development initiative without a community or civic
organization advocating the interests of inner city communities of color looks like in order
derive more definitive and meaningful conclusions about the function of race as a
diagnostic, dialogic, and power building mechanism in progressive civil society-led
economic planning. One of the controls might be a private sector led initiative that
incorporates the perspectives of inner city communities of color, while another initiative
might exclusively involve community and civic organizations but lack the component of
race analysis/consciousness. Another study might systematically compare the Cleveland
case with other worker or multi-stakeholder cooperatives and the LA case with other
community-environmental-labor initiatives to illuminate the extent of their respective
institutional innovations as well as the causal factors. Further, as various green sectors and
economic development initiatives continue to emerge within each of the cities, future
research might focus on several initiatives within the same city in order to control for local
contingencies.
1.4 Structure of the dissertation
The remaining chapters are divided into three parts, each organized around a
central question.
Part one addresses the question: To what extent, in what ways, and how has race
played a role in managing the tensions and contradictions between capitalism and democracy
at the local level? Here I explore the question within the contexts of Los Angeles and
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Cleveland (in chapters two and three respectively); I also compare and contrast the two
cases. Ultimately, I am interested in drawing links between historical events and the
examined cases; firstly, to understand how the latter might enable actors to address some
of the core problems arising from privatistic urban policy and local economic development.
Secondly, I want to trace how the initiatives build on oppositional traditions that might
have emerged over time, as actors "made" history by adjusting to changing economic and
social circumstances while also challenging the status quo.
Part two of the dissertation presents the case studies at the center of the
dissertation. In chapter four, I focus on the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative in Cleveland,
while chapter five tells the story of the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce Program.
Each chapter explores the question: To what extent, in what ways, and how have community
and civic organizations incorporated the experiences and perspectives of low-income inner
city communities of color into their respective green economic and workforce development
programs? Here I highlight the role of situational imperatives (including various field and
organizational level conditions, manifested as problematic situations), biographical factors
stemming from pivotal, formative past experiences at the individual level, and resources
available to coalition members (including historical contingencies) as enabling and shaping
collective agency.
Part three is the concluding chapter of the dissertation and discusses the
implications of the two cases for the project of economic democracy. Recently,
management scholars like Michael Porter and Mark Kramer have proposed "the big idea" of
reinventing capitalism to create "economic value in a way that also creates value for society
by addressing its needs and challenges" (Porter and Kramer, 2011). I list elements of their
conceptual framework as a point of reference before offering a critique based on the
empirical evidence from my case studies. Following, I build on DuBois' notion of double
consciousness and Bakhtin's formulations on dialogic exchange as well as draw from the
case studies to lay out a theoretical formula for shared value creation that focalizes the
perspectives and experiences of inner city communities of color and considers terms of
shared governance and collective problem solving, various program impacts, and issues of
program longevity and scale. I further discuss the role of planning theory with respect to
the project of building civil society in the service of economic democracy.
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PART I: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
In what follows, I present two sets of historical analyses that examine to what
extent, in what ways, and how race has played a role in managing the tensions and
contradictions between capitalism and democracy at the local level. This section presents
my conceptual approach before presenting the historical case of Cleveland. Chapter two
presents the historical case of Los Angeles along with a summary of findings and
comparison of the two cases. In each case, I focus on three separate periods: capitalist
urbanization, economic regionalization, and urban economic restructuring amidst federal
retrenchment from urban programs from the late 1970s. In each historical period, I study
how capitalist urbanization and local economic development led to the emergence and
perpetuation of racialized labor markets and neighborhoods. Given local contingencies, the
three periods of urban and economic development vary in form and sequence across the
two cases, with urbanization preceding industrialization in Los Angeles, while occurring
more or less simultaneously in Cleveland.
Among the overarching themes of the historical analysis is the stabilizing function of
race at the intersection of local markets and democracy, particularly during times of
economic restructuring. By disproportionately absorbing the burdens of structural change,
marginalized groups spare entrenched systems of economic and political governance
legitimation crises. In part, I dispute neoclassical accounts of urban policy and local
economic development that depict city making and living as neutral or inevitable by
exposing the myriad human activities and relations that feed and negotiate historical
outcomes at various junctures. I simultaneously seek to avoid functionalist explanation that
account for a particular set of behaviors, in this case, racialized labor markets and
neighborhoods along with racially differentiated social and economic outcomes for groups
of urban dwellers, simply by pointing to the fact that it has beneficial consequences for
certain groups of actors. Instead, I try to account for underlying mechanisms and frictions
inherent in social phenomena (Elster, 1985, pp. 27-28). Therefore I illuminate the
involvement of not only capitalists but also the white working class in maintaining systems
of racial discrimination and subordination. I also attend to oppositional movements that
emerged as actors grappled with experiences of marginality and adjusted to challenging
circumstances.
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As modern historians have sought to make sense of the past by searching for
patterns, they have embraced different schools of thought or modes of interpretation, each
with their own biases and shortcomings. A central topic in historical analysis being that of
agency, "Great Man Theory" premises that "the history of the world is but the biography of
great men," as stated by its mid 19th century proponent, Thomas Carlyle. In other words,
heroic individuals shape history through their personal attributes and decisive actions.
Critics such as Herbert Spencer have argued that great men are the products of their
environments and simply act upon preexisting social conditions. In the case of social
historians, they see history as resulting from the cumulative efforts of the multitude or the
"every man." Those embodying the "master subject" approach present history from the
perspective of a particular group. For instance, Karl Marx centered his analysis on the
proletariat as a sort of "chosen people" who would beget a revolutionary overthrow of
capitalism. In doing so, he overlooked the realities of division and internal conflict within
the group, an analytical shortcoming later underscored by radical Black scholars
incorporating critical racial analysis into the Marxist tradition (Robinson, 2000). Similarly,
the "systems approach" tends toward metanarratives in telling history through the use of
various "isms" while featuring anonymous actors as to fit well with the "master subject"
approach. As for my "social struggle-centered approach" to understanding history, I view
mutual engagement, complete with contention, conflict, and collaboration both across and
within groups, as determining the nature and function of societal institutions, which in
turn, bear sustained normative and practical impacts on individual and group outcomes. In
short, I present a "social history" that incorporates the intersecting experiences of multiple
historical subjects-whether they be capitalists, white workers, or racial minorities and
other historically marginalized groups- to interrogate the process by which capital- "ism,"
race- "ism," and privatist urbanization and local economic development unfolded over time
within particular locations.
My analytical approach brings together the literature on privatism, which combines
insights from political economy and urban history, with urban political theory on race. In
challenging the neoclassical dominance of planning thought on urban policy and local
economic development, the former uses historical analyses to highlight, contradict, and
contest the assumptions underlying privatist city building practices. The unstated
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principles governing privatism as identified by the literature can be summarized as follows
(Warner, 1987; Eisinger, 1988; Barnekov and Rich 1989; Levine, 1989; Frug, 1999):
(1) One's freedom to pursue material wealth is more important than commitments to
the community.
(2) The nuclear family is the ideal social unit.
(3) Healthy communities are best promoted by ensuring individual liberty and equal
opportunity to further individual wealth accumulation by means of unfettered
"neutral" markets; on the other hand, equal conditions incentivize freeriding and
hamper productivity and innovation.
(4) The private sector is the principal agent of urban change; in turn, the "free" market
is the most dynamic, productive, and dependable allocator of resources.
(5) The role of government is to facilitate private capital accumulation by property
owners and entrepreneurs; state planning should be minimized to the extent it
hinders market efficiency.
(6) The ultimate standard by which to judge any action, public or private, is market
efficiency.
By illuminating the immense social coordination, contestation, and struggle that feed into
privatist urban policy and economic development, the literature on privatism helps dispel
notions of naturalness and inevitability pervading neoclassical accounts of urban
construction and remaking. Where the notion of the invisible hand projects a sense of
"phantom objectivity," it exposes the negotiations and power plays that go into the making
of urban policy and local economic development at various historical junctures. Studies of
privatism also expose discontinuities between economistic planning practices at the local
level and anticipated effects as to undermine premises of market efficiency. In highlighting
the role of individual actors as potential perpetuators and challengers, the literature not
only reveals the ways in which the hegemonic is constituted but further underscores the
potential for intervention and resistance.
In coining the term "privatism," Sam Bass Warner cast the pervasive urban
phenomenon of black exclusion as a legacy of the "private city." As white citizens drew tight
boundaries around the individual, family, and homogeneous community, the "successful
city," in the words of Warner, became defined by "the cohesion of its congregations and its
neighborhoods" rather than "the manner in which it treats strangers" (Warner, 1987: xxiv).
My view is that the links between race and privatism are tighter and more intentional than
mere happenstance. While avoiding blaming and demonizing historical actors, DuBois'
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Black Reconstruction in America (1935) and more recent works by scholars like David
Roediger and Noel Ignatiev demonstrate that "white labor does not just receive and resist
racist ideas but embraces, adopts, and at times, murderously acts upon those ideas"
(Roediger, 2007, p. 12; Ignatiev, 2008). Likewise, my historical analysis uncovers greater
agency on the part of white working class residents of Cleveland and Los Angeles than
might be acknowledged by conventional Marxist accounts and allied schools of thought. As
I will show shortly, racial divisions certainly benefit the capitalist class in Cleveland and Los
Angeles. However, "racism [came] from both above and below" (Roediger, 2007, p.10), as
white workers battled conditions of alienation and economic insecurity, they more often
upheld the racial separatism at the ideological core of capitalism than forging class
solidarity across race on the basis of shared material conditions. Where overcoming group
differences and forming interracial coalitions required extensive effort, the simpler
alternative of elevating one's own status and privileges at the cost of "racial others"
provided the necessary uplift to remain invested in the body politic (Smith, 1999).
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CHAPTER 2: RACE, CAPITALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CLEVELAND
2.1 Capitalist urbanization and industrialization, late 18th to early 20th century
Cleveland, like many American cities, originated primarily as an economic entity but
expanded in large part through the financial graces of the state, the latter aggressively
harnessed by the town's entrepreneurial fathers. Settled in 1796 by land speculators intent
on turning quick profits, the town of Cleveland was quickly surveyed, haphazardly divided
into two-acre tracts, and sold to private buyers through a land lottery. Cleveland's period of
municipal mercantilism began in the 1830s when the state of Ohio selected the town as the
northern terminus of the Ohio and Erie Canal, in large thanks to lobbying efforts by the
Ohio state legislator and state canal commissioner Alfred Kelley, who also hailed from a
local merchant and shipping family. Because canal construction brought a steady flow of
Eastern investment capital and migrant workers, the city was a major transshipment hub
for agricultural products from the interior and manufactured goods from the East by 1845.
Enticed by the potential for even greater profits, local merchants shortly embraced the
railroad cause to formulate public subsidy schemes and sponsor local newspaper editorials
that framed the issue in terms of the unitary public interest. By the eve of the Civil War,
Cleveland had the highest density of rail access in the Great Lakes region. The war was a
further boon for local economy, as Cleveland's metal manufacturers responded to the
national demand for metal and metal products. By its end, Cleveland was home to thirty oil
refineries as well as numerous factories producing industrial machinery and supplies in
addition to consumer durables.
Capitalist urbanization and industrialization brought enormous sums of wealth
along with periodic economic crises. The upper and middle classes largely consisted of
native-born white Protestant transplants from New England, the wealthiest of whom made
their homes in the stately mansions of Euclid and Franklin Avenue. As for the "middle
portion of Cleveland society-laborers, craftsmen, and small business owners," they settled
in areas adjacent to work or wherever housing was affordable (Miller & Wheeler, 1995, p.
33). The mass arrival of German, Irish, English, and Czech immigrants from the 1840s gave
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rise to ethnic clustering and residential segregation.9 In contrast to white immigrants,
Black settlers, many of them freed slaves from the upper South arriving as early as 1809,
lived throughout the city (Perry, 1995). The poorest Clevelanders crowded into the
dilapidated neighborhoods adjacent to the industrial districts on the city's west side, where
they suffered exposure to noxious urban and industrial discharges along with occasional
epidemic outbreaks. Despite setting up ethnic businesses, religious institutions, and
fraternal organizations, Cleveland's immigrant communities commonly experienced
cyclical economic downturns and degradation by industrial work. In the aftermath of the
Panic of 1837, Cleveland workers began to form unions to demand improved wages and
work conditions. When union activity accelerated during the recession of the 1850s,
employers responded by hiring foreign strikebreakers from out of town. As the recession of
1877 (following the Panic of 1873) triggered a series of business failures, layoffs, and wage
cuts, growing industrial and urban tensions culminated in a series of worker strikes at the
railway yards, Standard Oil, and steel mills. Despite employer hostility and resistance, labor
unrest continued through the Panic of 1893 and into the turn of the century, with local
unions numbering 100 by 1900.
The fact that Cleveland's Protestant elite largely attributed poverty to personal
failings translated into benevolence programs that served as a means for social control as
much as poor relief; however in the face of growing labor unrest and popular concern over
social inequality, community action in matters of social reproduction appeared inevitable.
Increasingly conscious and critical of the inequities of unrestricted capitalism, workers
turned to collective action in the form of union organizing, workplace and citywide strikes,
and public discussions to raise demands about worker rights and employer obligations
(Miller & Wheeler, 2009, p. 88). While the middle class tended to embrace capitalism over
worker organizations, they were more favorably disposed toward the progressive
9 The first group arrived between the 1840s and the 1880s, and largely consisted of Germans, Irish, English,
and Czechs. Towards the end of the 19th century, Cleveland saw the mass migration of Slavic nationalities,
Hungarians, Russian Jews, and Italians. Based on cultural background, time of arrival, and occupational skills,
immigrant groups occupied different status positions but generally incorporated into mainstream society
within a couple generations, typically advancing from menial jobs to positions of higher skill and
compensation along the way. Where public schools, churches, families, and homes left off, the US military
further stepped in as an agent of assimilation and "democratization," the First World War conscripting five
million men, almost 20 percent of whom were foreign born, into the ranks of "Yanks and 'first-class fightin'
men" from which African Americans were excluded (Gerstle, 2002, p. 84).
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movement and settlement house movement, which arrived in the 1880s and 1890s
respectively, to reshape popular discourse on poverty as resulting from social inequality
and make demands for "good government." Consequently, the last two decades of the 19th
century brought the arrival of separate departments for police, fire, accounts, public works,
charities and correction along with sewage, tunnel, park, and school systems, extensive
street paving, and an electric streetcar line. Civic projects and reforms continued during
Cleveland's progressive era (1900-1914) under the mayoralty of Mayor Tom L. Johnson, a
former streetcar magnate influenced by the single tax theories of Henry George who
worked closely with the progressive populist movement at the local level. His efforts to
establish the nation's first public electric utility and break the streetcar monopoly elicited
retaliation by private interests behind the private utility company and the streetcar
railways unwilling to forgo profits in the emerging sector of urban infrastructure provision.
The protracted struggle eventually led to Johnson's electoral defeat and the street railway
lines along with railway fares going back to corporate control. Only the municipal electric
utility withstood the conservative backlash.
Where 19th century capitalist industrialization entailed a great deal of economic
volatility and class antagonisms, racialized labor markets further mitigated crises, typically
at lower cost to the white majority relative to public infrastructure and social welfare
spending. For all the woes of working a low wage, unskilled job, a white worker could earn
promotion to a semi-skilled job over time to eventually climb the internal ladder of
mobility within the factory or company. On the other hand, for a Black worker, menial work
was often a lifelong position rather than a stepping-stone to a career. Where the two races
worked adjacent to each other performing identical work, Blacks were paid a fraction of
what whites received. In cases of job variation, "wherever the work was heavy, hot, dirty,
and low paying, Black men could usually be found" (Trotter, 2006, p. 60). No matter how
educated or skilled, African Americans typically supervised only those of their own race, as
racial mores precluded their occupying positions of superiority to any white person (Jones,
1998). While many of the European immigrant groups worked and lived alongside African
Americans, few resisted the temptation of becoming "white" and escaping a certain set of
injustices and indignities that regularly befell African Americans in the labor market. In
fact, walk-outs and hate strikes by white workers in response to the hiring of Black
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workers was not uncommon, and some employers resisted hiring Black employees in light
of the expenses attached to redesigning separate dressing rooms and restrooms. More
commonly, Black Clevelanders found incorporation into labor relation strategies as a
reserve army of cheap labor to drive down wages and discipline white workers. 10
Hence African Americans were the only migrant group in Cleveland to experience
downward economic mobility in the post-Civil War era. Consisting of a total of 800 at the
eve of the Civil War, Cleveland's Black population steadily grew by about a hundred
persons per year during the half century after the Civil War, before quadrupling from 8,448
to 34,451 between 1910 and 1920 with the start of the Great Migration. Like their
immigrant counterparts, these new Clevelanders arrived in response to a number of push
and pull factors,'1 including escape from Jim Crow, disenfranchisement, and racial violence
as well as access to industrial work opportunities in a city known to be one of the most
"liberal" cities on the issue of race. In fact, antebellum Black Clevelanders enjoyed higher
levels of income, occupation, and quality of life compared to most urban Blacks in the
North. From thereon, racial discrimination intensified, with segregation of neighborhoods
and public accommodations complete by the start of World War I. Where as 32 percent of
male Black Clevelanders worked in the skilled trades in 1870, the percentage had dropped
down to 11 percent by 1910. As Cleveland's industrial base exploded between 1870 and
10As noted by Jacqueline Jones, new immigrant groups repeatedly served this function throughout America's
industrial history, but "out of all these groups, it was Black people alone who came to symbolize the scab"
(Jones, 1998, p. 311). For instance, Cleveland employers imported Polish and Czech workers as well as men
from Buffalo and St. Louis to temper labor militancy following the recession of 1877.
11 Between 1863 and 1877, Reconstruction delivered significant gains to African Americans (and poor
whites) in the South with respect to property ownership, educational attainment, and political power
(DuBois, [1935]1999; Foner, 2002). However, the acquisition of independent farms by rural Southern Blacks
and poor whites coincided with a precipitous drop in the price of cotton between 1881 and 1900, which
increased the indebtedness of many cotton growers under the crop lien system and heightened competition
for limited resources (Soule, 1992). Further, the growth of the manufacturing sector in Southern cities
between 1870 and 1910 propelled rural Blacks, many skilled in carpentry, masonry, and the mechanical
trades, to seek opportunities in manufacturing as manual wage labor, in turn posing a threat to industrial
workers (Wilson 1978). The1880s and 1890s additionally saw the emergence of a populist movement,
complete with a Populist party platform, which united smaller farmers and oppressed workers- both white
and Black- to advocate for cooperative enterprise and public regulation of exchange, and thereby challenge
powerful merchants, corporations, and the South's system of one party rule (Hahn, 1985). Consequently,
southern states passed constitutional amendments between 1890 and 1905, to keep African Americans and
many poor whites from voting, along with Jim Crow laws legally segregating public facilities. Amidst
heightened economic competition and political polarization, white citizens and vigilante groups such as the
Ku Klux Klan (founded in 1866) committed acts of ritualistic violence (averaging two lynchings per week
throughout the 1890s) targeting Black men, women, and children as well as white nonconformists and
dissenters.
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1915, jobs went first to immigrants arriving from Europe rather than native-born African
Americans regardless of educational background or skill level. Conversely, the percentage
of Black men in service occupations jumped from 15 percent in 1870 to 30 percent in 1910.
Another 30 percent worked as casual laborers on seasonal building and construction
projects (Trotter, 2006: 69). During this time, rates of property ownership in Cleveland's
African American community declined from 28 percent to 11 percent, with Black women
twice as likely as immigrant white women to work to support their families (Kusmer,
1995).
Black Clevelanders tried a variety of approaches to eradicate racial discrimination
and subordination. According to Kenneth Kusmer, "equal access to most public
accommodations and the modest size of the city's Black population in the nineteenth
century retarded the development of separate Black institutions in Cleveland" (Kusmer,
1995, p. 267). However, as the local African American population grew from 800 before the
Civil War to almost 35,000 in 1920, the increase in numbers not only spurred white
hostility and ghettoization but also community organization. 2 The dominant modes of
Black thought on racial relations in late 19th to early 20th century Cleveland reflected
national patterns in ideologically dividing along the lines of accommodationism and
integrationism. Prominent integrationists like Ohio state senator John P. Green, together
with the local NAACP, advocated for Blacks to pursue career opportunities and exercise full
civil and political rights within the mainstream of society, all the while pursuing a cautious
and unobtrusive program on race issues (Wye, 1995). On the other hand, Black
entrepreneurs like funeral parlor owner J. Walter Wills and publisher Nahum D. Brascher
emphasized self help, hard work, and discipline within the African American community
along with more gradualist approaches to civil and political rights. Amidst hardening
segregation in the first two decades of the 20th century, self-help philosophies and
separatist ideologies appeared to win out as indicated by the flourishing Black press,
commercial and professional sector, and network of churches, self help organizations, and
12 Where as immigrant whites in urban areas generally consolidated power through ward-based electoral
organizing and machine politics within the purview of the Democratic party, African Americans won political
office initially by building on factional divisions within the Republican party; however, following the
introduction of the direct primary in 1907, they began to rely more on solidifying the Black vote to counteract
the power of white voter prejudice (Wye, 1995).
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fraternal orders, which despite class divisions and rivalries, facilitated mutual support and
provided a robust Black civil sphere.
2.2 Capitalist economic regionalization, early 20th century to the 21st century
Where capitalist urbanization and industrialization transformed Cleveland into one
of the country's most prominent industrial cities by the early 20th century,13 the next phase
of urban economic development assumed a decentralized pattern, with Cleveland losing
much of its industry and commerce to suburban areas to instead focus on retail, corporate
services, real estate, and government administration. Again, highly resourced and
organized private sector actors found ways to enlist state intervention and harness public
subsidies to make sizeable profit. Beginning in the 1910s, the newly created Cleveland Real
Estate Board (CREB) established committees to study zoning, taxation, city planning,
legislation, highways, and other relevant issues in order to shape industry policy and
practices at the regional scale. Focusing on the central business district and urban fringes,
its members infiltrated local law firms, banks, and planning agencies along with the seats of
suburban mayoralties and city councils to transform the metropolitan real estate industry
to "a much-larger-scale, operationally integrated, twentieth century business" (Weiner,
2005, p. 153). New Deal institutions such as the Federal Housing Authority played a critical
role in securitizing mortgages and redlining bank lending in urban neighborhoods with a
noticeable minority presence, as did the Veteran's Administration, which offered no
interest loans to veterans. As car-bound Clevelanders migrated in mass to newly formed
suburban tracts in Lakewood, Cleveland Heights, Garfield Heights, and Parma, the
availability of funding for highway construction through the Federal Highway Act from the
mid 1950s additionally aided the expansion of the suburban real estate sector in the
postwar era.
The subsequent erosion of the center city's economic base threatened business
institutions requiring location in the city core for services, distribution, and markets as to
compel their promotion of redevelopment of "blighted" areas (Barnekov et al., 1989, p. 38).
13 As Cleveland reached its industrial peak in the "roaring twenties," its population hit 900, 429 in 1930 while
its industrial landscape boasted a myriad of auto plants, iron and steel mills, foundries, machine shops,
meatpacking plants, and clothing and paint factories.
55
With the exception of a brief return to full scale industrial production during World War
11,14 manufacturing, retail activity, and middle income families continued to drift out of
Cleveland. Amidst worsening neighborhood conditions and crime, Cleveland's public
officials and corporate leaders (representing Eaton Corporation, Republic Steel Company,
and Cleveland Illuminating Company, among others) turned to urban renewal as a
solution.15 Armed with the federal resources and local discretionary powers enabled by the
1949 the Housing Act and Federal Highway Act of 1956, they spun off the Cleveland
Development Foundation (CDF) in 1954 and the University Circle Development Foundation
(later University Circle, Inc.) in 1957 to act as the de facto "city planning and urban renewal
department for the city, subject to no public scrutiny" (Bartimole,1995, p. 163). Within a
decade from its first ground breaking in 1955, the urban renewal program in Cleveland
would grew to become the largest in the country, encompassing over 6,000 acres and seven
inner-city areas, all on the disproportionately African American East Side. Where urban
renewal built upon the city's precedent of constructing public housing to fight blight,
redevelopment projects like Erieview provided new government offices, high-rise
apartment buildings, and retail spaces rather than affordable housing,
The process of urban and economic restructuring brought both financial windfalls
and overwhelming burdens, neither of which fell evenly upon Clevelanders and other
residents of Cuyahoga County. The expansion of the regional real estate industry created
unprecedented opportunities for many of Cleveland's white ethnics not only in home
ownership but also business and employment related to real estate brokering, sales, and
construction. In addition to higher quality schools and better neighborhood amenities,
suburbanites also found broad work opportunities in newly burgeoning industrial and
commercial districts outside the city. Simultaneously, racial covenants, discriminatory real
estate and construction industry practices, limited public transportation, and citizen
vigilantism and mob violence promoted the racial exclusivity of suburbs.16 As World War II
14 The city leveraged its diverse industrial base, trained workers, easy access to raw materials and energy,
and efficient transportation connections to plug into wartime production.
1s These federal measures enabled cities to invoke powers of eminent domain to purchase property in areas
designated as blighted, clear them for reuse, and sell them to private developers below market value, with the
federal government covering two thirds of the net project cost.
16 While a significant number of African Americans entered the middle class by 1920s, those who sought
improved living conditions beyond the limits of the racial ghetto repeatedly met white mob violence. One case
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brought full employment, African Americans entered Cleveland's steel and iron industries,
where for the first time they discovered opportunities to move into skilled positions.
However, such gains were relatively short lived in a broader context of economic
restructuring and outward movement.17 Nevertheless, Cleveland continued as the second
most popular receiving point for the Great Migration, and the housing shortage in the city's
African American neighborhoods only grew worse along with building code and sanitary
violations, crime, redlining, and blockbusting (Wye, 1995). Urban renewal only
exacerbated existing problems, as tens of thousands of residents got displaced in the
process of neighborhood demolition, which failed to generate redevelopment of new units
or facilities beyond low-income housing.
Where turn of the century Black thought on the question of racial discrimination
and segregation, whether accommodationist or integrationist, tended to take capitalism as
the point of departure, the Great Depression gave way to more radical and militant
ideological currents (Wye, 1995). Amidst hardening segregation in the 1910s and 1920s,
organizations like the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) claimed hundreds of
thousands of members across the country under their self help, separatist program, which
also incorporated community organizing and cooperative ownership given their critique of
global capitalism. As the Great Depression brought soaring unemployment with rates as
high as 90 percent in some of Cleveland's majority Black neighborhoods, the Communist
Party began to attract African American members, with its commitment to overturning
capitalism along with racial equality. Another strand of radical Black thought, embodied by
the National Negro Congress (NNC), emphasized unionizing Black workers and forming an
alliance with the mainstream labor movement to exert pressure on the white power
structure and thereby address the economic problems of all workers. The third approach,
employed by the local Future Outlook League (FOL), drew on boycotts and picket lines
involving the Arthur Hill family, who in 1924 was forced to move back to Cleveland's Central area ghetto by a
mob of 200 angry whites who surrounded their new home in suburban Garfield Heights. Similarly, in 1925,
when Dr. Charles Garvin, a prominent Black physician in Cleveland attempted to build a home for his family
on Wade Park Avenue close to the suburban border, whites harassed the workmen building the home and
upon its completion, exploded two dynamites in addition to making threats on the lives of the residents.
17 Cleveland lost 130,000 jobs in the period between 1958 and 1977, while the suburbs of Cuyahoga County
gained almost 210,000. The commercial sector also suffered, with the number of occupied store units
dropping from 15,768 in 1958 to 12,269 in 1972, while the respective figures for the rest of Cuyahoga County
expanded (Miller & Wheeler, 2009).
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against white owned businesses to demand inclusive hiring practices. Their targets
included grocery stores, pharmacies, theater chains, and even the Ohio Bell Telephone
Company. Where these new organizations drew their membership from younger, working
class African Americans and were more assertive and sharply focused on economic
matters, centrist organizations such as the NAACP and Urban League incorporated some of
their thinking while maintaining their institutional dominance.
The start of the Second World War and ensuing Cold War "opened up domestic
policies to a global audience critical of American segregation and racial inequality" as to
compel greater ameliorative efforts on the part of the government agencies (Biondi, 2006,
p. 164). In Cleveland, the municipal government formed a series of committees and
advisory bodies beginning in 1943 to examine racial and economic conditions in
predominantly Black parts of the Cleveland and address racial intolerance and
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations.
By 1950, the city was at its peak population of 914,808, with African Americans
comprising over 27 percent (251,000) of the total. While the 50s and 60s brought
unprecedented Black gains in civil rights and electoral politics, Black Clevelanders also
faced deteriorating economic, housing, and public school conditions. Where protest and
civil disobedience comprised the prevailing mode of response to racial injustice into the
early 60s, the more militant strategies and rhetoric of the Black Power and community
control movements gained greater traction after 1963 (Goldberg & Griffey, 2010). Urban
renewal counted among the major sources of Black grievance in decimating predominantly
African American neighborhoods mainly to the benefit of white suburbanites while failing
to hire local residents on construction jobs. As the 1960s brought the Kennedy
administration's New Frontier programs along with Johnson's Great Society, containing
provisions of "maximum feasible participation," to the inner city, local chapters of the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and NAACP initiated a series of nationwide protests and
construction shut downs through 1963 to demand Black inclusion in government
subsidized construction projects. In Cleveland, 25,000 people marched to protest building
trades discrimination and demand jobs in inner city construction (Sugrue, 2004). The
ensuing six year national movement for affirmative action was distinct in being blending
Black radical and nationalist community organizing with labor politics to call for self
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determination and independent unionism rather than integration (Goldberg and Griffey,
2010).
Still, with progress on racial equality slow to materialize, mounting frustration over
ghetto conditions, including problems of poverty, poor housing, education, employment,
and police misconduct turned Black Clevelanders towards more aggressive directions. In
the summer of 1966, a barroom brawl between a white bartender and Black customer in
Hough escalated into four days of civil unrest, resulting in four deaths and millions of
dollars in property loss. In the aftermath of the Hough uprising, the business community
supported African American state representative Carl Stokes' successful run for mayor, in
part by funding CORE and other Black civic organizations to conduct voter registration
drives.18 Where Blacks made up 39 percent of Cleveland's population in 1967, Stokes
unified the city's Black councilmen under a single all Black nonpartisan political civic
organization and used the resulting power base to attain material improvements for Black
constituents (i.e. much needed public housing for poor communities, public sector jobs for
African Americans, who had been hitherto underrepresented in city hall). 19 More
fundamentally, he set a precedent for African Americans to use local politics and civic
affairs to "[redistribute] power in ways that would allow Blacks to control their own
destinies and share equally in the rewards of city government" (Nelson, Jr., 1995, p. 286).
However, where Stokes created a vertical structure of political organization based on
loyalty and tight personal control (Thompson, 2005), he unwittingly paved the way for city
council president George Forbes' style of Black politics, [which "focused] on individual
benefits and the concentration of powers in the hands of a small political elite" (Nelson, Jr.,
1995: 289). 20 Among the casualties of the Forbes machine (1973-1989) was an
18 The alliance between Stokes and Cleveland's corporate leadership came to an end when Stokes failed to
prevent a violent outbreak between Cleveland police and Black militants in Glenville in 1969. Soon after, the
media exposed links between the latter group and one of Stokes' community programs, which the business
leaders had funded. Stokes further disappointed the business establishment by reneging on his initial
agreement to sell the municipally owned utility, Muny Light, to its competitor, the Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company (CEI).
19 In a city that only constructed 6,700 units in the 30 years prior, he built 5,496 units of public housing over a
four-year span (Thompson, 2005: p.106).
20 According to J. Phillip Thompson (2005), the centralized structure of Black civic political organization
originated from the second term of Mayor Stokes, who unified the city's Black ward committee men and
councilman along with the Black vote in city, county, and congressional elections under the single banner of
the 21st District Caucus, a nonpartisan membership-based organization tightly held together by the
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overwhelming decline in Black political leadership and organization as it doled out
patronage benefits to coopt emergent leaders and contending organizations as well as
discouraged voter mobilization except to push establishment candidates.
2.3 Capitalist urban economic restructuring in an age of federal retrenchment
Where urban redevelopment from the 1930s through the 1960s depended heavily
on federal allocations for economic and social policy at the local level, federal retrenchment
from local economic and social affairs beginning in the 1970s imbued public-private
partnerships with newfound significance. Previously forming to eliminate blight through
urban renewal, public-private partnerships now undertook processes of spatial
reorganization to promote transition towards corporate command and control services,
high tech industries, and cultural and creative activities. As urban scholars and
policymakers identified unemployment as the most critical problem facing distressed
urban areas and offered local economic development as a politically viable solution, it fell
upon local governments to offer tax abatements, subsidies, and other incentives to
influence private investment and locational choices. As mayors came and went through the
70s and 80s, George Forbes dominated the city council by carefully controlling the
distribution of Community Development Block Grant dollars and cultivating political ties
with downtown business interests. While delivering significant incentives and benefits to
his business supporters, 21 he toted an image of Black activism, using the power of his office
to write affirmative action requirements into city legislation and speaking out against
discrimination in law enforcement and housing (Nelson Jr., 1995). While Michael White's
election as mayor in 1989 signaled a shift in local Black politics from leadership by a 'civil
rights' old guard to a "new breed" of technocratic Black candidates who forged coalitions
personality of Carl Stokes. While the Caucus failed to survive Stokes' exit with the end of his mayoral term, the
vertical structure of political organization based on loyalty and tight personal control remained.
21 These included major tax abatements to National City Bank and Standard Oil of Ohio for downtown
building construction in 1977, $250 million in tax abatements for construction of the AmeriTrust Center and
Society Center in Public Square, introduction of tax increment financing (TIF) as a mechanism to divert 75
percent of property taxes resulting from particular projects to finance other private and nonprofit ventures,
and redirection of $52 million in property taxes from the public school system to subsidize construction of
the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame (Bartimole, 1995).
60
with disaffected Black and white voters (Thompson, 2005), 22 corporate influence in
matters of urban policy and economic development in Cleveland remained largely
unperturbed. 23
Again the dominance of privatist urban policy and local economic development as
vehicles for downtown redevelopment since the 1970s disproportionately shifted the
burdens of economic growth onto the most marginalized segments of Cleveland society.
George Forbes commented in a 1989 interview with Fortune magazine on the virtues of
subsidized downtown redevelopment, "It means young people can be hotel managers and
desk clerks and cooks and waiters. They won't be making $20 an hour, but they damn sure
can make $10" (Magnet, 1995). Such failure to discriminate between economic
restructuring and employment growth delivering widespread economic security vs. that
resulting in a proliferation of low wage, dead end jobs carried dire consequences. In the
1980s, poverty in Cleveland increased by a third, and in 1990, the city had the highest Black
unemployment rate among American big cities (Keating et al., 1995). As tax abatements
and TIFs depleted tax revenues that otherwise would support Cleveland's public schools,
the resultant decline in education quality served as another impetus for mass exodus out of
the city, averaging 16 whites and four Blacks per day during the 1980s (Miggins 1995:
197). Where as in 1964, Black Clevelanders united around a yearlong protest of racial
discrimination and segregation in Cleveland's public schools, 24 increasing black electoral
2 2A vocal critic of the Forbes machine and its mode of political patronage, White captured 80 percent of the
white vote while winning only 30 percent of the Black vote in an election with 53 percent voter turnout. In
contrast, Carl Stokes, the only other Black mayor in Cleveland's history, had won the vast majority of the
Black vote and a small percentage of votes from white liberals and downtown interests in the 1967 general
election, which had a 79 percent total voter turnout (Thompson, 2005).
23 Despite Mayor White's rhetoric about balancing downtown revitalization with neighborhood priorities and
commitment to addressing homelessness in the city, he continued many of the same policies from the
Voinovich-Forbes era during his three four-year terms (1990-2001). While maintaining strong support for
the construction of the heavily subsidized Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the White administration critically
focused on obtaining public subsidies for the $344 million Gateway Project, a redevelopment program
including a new baseball stadium, basketball arena, and improvement of adjacent sites. To raise money for
the Gateway Project, Mayor White proposed a "sin tax" on cigarettes, beer, wine, and liquor, which passed in a
countywide vote despite two to one opposition from Cleveland voters. Promising 16,000 permanent jobs and
tax revenues from the new sports entertainment complex along with direct benefit to Cleveland schools
through $15.6 million in additional taxes, White went to state representatives the following year requesting
tax abatements in perpetuity for the stadium and arena (Bartimole, 1995).
24 From the 1920s, the school district had selectively transferred black children to a handful of overcrowded,
inferior schools where the curricula often deemphasized liberal arts in favor of more practical skills (Kusmer
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power during the 70s and 80s coupled with the disintegration of independent, grassroots
civic and community organizations in Cleveland's majority African American
neighborhoods as the Forbes machine eschewed grassroots organizing and democratic
power building given potential threats to its narrow base of leadership and system of
political patronage.
Hence there was no longer a democratic base for framing alternatives to the social
or economic status quo let alone ensuring the enforcement of affirmative action provisions
on publicly subsidized construction projects to benefit a broad spectrum of minority
contractors and desegregate the building trades unions. Like in many other American
cities, Cleveland's building and construction trades assumed a disparate trajectory from
other organized labor contingents in the postwar era. Early on, the diversity of the city's
industrial base and extreme economic inequality, along with the influx of European
immigrants, many of them predisposed to radical politics and well versed in organizing
repertoires from their homelands, helped ensure the vibrancy of Cleveland's labor
movement into the early 20th century (Miller & Wheeler, 2009). Following the rise of craft
unionism from the latter half of the 19th century, workers in the city's mass production
industries initiated a series of militant strikes in the 1930s, which resulted in significant
gains for the city's industrial unions. Consequently, the United Autoworkers (UAW) and
United Steel Workers (USW) maintained a strong presence in Cleveland until the 1970s,
when economic restructuring and deindustrialization decimated their ranks. As for the
building trades, they allied with real estate developers and other urban growth interests to
benefit from suburbanization and economic regionalization as well as urban renewal and
downtown redevelopment projects (Friedland, 1983; Goldberg & Griffey, 2010; Logan &
Molotch, 2007; Palladino, 2007). As the federal government responded to nationwide Black
protests calling for the integration of the construction industry with affirmative action in
the form of the Philadelphia Plan in the late 1960s, white building trades members
responded by holding rallies, walking off the job, hazing new black apprentices and
journeymen, and organizing a "hard hat movement" that brought the white working class
within the ranks of the Republican party in the 1970s (Griffey, 2010). As events unfolded
1994). As outmigration decimated the income and property tax base, the deterioration of Cleveland's public
school system intensified preexisting tensions, sparking protest in 1964.
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in Cleveland, affirmative action policies in the construction industry largely served to
enrich a small cadre of black contractors while having little effect on the building trades
and their racial status quo, both contingents becoming members of the urban growth
machine.
A parallel event that constrained the capacity of broader community organizing and
democratic power building efforts in Cleveland to challenge corporate control over the
city's political economy had to do with the professionalization of the neighborhood-based
community organizing movement of the late 70s and early 80s. Where the black church
served as an institutional launching pad for grassroots activism in Hough and other
predominantly African American wards in the city during the first half of the 20th century,
the Commission on Catholic Community Action- the social action arm of the Catholic
Diocese of Cleveland-seeded the neighborhood-based movement by holding a series of
Freirian educational forums and discussion groups in its parishes around collective
problems and social injustices (Cunningham, 2007).25 Building on the Industrial Areas
Foundation model, the Catholic Commission also helped form a network of multiracial
community congresses uniting myriad organizations, street clubs, nationality groups, and
churches at the neighborhood level. 26 With additional funding support from the Gund
Foundation and Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) and volunteer
involvement through the federal VISTA program, these coalitions conducted grassroots
organizing and leadership development around issues of neighborhood disinvestment
related to bank and insurance redlining, arson, abuses of CDBG funds, and reform of
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Affairs policies.27 In tracing their dissolution
in the early 1980s, competing theories point to staff burnout, the Reagan administration's
curbing of FEMA funding and the VISTA program, withdrawal of the Catholic Commission
from community organizing, and elimination of philanthropic funds for community
25 The Action for a Change program, which saw the participation of almost 10,000 people, included a segment
on racism in which white suburbanites went on field trips to fill out forms for welfare benefits in order to
understand the daily problems faced by inner city residents
26 These included the Buckeye Woodland Community Congress, St. Clair Superior Coalition, Citizens to Bring
Broadway Back, Union Miles Community Coalition, and Near West Neighbors in Action.
27 In overlapping with three different mayoral administrations, they often had a better working relationship
with the Republican mayors than populist Dennis Kucinich, who oddly saw activist groups as unnecessary in
the presence of an administration who supposedly understood their needs. (Cunningham, 2007).
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organizing and advocacy in the aftermath of the Chagrin Valley Hunt Club incident of 1982,
where 600 demonstrators arrived at the country club and demanded accountability to poor
and elderly people on the part of Standard Oil of Ohio's leadership (Cunningham, 2007).
Whatever the cause of their demise, where the neighborhood-based community organizing
movement once stood, a network of Community Development Corporations presently rely
on tax credit financing to drive low-income housing production in partnership with the
city's corporate community.28
As Cleveland entered the 21st century, the previous focus on downtown as the
strategic point for local economic development gave way to a more dumbbell shaped vision
linking downtown with the cultural, educational, health, and arts institutions of University
Circle via Euclid Avenue's "health tech" or "opportunity" corridor. Elected in 2002 on the
platform of measuring progress by "what we do for the least of us," Mayor Frank Jackson
inaugurated Cleveland's participation in the green cities movement by incorporating
principles of environmental, social, and economic sustainability in his approach to urban
policy and local economic development. 29 By building on existing assets such as the anchor
institutions of University Circle, he aims to transform Cleveland into a center for product
2 8 As the neighborhood-based community organizing movement met its demise, the Cleveland and Gund
Foundations, together with the City of Cleveland, converged around developing a network of Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) under the umbrella of the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN). The
Enterprise Foundation and Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) additionally established local
branches to facilitate the growth of Cleveland's CDCs, while the City of Cleveland dedicated almost $9 million
to housing nonprofits through the CDBG program between 1982 and 1987. The formalization of the CDC
sector under the auspices of corporate philanthropy and local government intensified with the establishment
of the Cleveland Neighborhood Partnership Program (CNPP) in 1985 to consolidate funds available to CDCs
and Neighborhood Progress Incorporated (NPI) in 1987 to oversee corporate efforts related to neighborhood
development. Hence by the late 1980s, the corporatization of community development was complete, with an
overwhelming focus on real estate development and success being measured by appreciated property values
and the addition of new land uses (Yin, 1998, p. 145).
29 The 1969 burning of the Cuyahoga River became a galvanizing symbol for the environmental movement
and compelled Congress to pass the Clean Water Act in 1972 and create the Environmental Protection Agency
(Maag 2009). From legalistic and oppositional strategies, the environmental movement adopted a frame of
sustainability to think more positively and holistically about building a resilient and regenerative city that
balances environmental, social, and economic priorities. In Cleveland, this critical shift was perhaps
embodied by the founding of EcoCity Cleveland in 1992 by David Beach, who in 1995 partnered with Detroit-
Shoreway CDC, the regional transit authority, private developers, the city, and residents to pilot an EcoVillage
project on Cleveland's near West Side. Since, the local sustainability movement has found an institutional
base within Mayor Jackson's administration in the form of the Sustainable Cleveland 2019 initiative as well as
the Green City Blue Lake program at the Cleveland Museum of Natural History. An important milestone for
the local sustainability movement took place in 2009, when Mayor Jackson convened the Sustainable
Cleveland 2019 initiative with the objective of "building an economic engine to empower a green city on a
blue lake" by the 50th anniversary of the infamous Cuyahoga River fire.
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design, product innovation and productivity process improvements (Jackson, 2007).
Endowed by Cleveland's first families in the early 20th century (along with Cleveland
Orchestra, Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland Play House, and Cleveland Institute of
Music of University Circle), the Cleveland Foundation continues to play a leading role in the
redevelopment of University Circle as it did in the 1950s with urban renewal. With their
leadership led to the completion of a rapid transit line along Euclid Avenue and seeded
plans for new road construction, neighborhood redevelopment, and business incubation
for the area around "health tech corridor." Meanwhile, the six neighborhoods surrounding
University Circle (Glenville, Hough, Fairfax, Buckeye-Shaker, Little Italy, and the eastern
end of East Cleveland) suffer from decades of neglect and abandonment, its total 43,000
residents carrying an annual median household income of $18,500. While many of the
neighborhoods are home to highly performing CDCs, they nevertheless became the nation's
epicenter of foreclosures during the 2006-2007 subprime mortgage crisis. Hence questions
remain as to what this iteration of capitalist urban redevelopment and economic
restructuring might have in store for "the least of us."
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CHAPTER 3: RACE, CAPITALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN LOS ANGELES
3.1 19th century Capitalist urban expansion and real estate speculation
Race and profits were at the center of California's incorporation into the Union by
way of conquest and the early development of Los Angeles as an American city. Before the
signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 brought Los Angeles, along with the rest
of what was then northeastern Mexico, under American control, a dominant class of cattle
ranchers combined the abundant lands and limited water supply of the region with the
involuntary servitude of Native Americans to engage in low intensity agriculture and lead
an autonomous way of life (Fogelson, 1993).30 Where the transition to American rule
brought boom and bust cycles, tax obligations, and workings of moneylenders, the gente de
razon gave way to a new ruling class of corporate capitalists mostly based out of San
Francisco. With westward migration picking up after the Civil War and improving the
market for farmland, ranchers discovered the alternative of subdividing their sprawling
estates into 20, 40, and 80- acre farms and selling them to pioneer farmers (Ibid.). Others
saw potential windfalls associated with the growing desire for travel among the rising
middle class in industrial cities back East. While Southern California's expansive acres,
temperate climate, and varied terrain could be commodified and marketed, its remote
location presented a significant barrier. Therefore when the terminating point for the
transcontinental railroad was completed in San Francisco in 1869, the region's most
prominent property owners and businessmen, newly organized as the "Committee of
Thirty," convinced Los Angeles voters to grant $610,000 to Southern Pacific to route trunk
lines through Los Angeles. Working in concert with the tourist bureau, land agents, and
other interest groups, the railroads successfully transformed Los Angeles into a national
destination by the 1880s (Davis, 2006, p. 111). Local boosters contributed at a deeper level
by recasting the region's racialized history into popular narratives and images
30 Prior to the US invasion, a dominant class of cattle ranchers, called the gente de razon, maintained what
was largely a subsistence economy centering on their sprawling ranchos. Claiming Spanish heritage and
sitting atop a segmented racial order, the gente de razon heavily relied on the involuntary servitude of Native
Americans, who performed virtually all the manual labor on the Mexican ranchos. In parallel, a lower class of
Mexicans, mostly of mixed race and almost entirely illiterate, comprised the ranks of the artisans, vaqueros,
and crafts people who labored on the ranchos and in the pueblo for wages.
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romanticizing the Spanish past (Davis, 2006; McWilliams, 1980).31
Capitalist economic development in Los Angeles proceeding by way of the real
estate sector rather than the more traditional avenue of industrialization, public
infrastructure provision prefigured urban growth as opposed to following popular demand.
Where the private sector drew significant profits through utility provision, those like Henry
Huntington took business to another level. Establishing the Pacific Electric Railway
Corporation alongside the Huntington Land and Improvement Company, he coordinated
the routing of electric rail lines with the acquisition, subdivision, and marketing of vast real
estate tracts throughout southern and eastern Los Angeles County. Nephew to Samuel
Huntington of Southern Pacific fame and heir to the vast railroad fortune, he stood at the
center of a bipartisan political machine including private utility companies, street railways,
public works contractors, liquor dealers, and vice and gambling interests that controlled
the city's infrastructure, economy, and politics along with state government between 1870
and 1910 (Erie, 2004, p. 49). Still, the most egregious utility scheme in the history of Los
Angeles fed on the public's ongoing concern over the region's short water supply. Between
1905 and 1910, a business syndicate including Henry Huntington, Harrison Gray Otis of the
Los Angeles Times and other prominent businessmen purchased 108,000 acres of
previously un-irrigated land in the San Fernando Valley and began the process of real
estate subdivision. At the same time, they enlisted the Chamber of Commerce, Merchants
and Manufacturers Association, Realty Board, Municipal League, newspapers, and
politicians to convince voters to approve a $23 million bond issue in 1907 to construct the
31 Helen Hunt Jackson's popular novel, Ramona (1884) first invented the myth of the happy Indian
safeguarded by benevolent Franciscan Missionaries and "fine old Spanish families" (McWilliams, 1973, p. 76).
According to Mike Davis, the "capitalization of Los Angeles's fictional 'Spanish' past" not only censored history
but also "sublimated contemporary class struggle" (Davis, 2006, p. 27). The LA Times and other downtown
business interests, invented the tradition of La Fiesta de Los Angeles to prevent local Pullman strikers from
catalyzing a general strike in 1894. Moreover, the Mission theme found its way into the single family
Craftsman bungalows that became the primary vehicle of working class home ownership by 1930, hailed by
M&M as "the keystone of the Open Shop and a 'contented' labor-force" and denounced by union leaders as
facilitating "a 'new serfdom' that made Los Angeles workers timid in the faces of their bosses" (Davis, 2006, p.
28). Eager to bear the privileged burden of making mortgage payments within the safe confines of the
homogeneous suburban neighborhood, white workers found little use for racial consciousness or inclusion.
Harrison Gray Otis enlisted the aid of Charles Fletcher Lummis to restore the historic Missions for the
purpose of boosterism. In time, the Missions, besides fulfilling their role of drawing in massive tourism, also
spun off a series of thematic motor inns, plays and pageants, furniture, and commercial and residential
architecture as the "great real estate promotion of Southern California was being organized" (Ibid., p. 77).
67
Owens Valley Aqueduct and bring water to the city. In actuality, the project simply diverted
water from the Owens Valley to the San Fernando Valley, at this point still outside LA city
limits but annexed shortly thereafter (McWilliams, 1980).32
Where boom and bust cycles became a permanent fixture of the Southern
Californian landscape, white working class insecurity and anxiety amidst a general climate
of economic instability found partial expression in racial violence and subordination.
According to Gordon DeMarco, in the aftermath of the conquest, Los Angeles was noted for
attracting a disproportionate number of "drifters, thieves, and conmen who in addition to
everything else, were for the most part racist and given to cruel outbursts of violence"
mostly directed at Mexicans, Indians, and Chinese, the black population numbering only
100 in 1880 (Demarco, 1987, p. 32). By some accounts, white working class resentment
toward Mexicans originated in the hyper competitive, laissez faire environment of the
California gold mines, with "the practice of lynching Mexicans [along with Indians, soon
becoming] an outdoor sport in Southern California" (McWilliams, 1980, p. 60-61). The
Chinese also received frequent attacks as they arrived in Southern California from the
1860s to work as merchants, fishmongers, agricultural laborers, and domestic servants
(Scott & Soja, 1998). Besides being ousted from various economic niches, they were
targeted in an 1871 race riot in which a thousand Angelenos attacked Chinatown, stole
$40,000 in cash, and lynched 19 Chinese in the process (McWilliams, 1980).33 As Chinese
agricultural techniques established a vital celery industry in Orange County in the 1890s,
one company posted armed guards to protect Chinese laborers in the fields and
encampments from harassment and arson by white residents. Despite being the population
majority in 1880, Mexicans, Indians, and the Chinese lived in highly segregated areas and
accommodated the white minority through ethnic solidarity and self-help.34 Likewise, black
migrants arriving in Los Angeles (mostly from Texas and Louisiana by way of the Southern
Pacific Sunset Route) settled in ethnic enclaves where they established a series of churches
32 In turn, a portion of the large capital gains fed the downtown construction boom of the 1920s, which
brought a series of skyscrapers, hotels, and civic projects.
33 At the national level, white supremacist organizations and labor unions singled out the Chinese in
legislating the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
34 For example, Mexicans established benevolent societies and attended Catholic churches, while Chinese
immigrants created benevolent associations to offer political and social support systems to newcomers
(Fogelson, 1993).
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and self help organizations (Sides, 2006, p. 15).
From the 1880s, railroad traffic brought the arrival of a broader class spectrum of
migrants from the east and Midwest, many of whom became active in the burgeoning
progressive movement. In contrast to older cities back east, where ethnicity and national
origin defined social affiliations and political allegiances, white newcomers tended to be
generations removed from immigration or quick to trade in their ethnic identities for
membership to the racial majority. In addition to middle class whites of more conservative
disposition, turn of the century Southern California also boasted a significant presence of
Fabian socialists and other leftist visionaries, who comprised the radical wing of the
Progressive movement that took root in Los Angeles beginning in the early 1890s.
Nevertheless dominated by the moderate reform faction, the Progressives instituted the
initiative, referendum, and recall in 1900 along with non-partisanship, direct primaries,
and at-large elections in 1906. Thus concentrating influence in the hands of majorities, they
not only curbed the influence of the Southern Pacific machine but also constrained the
ability of racial minorities to build political power.35 When radical Progressives and
Socialists sought greater representation for dissenting voices on City Council by proposing
proportional representation for municipal elections in 1912, they met defeat at the hands
of moderate progressive and conservative business interests, freshly emerging from their
victorious battle against socialist mayoral candidate Job Harriman. 36 In tandem, the Los
Angeles Progressives pursued immigration restriction and led Americanization programs
to assimilate minorities while prioritizing suburbanization centered on the family unit and
driven by consumerist living (Avila, 2006; Bridges, 1999).
Hence the formation of a modern economy in Southern California was predicated on
a series of public investments and subsidies, including war and conquest, which, in the case
of the Mexican American War, bore heavy American casualties. On the other hand, the
accompanying gains found uneven distribution patterns, as land holdings largely shifted
from the hands of the gente de razon to a small clique of San Francisco-based corporate
35 Consequently the Los Angeles City Council was exclusively white from 1900 until Edward Roybal's election
in 1949 (Sonenshein, 1994, p. 30).
36 A new city charter effective in 1925 following a California Supreme Court decision replaced the "at large"
voting with district elections, where the city was divided into 15 council districts and one member was
elected from each district.
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capitalists. A number of the latter further benefited from government subsidies and land
grants provided to extend the railroad to Los Angeles, which followed public convincing on
the part of the "Committee of Thirty" and a favorable popular vote. Following, the provision
of street railways electricity, water, and other public utilities disproportionately enriched a
small base of landowners and other economic interests allied with the Southern Pacific
machine at great cost to Los Angeles taxpayers. Meanwhile, the region faced a series of
economic crises (early iterations including the Panic of 1873, realty bust in 1889, Panic of
1893, and Panic of 1907), complete with soaring unemployment and real estate market
crashes, underscoring the tenuousness of middle class status. In such a context, shared
membership in the white race bound otherwise socially disparate democratic citizens
around the common project of maintaining the structure of relative privilege. Thereby race
stemmed tensions and contradictions arising from widespread economic denigration by
uneven capitalist urbanization and economic development and democratic discourse
touting majority rule, freedom, and political equality.
3.2 Capitalist industrialization and economic regionalization in Los Angeles, late 19th
century to mid 20th century
The land boom of the 1880s sowed the seeds of change for Los Angeles' political
economy in creating a class of merchants, bankers, publishers, and large-scale real estate
developers and investors intent on harvesting longer term profits through a diversified
regional economy including an industrial base. Given the region's lack of natural
advantages, this emerging faction of economic elites based out of downtown Los Angeles
set upon the task of manufacturing the conditions for industrial and commercial
development, namely a world class seaport and cheap nonunion labor. Led by Harrison
Gray Otis, they formed the Free Harbor League in 1895, soon after lobbying Congress for
federal aid to construct an inside harbor and deep-water port at San Pedro, directly 20
miles south of downtown. The act was a direct challenge to the Southern Pacific Machine
and their ambitions to build a rival commercial harbor and wharf in Santa Monica, where
they held real estate. After nearly a decade of deadlock, Otis and his allies won the "struggle
for speculative profits" by playing on popular suspicions of the Southern Pacific (Fogelson,
1993, p. 113). With construction completed in 1912, The Port of Los Angeles, together with
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its "twin" Port of Long Beach, surpassed all West Coast ports in trade volume by 1920.3 At
the same time, the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association (M&M) united the region's
fruit growers and merchants behind an emphatically anti-union agenda to tout Los Angeles
as an open shop town with unwavering support from the LA Times. By 1930, the task of
industrializing Los Angeles was complete as indicated by its landscape, which boasted oil
refineries, motion picture studios, branch auto and rubber plants, local furniture and
clothing manufacturers, and a growing presence of firms in the electronics, chemical, and
aviation industries in addition to older slaughterhouses, publishing firms, and lumber mills
(Fogelson, 1993).
The development of Southern California's postwar science-based economy followed
the precedent set by the harbor battle in funneling large federal sums into regional
economic development. Cal Tech's George Ellery Hale played a leading role in recruiting the
nation's leading physical scientists, engineers, heads of science-based corporations, and 60
local millionaires to support his vision of a regional economy built on a science-business
partnership. Setting the social infrastructure from 1917, Hale encountered a sudden
windfall when White House-Wall Street relations soured in the face of New Deal banking
regulations, creating room for "new money" interests from the South and West to
"politically and financially [shore] up the Roosevelt administration" during the 1936
presidential election (Davis, 2006, p. 386). In the words of Mike Davis, "The modern
'Sunbelt' was largely born out of the political rewards of this Second New Deal coalition.
Billions of dollars in federal aid (representing net transfers from the rest of the country)
laid down an industrial infrastructure in California, Washington, and Texas" (Ibid., p. 387).
As the Second World War inaugurated an extended period of American geopolitical and
economic machinations across the Pacific, the Los Angeles region developed a thriving
aerospace industry and "extensive network of components manufacturers, service
providers, research centers, and a growing electronics industry" (Scott & Soja, 1998, p. 9).
37 The Los Angeles Board of Harbor Commissioners and Harbor Department partnered with the newly
formed Greater Harbor Committee of Two Hundred, which included representatives of major wholesale and
retail businesses, oil companies, shipping concerns, railroads, banks, law firms, and labor unions (Erie, 2004,
p. 55). The coalition continued to leverage the caretaker state to stabilize and expand the market, using
department-sponsored bond referenda, charter amendments, and ordinances to finance port expansion (Erie,
2004, p. 56).
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Along with the regionalization of the aerospace-military-electronics industry, housing
tracts targeting primarily white, working class homebuyers sprang up around the nearly
sixty new municipalities incorporated around Los Angeles County between 1940 and
1960.38
Where the roots of capitalist economic development in Los Angeles lay with the real
estate sector, the commencement of industrialization at the regional scale only expanded
the scale of real estate development, both of which proceeded along racially stratified lines.
In the words of Mike Davis, "the land conversion process, already raised to an economy of
scale by prewar syndicates and developers, was now transformed into a true mass
production industry. Federally guaranteed mortgages, veterans benefits, and a protected
savings and loan sector-along with the higher wages of the aircraft plants-provided a
stable mass demand for the products of local 'merchant builders' who industrialized land
assembly and construction in the infant suburbs of the San Fernando Valley and the
southeastern coastal plain" (Davis, 2006, p. 121). While suburbanization enabled white
access to more spacious surroundings, cleaner air, better public amenities, and higher
quality schools, such emblems of the Southern Californian good life were off limits to racial
minorities in part thanks to racially restrictive covenants and discriminatory mortgage
lending policies, which kept racial minorities out of 95 percent of the city's housing stock in
the 1920s (Ibid.). Aside from social mores, residential segregation was a lucrative business,
not only for real estate developers but also organizers of homeowner associations, allied
title companies, apartment sub-dividers and landlords, realty brokers, banks, and law firms
who saw unceasing demand for new suburban housing far removed from the presence of
racial minorities. Racist vigilante organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan also benefited
from soaring membership rolls, as they overlapped with white homeowners associations in
purpose and activities. In particular, the working class suburbs surrounding South Central
were home to the most vehement segregationists, who were also the least able to afford
homes elsewhere.
38 Often coming from rural areas and uneasy with the context of rapid change and urbanization, whites folded
themselves into racially homogeneous suburban tracts to forge a sense of community in contradistinction to
the racial other and find relief in material attainment. Aside from racist hiring policies by employers and
unions, racially restrictive covenants and discriminatory mortgage lending policies restrained minority
access to the region's most coveted jobs, including those in the aerospace industry.
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While the mass proliferation of civil disobedience and general strikes in the 1930s
broke open the "citadel of the open shop" to expand LA's union membership from pre-
Depression figures of 20,000 to more than 150,000 by 1938 (Milkman, 2006, p. 26), the
gains disproportionately accrued to white Angelenos. Comprising 85 percent of the
population by 1930, whites dominated the skilled craft unions along with unionized sectors
of the shipbuilding, longshoring, and automotive and aircraft manufacturing industries.
Relative to their exclusionary stance towards African Americans and Asian Americans, the
industrial and skilled craft unions had a more ambiguous relationship with Mexicans; in
late 1930s Los Angeles, the newly established Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO)
recruited 15,000 Mexicans working in the textile, agriculture, steel, warehousing, and
transportation industries to fight against the "Mexican wage" (Sides, 2006, p. 27).39 As
observed by the social scientist Charles Johnson, racial discrimination in Los Angeles was
highly complex, with the treatment of Mexicans depending on whether they were regarded
as white or black (Horne, 1997, p. 29).40 The start of the Second World War, which brought
two decades of industrial expansion to Los Angeles along with federal workplace
desegregation policies, significantly expanded industrial work opportunities for African
Americans who were previously overrepresented in the most dangerous, menial, and
unstable occupations. As for Japanese Americans, they took over many of the local sectors
previously dominated by the Chinese prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and carved
out a niche in horticulture, until nativist backlash culminated in the mass relocation and
internment of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in 1942. In general, Asian Pacific
Islanders were excluded from LA's industrial and skilled craft unions and overrepresented
in agriculture, service sector, and unskilled production jobs.
As the 20st century wore on, Angelenos of color shifted from an earlier approach of
39 After experiencing dramatic decline, partly as a result of white Nativist violence, the Mexican population
began to slowly increase from 1880 as employers recruited immigrant workers to extend the Southern Pacific
to Los Angeles and expand the intra- and inter-urban railways. By 1930, they made up eight percent of the
population, while African Americans and Asian Americans made up three percent and two percent
respectively. Mexican labor also sustained the region's citrus farms and other lines of agriculture as well as
manufacturing after the turn of the century, despite a period of mass deportation during the Great
Depression. During the Zoot Suit Riots, white servicemen randomly attacked Latino youth clad in zoot suits
on the basis of their purported "lack of patriotism."
40 Yet during the Great Depression, they also fell victim to targeted mass deportation and repatriation (Avila,
2006).
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accommodationism to an integrationist stance that demanded equal economic opportunity
and civil and political rights. The multiracial character of residential segregation and labor
market segmentation in Los Angeles not only gave way to intergroup tensions and rivalries
but also facilitated neighborhood-based identity formation and organizing across race. One
current of activism grew out of the city's east side neighborhoods and was affiliated with
radical sections of the labor movement. In the turbulent 1930s, Boyle Heights was home to
Mexican, Jewish, Japanese, and African American workers, many of them active in battles
for higher wages and better work conditions in the needle trades, janitorial services, and
other low wage sectors (i.e. 1933 El Monte berry workers strike, International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, El Congreso Nacional de Habla Espanol). According to Josh Sides,
relative to the local Latino community, organized labor had a minimal influence in prewar
Black Los Angeles (Sides, 2006), partly as a result of the small numbers of African
Americans in the city (at three percent of the populace). Where union activity involving
African Americans in prewar Los Angeles was largely limited to black-only unions such as
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), the few integrated AFL unions
representing unskilled and semiskilled workers had a strong base in neighborhoods like
Watts and Boyle Heights. Beyond seeding community unionism, LA's diverse working class
inner city neighborhoods along with their community and civic organizations, also
launched electoral organizing drives for progressive candidates like Mayor Fletcher
Bowron and Councilman Edward Roybal, who in turn advocated "a 'public' mode of urban
growth that stressed government programs such as public housing to eliminate slum
conditions and to provide affordable housing for the city's inhabitants" (Avila, 2006, p. 38).
Despite some amount of co-location and overlap in progressive activist traditions,
LA's minority communities also had diverse approaches to challenging the prevailing mode
of privatist city making and living. As mentioned earlier, from the 1930s, Latino Angelenos
found greater incorporation into the ranks of the AFL and CIO unions relative to their Asian
Pacific Islander and African American counterparts. Besides the favorable racial attitudes
of the Anglo majority, the larger presence of Latino workers in the garment industry and
other sectors in parallel with politicized Jewish workers that bore militant labor organizing
campaigns may have played a facilitating role. As noted by Douglas Monroy, "World politics
came to the Mexican immigrants of Southern California by way of Eastern Europe's shtetls,
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from which came most of the garment employers, ILGWU leaders, and Communists in the
needle trades" (Monroy, 1999, p. 238). Beyond workplace issues, Community Services
Organization (CSO), established in 1947 on the city's eastside, injected Chicano civil rights
organizing with an Alinskyite flair in fighting discrimination, registering voters, and
training community and labor organizers like Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta (Davis,
2006). Largely based out of LA's African American community, civil rights organizations
like the Urban League and NAACP harnessed the legislative and judicial powers of the
federal, state, and local governments to expand minority job opportunities in the defense
industries and overturn racial covenants and other discriminatory housing measures.
Where these organizations tended to be dominated by middle class interests, by the 1950s,
the Communist Party made inroads among working class black Angelenos through
aggressive protest tactics against the LAPD, white vigilante organizations, and
discriminatory workplaces (Sides, 2006, pp. 141-142).41 While the prevailing climate of
anti-communism assured their relative marginality within black civil society, the local
chapter of the NAACP nevertheless incorporated more direct action tactics as
demonstrated by their consumer boycotts in the late 1950s.
3.3 Late 20th century capitalist downtown redevelopment
The postwar aerospace-military-electronics boom, complete with the growth of the
Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex, 42 effectively seeded the next phase of economic
restructuring in spinning off the information communication technologies and
advancements in logistics and supply chain management at the core of economic
globalization. Beginning in the early 1960s, basic manufacturing firms began to leave South
Central and the Alameda Corridor for the outer suburbs, with more relocating to foreign
countries or entirely closing shop by the end of the decade. On the other hand, downtown
Los Angeles saw a tenfold increase in the number of high rise buildings between 1973 and
41 Eventually forming the largest party district outside New York, the local branch drew approximately 10
percent of its membership among African Americans at the peak of its activity.
42 Thanks to an immense program of new investment in LA's ports and airports undertaken by the Bradley
administration, the city continued as the dominating hub of Pacific Rim commerce as to survive the eventual
post-Cold War downsizing of its aerospace economy" (Sides, 2006).
75
1990, while Wilshire Corridor, between downtown and Santa Monica, came to account for
another third of the high rise office space in the five county region. The problem facing Los
Angeles was not so much economic decline as it was bifurcation resulting from the loss of
unionized, blue-collar jobs in the heavy industries (i.e. auto, tire, steel, and civilian aircraft)
coupled with the increase of high skill professional and managerial jobs related to finance,
accounting, insurance, and business services on one end and the proliferation of non union,
low skill manufacturing and service jobs on the other (Soja et al., 1983). The spatial
dimension added another layer, as the expanding high tech industries were mostly located
in outlying suburban areas such as Orange County. Meanwhile plant closures (about 75
percent) were concentrated near South Central (between downtown and the ports) and
Boyle Heights (east of downtown toward San Bernardino), neighborhoods marked by
intensified segregation (Soja et al., 1983, p. 221). Parts of the old industrial core moved into
warehousing and distribution, generally consisting of low wage, dead end jobs. In addition
to generating much of the containerized imports moving through the ports, Asian Pacific
countries also poured significant capital into downtown real estate by the 1980s.
The urban and economic restructuring proceeded in a manner that was neither
natural nor evenhanded. The remaking of downtown went back as early as the late 1930s
when the Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC) made particular note of their racial
diversity in identifying the downtown neighborhoods of Chavez Ravine and Bunker Hill as
areas that were blighted and meriting slum clearance (Avila, 2006). In the early 1950s, the
Los Angeles City Housing Authority (CHA), under the progressive auspices of Mayor
Fletcher Bowron, drafted plans to redevelop these areas to include 10,000 units of federally
subsidized public housing. Most strategically, conservative downtown business interests
purged the CHA of "subversive influences" and defeated Bowron at the polls while they
were in the midst of temporarily relocating Chavez Ravine residents to accommodate
construction (Avila, 2006; Gottlieb, 1977). Shortly thereafter, organized labor, led by the
building trades, withdrew their support from the New Deal coalition and allied with the
new administration against public housing (Avila, 2006). Then in 1957, the right wing
Congressman turn mayor Norris Poulson signed over 315 acres of public land where
Chavez Ravine once stood to Walter O'Malley in 1957 to construct Dodger's Stadium.
Emboldened by their "success," the growth coalition moved forward on plans to clear
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Bunker Hill of its working class residents and transform it into a complex of corporate
office towers, luxury apartments, and a cultural center during the 1950s and 1960s. 4 3
Simultaneously armed with the powers of eminent domain and federal funding through the
Federal Highway Act of 1956, the city's transportation planners coordinated highway
construction with the clearance of thousands of homes in South Los Angeles, Boyle Heights,
and adjacent communities.
The passage of fair employment and housing legislation at state and federal levels in
the late 1950s and early 1960s left working class black communities increasingly isolated
as their Jewish, Asian American, Latino, and black middle class neighbors entered the ranks
of white collar employment and moved into the suburbs. In South Los Angeles and the
Alameda industrial corridor, blue collar black workers faced a declining number of
manufacturing jobs, with the disintegration of the street railway system and subsequent
replacement by a sparse and unreliable bus network further undermining their job
prospects. As the children of the Great Migration came of age in the inner city, they
experienced police harassment and "compounded racism," not only by whites and other
minorities but also lighter skinned, more affluent blacks (Horne, 1997). Disaffected by the
middle class orientation of the NAACP, many embraced the Nation of Islam, Black Panther
Party, and other black nationalist organizations embodying more aggressive, anti-white
and anti-capitalist stances. Tensions finally exploded in August of 1965 when an angry
confrontation between the LAPD and Watts residents sparked six days of civil unrest.44
Among the immediate impacts, the city used federal funding obtained through the
Economic Opportunity Act to run a series of after school, vocational, and family planning
programs. While these helped alleviate tensions, they left intact the prevailing mode of
capitalist urbanization and economic development underlying the marginalization of the
43 Like the last few remaining in Chavez Ravine, the residents of these multiracial communities voiced
opposition by circulating petitions, holding community meetings, and organizing public demonstrations.
However, the absence of labor allies coupled with the disproportionate power, resources, and influence held
by their opponents overburdened these guardians of the city's remaining "heterosocial spaces," and the
"postwar agglomeration of racially segregated communities" proceeded a pace through the 1960s (Avila,
2006, p. 208).
44 An immediate response was when the city broke the ongoing deadlock over War on Poverty funds to
create the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA), which in turn
sponsored Head Start and ran an on-the-job training program that transitioned program enrollees into more
than 30,000 permanent and part time jobs.
77
urban black poor.
As the LA region added over 1.3 million jobs in the 1970s, the mainstream "Anglo
labor movement" continued to focus on bread and butter issues for its membership;
meanwhile, working class communities of color and their allies tried coalitional approaches
to address the detrimental effects of economic restructuring outside the framework of
traditional unionism. In East Los Angeles, the late 1960s saw rising activism among
younger Chicanos (i.e. Brown Berets, MEChA) and immigrant workers (i.e. United Farm
Workers), many of whom united with 30,000 other antiwar demonstrators during the
Chicano Moratorium of 1970. Historically opposed to organized labor and allied with the
LAPD, the Catholic archdiocese of Los Angeles partnered with the Community Services
Organization in the 1970s to replicate the Industrial Areas Foundation's San Antonio model
of congregation-based community organizing for the purpose of "reintegrating alienated
eastside parishes while strengthening Catholic social values and Chicano political clout at
the same time" (Davis 2006: 34?).4s In South Los Angeles, the founding of the Watts Labor
Community Action Center (WLCAC) in 1965 by fourteen civil rights and labor activists
(Soja 2010: 133) kicked off the local community development movement. Besides
operating as a community development corporation from the 1970s, the WLCAC also
partnered with UFW to advocate "community unionism," or "organizational strategies
[recognizing] the need to go beyond immediate workplace issues to address wider
community interests" (Soja 2010: 131). Aside from overlapping coalitional strategies, the
United Farm Workers, Community Services Organization, and Watts Labor Community
Action Center were each deeply rooted in LA's inner city minority working class
neighborhoods. Despite their differing issue areas and constituencies, they enabled
communities of color to define their own priorities and agendas as well as advocate for
their own interests. In doing so, they established a democratic power base independent of
45 According to Mike Davis, the initiative focused on grassroots mobilization, organized dramatic
confrontations with the power structure, and eschewed formal deals or electoral endorsements. It was
"conservative in its general avoidance of coalition building with progressive groups, its apotheosis of family
values and its selection of only winnable issues, one at a time that empathized catholic moralism as much as
community empowerment and economic survival" (Davis 2006, p. 346-347). However, it was successful in
prompting a federal trade commission investigation on discriminatory auto insurance rates in the east side
and organizing residents around winning housing rehabilitation funds, building new supermarkets,
improving eastside schools. At the same time, it failed to redistribute power and was not democratically
accountable but rather controlled by the church leadership. Further, it lacked an economic program.
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the mainstream labor movement, which catered to the priorities of its predominantly
white, growingly middle class members.
Communities of color also tried coalitional approaches to consolidating political
power in post-Watts Los Angeles; for instance, "Bradley's 1969 and 1973 campaigns
[brought] together the city's political outsiders-primarily Jews, Blacks, and Latinos-
some of whom had joined forces in the civil rights and antiwar trenches before forging an
alliance to take over city hall (Gottlieb et al., 2006, p. 143). Where African Americans
constituted 26 percent of the local electorate in 1973 (making the historical highpoint of
black electoral participation), black candidates like Tom Bradley additionally depended on
Jewish and white liberal support (Jewish Angelenos were only starting to become "white"
in the eyes of the mainstream) along with the Latino vote. Relative to African Americans,
Latinos remained the "politically weakest and most disenfranchised group in Los Angeles"
(Gottlieb et al., 2006, p. 148), both as a result of immigration status as well as
fragmentation of Latino districts. It would take another decade before state and federal
reapportionment created a number of Latino legislative districts and another decade after
that, for Proposition 187 (1994)-a ballot initiative intended deny the use of public
resources including schools and hospitals to undocumented immigrants- to spark
naturalization, voter registration, and voting on the part of California Latinos. In the
meantime, Latino voters played a small but not unsubstantial role in winning the election
of Tom Bradley as the city's first black mayor in 1973, which marked significant racial
progress in post-Watts Los Angeles. A proponent of affirmative action policies, Mayor
Bradley integrated the municipal workforce as well as increased the representation of
racial minorities and women on city commissions. His administration further banned the
LAPD's use of the controversial chokehold and limited the department's intelligence
gathering activities, although its police reforms paled in comparison to other major cities
(Sides, 2006; Thompson, 2005).
With respect to the city's black inner city poor and working class residents, the
Bradley administration offered them few substantive improvements, demonstrating the
hollow racial mediation at the heart of his electoral campaign, particularly in a context of
declining public resources and economic recession. Beholden to a new cadre of liberal
Jewish elites based out of the Westside (who had made their fortunes off postwar
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suburbanization and the aerospace-military-electronics industry) and shortly allied with
downtown-based corporate leaders, the Bradley administration focused its attentions on
the most visible markers of economic growth, namely downtown revitalization and port
expansion. Meanwhile the more critical issues around blue-collar job loss, affordable
housing, and public safety in places like South Central remained a low priority.
Additionally, where the public sector helped temper unemployment during the 1960s and
1970s by providing jobs and social services, the federal government drastically eliminated
funding for urban programs during the 1980s, while the passage of Proposition 13 (1978)
at the statewide level constrained the ability of the state and cities to raise revenue for
basic services.46 Among the legislative victories of the burgeoning homeowners movement
based out of the San Fernando Valley, Proposition 13 (along with Proposition 187 and the
series of attempts by Valley residents to secede from the rest of the city) signified efforts on
the part of white Angelenos and other supporters to guard their racial privileges in a time
of growing economic insecurity, partly by undermining the capacity of the public sector to
serve the social and economic interests of certain minority groups. In the case of
Proposition 187, it not only carried the majority of the white vote but also half of the Asian
and Black vote respectively. The policy initiative thereby exposed racial divisions among
LA's non-white population along with the salience of racialized policy discourse in
activating individualistic and nationalistic ideologies. Amidst rising inner city
unemployment and poverty, Los Angeles again erupted into flames on April 29, 1992 upon
the acquittal of four white police officers in the Rodney King case, (Gottlieb et al., 2006).
Where Korean owned businesses were among the most prominent targets for looting and
arson, the mainstream media chose to highlight the conflicted dynamics between Korean
merchants and South LA residents while downplaying the deeper economic and political
dimensions of the urban uprising along with deeper racial implications. 47
In the aftermath of the 1992 riots, Mayor Bradley called together Rebuild LA,
46 Both the election of Reagan, who implemented federal budget cuts in the area of urban social and economic
policy, and Proposition 13 came about through the conservative populist movement based out of Southern
California's suburbs.
47 For instance, those arrested during the 1992 were split between African Americans and Latinos, and the
vast majority of those convicted of serious crimes were young men between the ages of 18 and 34-the exact
demographic facing high unemployment and therefore disaffected amidst economic restructuring (Gottlieb et
al. 2005, p. 70-71).
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consisting of leading business and political figures with a handful of ministers "to
demonstrate that the private sector could achieve what government had not" (Gottlieb et
al., 2006, p. 179). At the same time, he ignored alternative policy proposals put forth by
grassroots organizations such as "Give us the Hammer and the Nails and We Will Rebuild
the City," issued by the Bloods and Crips who simultaneously declared a truce in the wake
of the riots (Kelley, 1996b; Thompson, 2005). Consequently progressive activists turned to
grassroots organizing, coalition building, and policy advocacy to tackle housing and
community development, urban design, transportation planning, environmental policy, and
regional economic development (Brodkin, 2007; Soja, 2010). Between the late 1970s and
mid 1980s, a community-labor coalition called the Los Angeles Coalition Against Plant
Shutdowns had waged a defensive struggle against factory closures. Inevitably meeting
failure, several of the activists joined the urban planning department at UCLA where they
continued to lend support to community-labor coalitions by undertaking popular
education, research, and publication in partnership with community partners as well as
seeding progressive policy advocacy organizations (Haas, 2011; Wolff, 2011). Where
previous efforts tended to be reactive in trying to stall or ameliorate the negative effects of
economic restructuring and changing work arrangements, post 1992 Los Angeles saw an
upsurge of broad-based efforts aimed at expanding the economic and social rights of low-
income communities in the "new economy" (Soja, 2010). While manufacturing jobs
continued to leave inner city neighborhoods, initiatives like the Living Wage Campaign and
Ordinance, SEIU Homecare Workers organizing campaign, the Multiethnic Immigrant
Worker Organizing Network's Koreatown Restaurant Workers Justice Campaign, the
Metropolitan Alliance's City Jobs Program, and Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy's
campaigns for Community Benefits Agreements strategically focused on economic sectors
and activities rooted in the Los Angeles region in promoting democratically accountable
urban economic development.48 The same period also saw growing ties between labor,
48 Major milestones in the post 1992 renaissance of progressive activism included the Living Wage Campaign
and Ordinance (enacted in 1997) led by LAANE in partnership with community, labor, tenants rights, and
religious organizations; political invigoration of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor by means of
electoral organizing drives around issues of concern to low wage earners under the leadership of Miguel
Contreras between 1996 and 2005; formation of the Multiethnic Immigrant Worker Organizing Network
(MIWON) in 1999 and their ensuing Koreatown Restaurant Workers Justice Campaign; 1999 election of
70,000 LA County homecare workers to join SEIU Local 434B (the biggest organizing victory since the 1941
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community, and environmental organizations around improving public transportation,
greening the LA and Long Beach Ports and transportation corridors, and creating healthier
food options in inner city neighborhoods (Gottlieb et al., 2006).
At the center of these new developments was the unexpected emergence of Los
Angeles as a center of labor movement resurgence by way of former AFL affiliates such as
SEIU and UNITE HERE. Scholar Ruth Milkman has pointed to four major causal factors
underlying LA's union revitalization and strategic innovation. The first relates to the nature
of the regional economy, namely the central role of tourism and real estate speculation in
the historical development of the Southern California economy. The result was a
concentration of employment and unionization in the transportation, construction,
services, and government sectors traditionally affiliated with the AFL as opposed to the
CIO-dominated mass production-based industries, which dominated in Eastern and
Midwestern cities (Milkman, 2006, p. 32). Given dispersed spatial patterns of employment,
the AFL affiliates pursued strategic approaches that took wages out of competition in entire
industries or sectors (e.g. advocating common wage standards) rather than organize at
specific work sites (Ibid., p. 23). Another enabling condition was the proliferation of low-
wage casualized employment and economic restructuring, which emerged earlier and more
intensely in Southern California compared to other parts of the country. This came, in part,
as a result of the burgeoning conservative movement based out of Orange County, which
used the "region's rapidly expanding economy [as a] early testing ground for low-road
managerial strategies that sprouted up all across the United States in the 1970s and 1980s"
(Milkman, 2006, pp. 8-9; McGirr, 2001). A third factor had to do with the 1965 Immigration
and Naturalization Act and the region becoming the most popular destination for Latino
immigrants. These newcomers not only moved into de-unionized and restructured jobs
UAW Ford River Rouge plant campaign); creation of the City Jobs Program, designed to transition welfare
recipients into municipal employment with livable wages and clear career paths in the aftermath of federal
welfare reform (led by the Metropolitan Alliance, a coalition of community-based organizations, labor unions,
and faith-based organizations); proliferation of Community Benefits Agreements (CBA) on publicly
subsidized major urban redevelopment projects in Los Angeles under the leadership of LAANE (i.e. the
Hollywood and Highland Center, Staples Center, Hollywood and Vine mixed-use, transit-oriented
development, and the LAX expansion); and finally the expanded use of Project Labor Agreements (PLAs), with
built-in local hire provisions under the leadership of the LA County Federation of Labor (major signatories
including the LA Unified School District, LA Community Redevelopment Agency and Public works
Department, and LA County Metropolitan Transit Authority).
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abandoned by native-born workers but were also predisposed to collective action and
progressive movement building, often from past political struggles in their countries of
departure. Where Milkman notes the strength and vitality of immigrant social networks
along with persistent immigrant stigmatization by the white majority as a sub-factors
fostering worker solidarity and organization, we might additionally underscore the role of
independent Latino and other minority civil society organizations and groups in organizing
and politicizing workers as well as cultivating community leaders (Milkman, 2006). Finally,
Milkman points to the factor of geography, or the remoteness of Los Angeles from labor
traditional strongholds on the East Coast and in San Francisco, home to "entrenched, risk
averse, old guard labor leadership" prior to 1995 (Ibid., p. 10).
In conjunction with the rising presence of Latinos within the labor movement,
electoral re-apportionment along with voter registration and mobilization drives by
organizations like the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor expanded Latino voting
power. As continuing immigration brought a growing number of Latino residents into
previously black majority neighborhoods, shifting demographic patterns gave rise to
tensions as well as collaborations (Gottlieb et al., 2006, p. 148). For instance, homeless
activist Ted Hayes, Jr. of Dome Village fame has waged campaigns to get blacks to join the
Minuteman Project, which monitors the U.S.-Mexican border (Kaplan, 2006). Further, in
2006, members of a Latino street gang were convicted of perpetrating s series of hate
crimes in order to drive black residents out of a predominantly Latino neighborhood north
of downtown Los Angeles. LA County jails have also seen deadly explosions of violence
between black and Latino gang members. In electoral politics, the 2001 mayoral election
exposed black-brown divisions when the city's African American voters overwhelmingly
supported James Hahn, son of Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, a longtime LA County Supervisor
and ally of the civil rights movement, delivering him to campaign victory against Latino
Democrat and former labor organizer Antonio Villaraigosa (Gottlieb et al., 2006). Despite
initial defeat, Villaraigosa went on to win the 2005 election, this time with the backing from
the Latino-labor coalition as well as leading black organizers and political leaders, who
shifted their loyalties from Hahn in the face of broken campaign promises about black
political appointments (Sonenshein, & Pinkus, 2005). Where interracial relations enabling
electoral alliances might be more transactional in nature, organizations like Community
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Coalition and SCOPE have pursued a deeper, longer-term approach to promoting black and
brown unity in the process of community organizing for social and economic justice in
South Los Angeles. Likewise the Black Worker Center, based out of the UCLA Labor Center,
works to strengthen the relationship between Black Los Angeles and the labor movement.
As for Asian Pacific Islanders (APIs) in Los Angeles, post-1965 immigration
enhanced their internal heterogeneity in terms of nationality, ethnicity, class, religion,
gender, and political orientation (Takaki, 1998). Compared to the city's black population,
which remained stable between 1960 and 2010, the API population expanded fivefold
during the same period (although less than the seven-fold growth among Latinos).
Originating in the late 1960s, the model minority myth points to high rates of educational
attainment and income among Asian immigrants in order to invalidate Black claims of
structural racism and demands for racial justice (Chou & Feagin, 2008; Petersen, 1971;
Petersen, William, 1966). In fact, stereotypes about high API educational and economic
achievement mask the bifurcated structure of the population. As glorified by the media,
some of the post 1965 immigrants, particularly those arriving from East Asia, entered
directly into middle class suburbs, business ownership, and white collar employment,
thanks in part to the hard won gains of the Civil Rights Movement (Li, 2009); at the same
time, many Asian immigrants also went into the non-union, low wage service sector and
manufacturing jobs, with Hmong, Laotian, Cambodian, and Samoan American communities,
in particular, facing problems of unemployment and poverty (Zhou & Xiong, 2005).
Further, model minority stereotypes fuel oppositional dynamics among minority groups by
uplifting one "success" case at the expense of others when in reality the glass ceilings and
denigrating remarks (i.e. "You speak such good English!" uttered to a native-born person of
Chinese ancestry) frequently encountered by Asian Pacific Americans have proven the
difficulty of transcending the American racial order.49 In responding to racial oppression,
Asian Pacific Islanders in Los Angeles have started to translate their growing numbers into
political power, through naturalization and voter registration. Community-based
organizations like Asian Americans for Civil Rights and Equality and Asian Pacific American
49 Korean Americans whose businesses were looted and destroyed during the 1992 uprising learned that a
"model" minority is still but a minority when LAPD neglected their pleas for help to instead guard Hancock
Park, Beverly Hills, and other affluent, disproportionately white parts of the city.
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Legal Center maintain efforts to organize a pan-ethnic voting bloc and hold elected officials
accountable to shared interests such as civil rights, immigrant rights, and access to
language assistance.so At the same time, organizations like the Koreatown Immigrant
Worker Center, Pilipino Worker Center, and South Asian Network have taken part in
multiracial alliances to push workforce-related organizing campaigns and policies in Los
Angeles (Milkman et al., 2006).
As Los Angeles entered the 21st century, its economic future appeared uncertain.
Political leaders increasingly embraced the living wage as a standard and union density in
the LA region continued to outpace the national average,5 1 in large part due to past and
ongoing grassroots organizing efforts in the low wage service and manufacturing sectors.
Following his election in 2005, Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa shortly appointed a series of
progressive activists with expertise in areas including but not limited to civil rights, labor
organizing, environmental justice and transportation planning to leadership positions
within the administration. Many of them converging on commitments to the triple bottom
line of environmental, social, and economic sustainability, the administration instituted the
Green LA plan in 2007, setting benchmarks for turning Los Angeles into one of the greenest
big cities in the nation. In terms of economic development policy, the prospect of
generating a place-based "clean tech" industry complete with quality jobs achieved wide
resonance particularly in the aftermath of the housing and economic crisis of the late
2000s. Since abandoning Fletcher Bowron's progressive coalition during the 1950s to do
business with the city's growth coalition over the next few decades, the building trades
reemerged at the center of a progressive labor-community-environmental coalition. The
series of policy victories achieved over the past seven years center on green building and
infrastructure projects complete with project labor agreements containing ambitious
targeted hiring programs, partly designed to mend the history of environmental
50 So far, electoral participation rates among APIs remain lower than among Latinos or African Americans,
and efforts by activists advocating pan-ethnic solidarity have yet to render an effective voting bloc. However,
researchers at the UCLA Asian American Studies Center and the UC Asian American and Pacific Islander
Policy Initiative are touting APIs as the new "sleeping giant" in California politics.
51 In 2011, the LA region, including Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Ana, Oxnard, Thousand Oaks, Ventura,
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ontario Counties, had unionization rates of 56 percent in the public sector and
9 percent in the private sector compared to national rates of 36.7 percent for the public sector and 6.9
percent private sector (Applebaum & Zipperer, 2011).
85
degradation and racial exclusion in the unionized sector of the construction industry and
the "higher" echelons of the labor movement. In the interim, soaring unemployment amidst
the Great Recession and public budget cuts pose more immediate challenges for coalition
members. While bearing disparate impacts throughout the Southland, the economic
recession has also affected the dissipating middle class, in turn raising the stakes with
respect to the currently open market and policy window of the local "green economy."
3.4 Discussion
This final section returns to the question: To what extent, in what ways, and how has
race played a role in managing the tensions and contradictions between capitalism and
democracy at the local level? Our historical analysis indicates that race played a profound
role in shaping the unfolding of capitalist industrialization and urbanization in both
Cleveland and Los Angeles. As capitalists and other economic elites "made" markets,
whether related to manufacturing, real estate, or utilities, with the use of public resources,
local economies were highly unstable and inequitable by design. Beyond the periodic
panics stemming from boom and bust cycles, racialized labor markets absorbed tensions
that might arise as certain democratic citizens performed dangerous, dirty, and demeaning
jobs while others absorbed the lion's share of benefits. As long as there was a subordinated
class of workers, employers could benefit from paying cheaper wages and hiring and firing
at a moment's notice in tune with market fluctuations. On the other hand, the white
working class could feel assurance in knowing that their economic prospects, no matter
how bad, were better than that of blacks. Racialized housing markets fueled demand for
new housing products and assured the racial majority of economic rewards in the form of
business and job opportunities and rising homeowner equity. In the center city and inner
ring suburbs, they even maintained demand for dilapidated, old housing stock to the extent
the supply was all that was available to racial minorities. A more implicit point has to do
with "undesirable land uses" and negative externalities of urban development, the latter
exemplified by public housing and the latter by pollution and environmental destruction.
Both were concentrated in low-income communities of color as to spare other sections of
the city or region adverse impacts on real estate value and neighborhood quality of life and
politicians and other public officials retaliation from the population majority.
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As far as "how" race managed the tensions and contradictions between capitalism and
democracy, it was through highly "social" means. Put another way, racial discrimination
and subordination was "social" to the extent it was created and maintained in a broad-
based, decentralized manner rather an invention of the ruling class with purported aims of
racially dividing the working class. In fact, ordinary white citizens mobilized at the
grassroots and policy level to keep racial minorities out of suburban neighborhoods, public
schools, and public spaces. Frequently employed rationales for minority exclusion were
also "social" in the sense that they pointed to "custom" and "precedent" rather than
instrumental reasons (Jones, 1998). Where white vigilante organizations maintained racial
homogeneity in neighborhoods, labor unions played comparable roles at the workplace.
Employers by every means benefited from racial divisions of labor in terms of lower overall
factor costs resulting from lower wages paid to racial minorities along with the ability to
discipline white workers using the threat of hiring low wage competitors. Still, whether in
the factories of the rustbelt or agricultural fields of Southern California, white workers
spearheaded harassment and violence against workers of color as to occasionally require
protective or cautionary measures on the part of employers. At the cultural ideological
level, racial stratification provided a sense of comfort for white workers who felt
dehumanized and oppressed by their work conditions as well as dissatisfied with their
living conditions (Ignatiev, 2008; Roediger, 2007). However, such an "escape" was not
exclusive to white workers but also sought by racial minority groups to the extent they
adopted the racism of the white majority in their outlooks and actions toward other
minorities. African Americans in Los Angeles in some ways benefited from "rainbow
racism," where it dispersed negative attentions, but also suffered from a "compounded
racism" in their dealings with other minorities (Horne, 1997). Hence, the "working" class
(the middle class included) overwhelmingly outnumbered economic elites in a market
democracy where private sector profits was highly contingent on state intervention but
bounded its transformative power by adhering to a form of racial separatism that sought
personal redemption through fleeting material achievements and condemnation of lazy
and undeserving "others."
The variable of space was deeply implicated in both absorbing and challenging the
tensions and contradictions between capitalism and democracy. The concentration of racial
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minorities in the center city and inner ring suburbs along with the remnants of economic
failures or bygones, whether related to manufacturing or housing production, maintained
widespread adherence to the paradigm of economic growth as equal to maximized public
interest or social welfare. As long as the population majority remained surrounded by
markers of economic prosperity and associated blight and poverty with the inherent
deficiencies of racialized groups, urban policy and economic development programs could
continue as is without any legitimation crises. On the other hand, heavily minority
neighborhoods like Hough, Buckeye Woodland, or the Near West in Cleveland or Boyle
Heights and Watts in Los Angeles frequently served as rallying points for grassroots
organizing and social movements with transformative agendas. The co-location of people
actively grappling with experiences of marginality and adjusting to challenging social and
economic circumstances catalyzed the formation of shared identities, a sense of solidarity,
and impetus for collective action. Prior to urban renewal and the outmigration of Jews,
Asian Americans, and middle class Latinos and African Americans, places like Boyle Heights
and Watts, neighborhood-based identity formation and organizing played a central role in
forging solidarity across race, ethnicity, religion, and class lines. Minority discourse and
strategies around racial justice and equality ranged from accommodationist stances to
aggressive manifestations encompassing armed struggle and urban uprisings depending on
their numbers, the surrounding economic context, and the intensity of their
marginalization by mainstream society and in the case of Black Angelenos, other
minorities. In both cases, increasing numbers brought political power, while troubling
social and economic circumstances increased the penchant for direct action and more
radical reform as demonstrated by depression era Black Cleveland and Proposition 187-era
California Latinos. As for the effects of social marginality on oppositional movements, the
health of minority civil society appeared to play a mediating role, with diverse community
and civic groups, ethnic media, and other civil spheres converting disaffection and
frustration with the political and economic status quo into more constructive reform
efforts (i.e. Black Cleveland from the 1930-1960s vs. the Forbes era; Watts from the 1930s-
early 60s vs. next two decades).
For all their overlap, Cleveland and Los Angeles also have significant differences, an
obvious point of contrast centering on LA's emergence as the center of union revitalization
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vs. the general trend of industrial and union decline in Cleveland. As illuminated by Ruth
Milkman, underlying factors include the nature of their respective economies. For one
thing, Cleveland has taken the path of a more "traditional" industrial city, experiencing
deindustrialization beginning in the 1920s and struggling to regain its economic stature
despite efforts to seat a series of corporate headquarters and become a center for
biomedical and healthcare technology. In conjunction, the city's once powerful CIO-
affiliated unions met decline, while public sector unions also suffered amidst growing
federal retrenchment and privatization from the late 1970s. On the other hand, LA's
economic base retained a more diverse and flexible character, whether related to tourism,
agriculture, and speculative real estate development in the late 19th and early 20th century,
the postwar aerospace-military-electronics production and suburbanization, growing US
trade with Asia, or high-end corporate services. As mentioned earlier, the relatively strong
presence of craft unionism along with anti-union offensives and labor casualization efforts
also furthered community unionism and other nontraditional labor organizing strategies.
Demographic differences also played a role in setting disparate trajectories, Cleveland with
its black-white racial dichotomy and trend of depopulation from the 1950s and LA's
population being more multiracial since the American conquest, 52 with post-1965
immigration fueling its continued expansion. The fact that Mexicans assumed an
ambiguous status with respect to the mainstream labor movement (compared to African
Americans and Asian Pacific Islanders, who were more marginalized) might have also
helped establish initial Latino representation within local unions, who in turn mediated the
incorporation of immigrant newcomers and their movement repertoires. Finally, the co-
location of Jewish European, Asian, Mexican, and African American Angelenos in multiracial
neighborhoods like Boyle Heights and Watts until the 1950s facilitated the blending of
diverse oppositional cultures and strategies under the framework of unionism as to set an
effective precedent (Avila, 2006; Gottlieb et al., 2006). Alternatively Black Clevelanders
singularly absorbed white racism and remained socially and spatially isolated from
European socialists and other radical immigrant groups (outside Communist and Socialist
52 Comprising 15 percent of the population in 1950, black Clevelanders now make up the population majority
(53 percent), while whites account for 37 percent, Latinos- 10 percent, and Asian Americans- 2 percent. As
of 2010, the city of Los Angeles had just under 4 million residents of whom 49 percent were Latino, 29
percent- white, 11 percent- Asian American, and 10 percent- African American.
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organizations, which remained on the political fringes). Thus they were not only more
likely to pursue self help and community control approaches but also more inclined to
succeed at them compared to their counterparts in Los Angeles, who generally comprised
but a small share of the population (ranging between 9 and 18 percent between 1960 and
2010).
In terms of minority political power, Cleveland and Los Angeles were both early
movers in electing black mayors. Two years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act
(1965), Carl Stokes became the first African American to be elected mayor of an American
city, with Tom Bradley following fourth in line just five years later in 1972 with the help of
a multiracial Black-Jewish-Latino coalition. As described by J. Phillip Thompson, "this first
wave of black mayors made tremendous changes in ordinary black citizens' perception of
city government" (Thompson, 2005, p. 4). Their initial accomplishments included reining in
police departments and expanding public sector employment opportunities for minorities.
However they failed to generate much in the way of substantive gains for their poor black
constituents amidst declining federal aid to cities. As time went by, black elected officials
often discouraged black political participation beyond the support of establishment
candidates in order to protect their power bases as exemplified by George Forbes in
Cleveland. Nevertheless, the first generation of black mayors often received criticism from
the mainstream for "assuming a role of race leader rather than [acting] as city manager,
and accused of antagonizing white businesses and failing to entice them to their cities"
(Ibid., p. 6). Consequently, the next generation of "technocratic mayors" like Michael White,
who defeated George Forbes in the 1989 mayoral election, tended to deemphasize race and
work closely with the corporate community around "pro-business" urban policy. In the
case of LA's Tom Bradley, he was more akin to the second typology in deprioritizing inner
city social and economic concerns relative to downtown redevelopment and port
expansion and embracing race-neutrality as demonstrated in the bussing plan of the 1970s.
As seen in Stokes-era Cleveland, when poor blacks were well organized and politically
active, they were better able to hold elected officials accountable to their interests (e.g.
building much needed public housing) as opposed to conflicting ones advocated by other
members of the overarching biracial coalition. Even aside from electoral politics, mass
voter registration and mobilization among Latino Angelenos in the wake of Proposition
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187, which went hand in hand with grassroots labor organizing and unionization, helped
bring progressive economic policy victories at the city level in the form of the living wage
ordinance, City Jobs Program, Community Benefit Agreements, and Project Labor
Agreements.
A final noteworthy difference between Cleveland and Los Angeles has to do with the
cities' power structures. LA saw the rise and fall of the Southern Pacific machine and the
later displacement of the Times-led downtown establishment by Jewish nouveaux riches
based in the entertainment, home building, and savings and loan industries who in turn
gave way to a more diffuse and horizontal contemporary power structure. In contrast,
Cleveland has had a relatively coherent and stable base of WASP economic elites upholding
a civic legacy of noblesse oblige that continues into the present as embodied by the active
role of local foundations and anchor institutions around University Circle.
Hence where local conditions appear to have significantly mediated the ways in
which race manages the tensions and contradictions at the intersection of capitalism and
democracy, the next section turns to the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program and Evergreen Cooperative Initiative to explore in greater detail their outgrowth
from the respective sets of local conditions together with broader national trends.
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PART II: CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 4: THE EVERGREEN COOPERATIVE INITIATIVE
4.1 The Cleveland Foundation
The Evergreen Cooperative Initiative emerged from a collaborative partnership
between philanthropic organizations, public agencies, non-profit anchor institutions,
university-based centers of policy research and practice, financial institutions, and
community development corporations aiming to improve neighborhood conditions around
Cleveland's University Circle. Still no single organization played a greater role in the
conception and expansion of the initiative than the Cleveland Foundation. Established in
1914 during Cleveland's industrial heyday by Frederick Goff, corporate attorney turn
president of the Cleveland Trust Company, it was the oldest and third largest of community
foundations in the United States.5 3 Mounting a humanist defense of laissez faire capitalism
amidst growing labor unrest and class antagonism, Goff revamped the charitable trust
model to aggregate multitudinal gifts into a single endowment serving the residents of
Cleveland through the broadest possible charitable purposes. In 1919, he stated with
regards to the community foundation:
I am hopeful that these days of social unrest, when the accumulation of large fortunes
is often decried, if it be known that a generous portion of the wealth one accumulates
is ultimately to be devoted to community use, it may be deemed honorable, even in the
eyes of the professional critic, for men who prefer struggle and achievement to idleness
and leisure to continue the pursuit of wealth (Tittle, 1992, p. 33).
Shortly passing in 1923, Goff failed to witness Cleveland's descent into gradual industrial
decline following the Great Recession. However, if there was an upside to Cleveland's vast
economic disparities, the great fortunes accumulated through the city's shipping, mining,
iron and steel, manufacturing, and oil industries sustained a tradition of noblesse oblige for
generations. By 2003 the foundation had $1.52 billion in assets and was expending over
$80 million in annual grant funding.
In addition to supporting the Cleveland Foundation, Cleveland's first families
endowed a series of cultural and educational institutions including the Cleveland Museum
s A close associate of the progressive populist mayor Tom Johnson as well as John D. Rockefeller, Goff
combined an "empathy for the plight of the common people" and sharp business acumen (Tittle, 1992, p. 25).
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of Art, Cleveland Play House, Cleveland Orchestra, and Cleveland Institute of Music in the
city's uptown district during the early decades of the 21st century. Roughly one square mile
in area, the district continued to expand as a regional education, medical, arts, and cultural
hub through the New Deal and post war eras, partly thanks to federal social welfare policy
including employer provided health insurance and Medicare and Medicaid along with
federal investments in science-based research and development. On the other hand, the six
neighborhoods that surrounded University Circle- namely Glenville, Hough, Fairfax,
Buckeye-Shaker, Little Italy, and the eastern part of East Cleveland- were home to a total
of about 43,000 local residents with an annual median household income under $18,500
(Dubb & Howard, 2012). Disproportionately African American, the area had some of the
highest foreclosure and unemployment rates in the country, along with a noticeable dearth
of retail and service outlets as well as basic neighborhood amenities.
The Cleveland Foundation remained deeply implicated in the fates of both the
anchor institutions of University Circle as well as the surrounding east side neighborhoods.
The fact was perhaps unsurprising in light of the foundation's Board of Directors, heavily
populated by leading members of Cleveland's business community with strong influence
over matters of urban policy and local economic development (Tittle, 1992). The Cleveland
Foundation's involvement in University Circle ranged from providing funding support to
anchor institutions, including the Cleveland Orchestra, opera, and art museum, to playing a
leading role in the city's massive urban renewal program, which displaced tens of
thousands of residents.s4 Where CDF focused on the downtown area, University Circle Inc.
followed in 1957 to launch a ten year campaign to improve physical infrastructure in "the
Circle," which by then was already home to more than 30 cultural, educational, and medical
institutions (Tittle, 1992). As urban renewal helped fuel civil rights activism and the Black
power and community control movements in the 1960s, the Cleveland Foundation
supported the Businessmen's Interracial Committee on Civic Affairs to provide a dialogic
space for white corporate leaders and Cleveland's black community leaders to manage
racial relations in the city (Shiao, 2004, p. 68). It also supported the mayoral candidacy of
4 Building on the model of the Allegheny Conference in Pittsburgh, Cleveland's corporate
executives created the Cleveland Development Foundation (CDF) in 1954, which was in
turn administered by the Cleveland Foundation.
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Carl Stokes by funding electoral organizing efforts together with the Ford Foundation. By
the 1970s, the Cleveland Foundation was helping launch an "information clearinghouse"
and "outreach effort" to prepare Cleveland for school desegregation while curbing
outbreaks of racist violence against blacks (Ibid.). In the aftermath of the community
organizing movement (1975-1985), the Cleveland Foundation further played a leading role
in developing a corporatized network of Community Development Corporations under the
umbrella of the Cleveland Housing Network (Yin, 1998).
4.2 Changing winds
4.2.1 Cleveland Foundation
From the early days of Frederick Goff, the Cleveland Foundation had a record of
leadership that was ahead of its times. In the 1960s, Director James Norton encouraged a
"wide variety of socioeconomic programs for the disadvantaged and the poor," believing
"that a community foundation had an obligation to support as many different community
groups and activities as possible" (Tittle, 1992, p. 13-14). His successor, Homer Wadsworth
(1974-1983) had helped desegregate Kansas City schools in the aftermath of Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka. Focusing on improving select public institutions such as
Cleveland's languishing Playhouse Square district, his tenure saw the Foundation's early
adoption of program related investments (PRI), which invested a portion of the
foundation's assets in a manner that advanced a program objective (Ibid., p. 14). Following,
in 1984, Steven Minter became the foundation's first African American director as well as
the first racial minority to attain such a position in the country. Under his leadership, the
Cleveland Foundation not only pushed "minority access to and participation in the city's
institutional life" but more fundamentally "[moved] beyond the traditional role of
responsive funder played by most community trusts and provide civic leadership as an
educator, program manager, catalyst, and convener" (Tittle, 1992, p. 16, 6). Besides
focusing in the usual program areas of education, health, social services, the arts, and civic
affairs, the Foundation further committed to encouraging the city's economic revitalization.
Building on the work of his predecessors as did all of the past directors, Minter clarified a
new direction for the Foundation as a strategic investor, not only in downtown and
lakefront development but also in higher education and the economic application of
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biomedical research coming out of the local hospitals and universities (Ibid., p. 22). In
working toward its goals, the Foundation leveraged its status as Cleveland's largest
philanthropy to bring other major funders together as well as focus public attention and
resources on what it saw as the most pressing issues.
Again in 2003, the Cleveland Foundation underwent a shift in leadership and
orientation, as Executive Director Steven Minter retired after twenty years of service to be
replaced by Ronald Richard. With previous experience working as a US diplomat in Japan,
senior manager at Panasonic, managing director and chief operating officer at the CIA's
venture capital fund, and director/business strategist for biotechnology and medical
research firms, Director Richard brought an expert working knowledge of public, private
and non-profit sectors together with an innovative drive. Arriving at the Cleveland
Foundation, he restructured the organization by hiring people with extensive local
knowledge and trusted contacts from years of "working in the trenches." The new Program
Director for Neighborhoods, Housing, and Community Development, India Pierce Lee, had
worked in various housing, community, and economic development projects around
Cleveland, most recently as senior vice president of programs at Neighborhood Progress
Inc. (NPI), a grantee organization. In hiring Ms. Lee, the Foundation also got a staff person
who was willing to roll up her sleeves and delve into problem solving. Later, Ms. Lee shared
her reflections,
When I started in community development, when I came in, I knew nothing about
building new houses. I learned from the ground up. Since the time I've been in this
industry I've been told, 'No, you can't do this.' So 95 percent of the time I've been able
to succeed at what I was told I couldn't do. For me [Evergreen] is another challenge.
All the naysayers who say this isn't real, I love every time I can send a news release, still
realizing we have a long way to go.
Another new hire that would prove instrumental to the development of the Evergreen
Cooperative Initiative was Lillian Kuri, a licensed architect with expertise in urban
redevelopment and innovative environmental services who initially worked as a consultant
to develop a comprehensive strategy for the revitalization of the Greater University Circle
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area before becoming permanent staff.55 Outside of new hires, existing senior staff went
from overseeing grant writing to working directly with partners in key priority areas.
Where the Foundation previously promoted racial inclusion by supporting community
development corporations and redevelopment projects apart from their project of growing
a regional biomedical industry in the University Circle vicinity, it would shortly synthesize
the two priorities in the flagship "Greater University Circle Initiative."
4.2.2 Anchor institutions
Around the time of Richard's arrival, three of University Circle's largest anchor
institutions-Case Western Reserve University, University Hospitals, and Cleveland
Clinic- also saw the arrival of new leadership, who chose to break with existing
arrangements and routines within their organizations. Traditionally, the area's education,
medical, arts, and cultural institutions saw its constituency as consisting of residents from
the surrounding region rather than the immediately surrounding neighborhoods. Walter
Wright, Project Director of the Greater University Circle Community Wealth Building
Initiative at the Cleveland Foundation, put the events into historical perspective. He stated,
"After the late 60s when there was a lot of rioting and strife in Cleveland- the Hough
neighborhood erupted into flames- the institutions, they turned their backs on the
neighborhood literally and figuratively. I mean they physically built concrete bumper
barriers, and that's been a real problem." Shortly, the institutions underwent a change in
orientation, described by Mr. Wright:
They have reengaged with the community, because they understand a couple of things;
number one, our fates are intertwined. The people who live in the communities are
both their patrons and their potential employees, and also, if the neighborhoods are in
really bad shape, it's a barrier to people going to Case, University Hospitals, or the
Clinic. So it was in everybody's interest to work together.
In a series of interviews conducted by the Cleveland Foundation (Standley, 2012), Chief
Administrative Officer Steve Standley of University Hospitals described the situation he
faced upon entering the organization in 2000:
55 She became Director of Special Projects in 2007 and has since become Program Director for Architecture,
Urban Design and Sustainable Development.
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Just like a lot of major, urban college hospital campuses, we're sitting in this one
square mile of these beautiful institutions and then there's this wall. Then you go into
some of the poorest neighborhoods in Cleveland. And those are our constituencies and
a lot of our stakeholders... And if we don't do something to improve the community as
much as we can, these are our stakeholders. If this was a business, these are the people
we take care of, regardless of whether they have insurance or not, the fact is, that's
why we're here. With no people, there's no need for a health system. And we were
really struggling to connect with them. We had the classic old-fashioned diversity
methodology and tactics.
He provided examples of charity walks, community health screenings, and drug prevention
programs to characterize the "old" approach.
Mr. Standley pointed to a number of factors motivating new approaches to
community engagement among some of the hospitals in University Circle, two of which had
to do with staff recruitment. He stated, "The reality is, if we don't fix these neighborhoods,
I'm not going to get nurses who live in first ring and outer suburbs to feel safe enough to
drive to work here. So if you totally shed all the humanistic pieces of this, the reality is that
you can't have a fort in the middle of a warzone and continue to recruit people to work
here." He also emphasized lifestyle preferences of another workforce continent:
What's happened with the recession, [rising gas, fuel prices], sustainability movement,
and everything else, the younger people coming to work for us, they want to know,
'Can I live there?Areyou going to help me live near there? I don't really want to own a
car. So what's the public transportation like? What are you doing to control all these
environmental issues?' So the way we recruit now is driving and reinforcing what we
are doing in the community.
Thirdly, Mr. Standley spoke to the role of regulatory changes in incentivizing institutional
change:
For those of us that are not-for-profit hospitals, the realities of health care reform [had
led to] much more scrutiny of what we claim and report as being 'community benefit.'
You can no longer claim that eight-person table at the Cattleman's Club, where one of
your board members gets an award. You can't claim that as 'community benefit.'
That's marketing. So we had to segregate our marketing budgetsfrom our community
benefit budgets and get much more rigorous about what our community benefit was.
In becoming more "rigorous" about "community benefits," University Hospitals began with
its Vision 2010 strategic growth plan, more specifically overhauling the process by which
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they allocated vendor and workforce contracts on $750 million worth of construction.5 6 In
fact, Mr. Standley and other executive staff at the hospital only realized the shortcomings of
their existing procurement and purchasing protocol when University Hospitals brought in a
black community representative onto the hospital board of directors who pointed out
various problematic issues. What Mr. Standley encountered was a poignant and formative
learning experience: "I started meeting with all these people and I started hearing all this
horrendous stuff. I will tell you in 2004, 2005, 1 had no idea. I had somewhat of an idea, but
I had no idea how really hard it was for these people and their companies to get anywhere,
especially with respect to health care." He explained,
You know, ifyou are a majority electrical company, they view your bonding capacity
based on your company's profit and loss statement, not based on your owner's divorce
or late credit card [payment]. When you get to small companies, whether they're
African American, Hispanic, female-owned, whatever, it's everything about the
person's life that is being investigated to see whether they can post the bond.
Among the ameliorative responses, many of which occurred concurrently to the
development of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, was that of "breaking the projects up
into hundreds of little packages [to enable small contractors to bid on the projects] instead
of the easier way, which was the old way, which is you anoint one king, and you let that
king go out and decide who's going to work" (Ibid.). In addition, University Hospitals
negotiated a Project Labor Agreement with ambitious local/ minority hiring targets, strict
enforcement mechanisms, and integrative mechanisms for smaller minority contractors (to
the extent they utilized union labor for the given project). The latter measure partly served
to enhance minority entry into the regional building trades to counter its history of racial
exclusion. To further support minority contractors in winning future projects, University
Hospitals publicly recognized the different contractors in an advertisement in the
Cleveland's major newspaper. Steve Standley explained, "If you are a small business,
whether you are minority owned or not, if you can get a health care job on your resume, it
56 The Vision 2010 program at the UH created more than 5,200 jobs totaling over $500 million in wages,
salaries, and benefits at the height of construction, but voluntarily incorporated diversity hire targets
specifying 5 percent of contractors would be female owned businesses, 15 percent- minority owned
businesses, 80 percent-locally-based companies, and 20 percent of all workers-residents of Cleveland.
98
elevates you way past the people that are building malls and stores and developer based
projects where you are just doing tenant improvements in an apartment building."
Lest the motivating factors for transformative social action appear simply
instrumental or about problem solving, this was hardly the case with respect to Vision
2010 or the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, as we shall see shortly. In the case of Mr.
Standley, he connected the minority inclusion components of the Vision 2010 project back
to his biographical trajectory and interpersonal connections, reflecting:
I guess it's just me. I just resented the good old boy thing...not even racial... just the
club. And I'm very unique in this role. I am an artist. I started with nothing. I grew up
in Canada. I had three fathers by the time I was 13 years old. So I just had a different
platform... no silver spoon stuff.. and started on a dock, loading trucks at a hospital. So
I guess some of it was maybe that. The other part of it really was that there's
something so invaluable about it, and it sounds corny, but... that one year when I met
with people, it was transformational.
Elaborating on the interpersonal dimensions of the work, Steve Standley described what he
referred to as "one of the most moving things for me of this whole thing. This was actually
my reward in a corny way." Invited to attend a "town hall" with minority contractors and
subcontractors, Mr. Standley was greatly surprised to find a commemorative event in his
honor. He recalled, "They just went one by one and they got up and told me who they were
and what they had done on our projects, what it meant to them and what they are doing
now. And I'm about twelve in, and I'm falling apart. I'm like, 'I can't do this.' It was amazing!
I wish we had videotaped it, because it was amazing. Their stories were incredible."
Among the anchors, University Hospitals, particularly with Mr. Standley as the
leader, was exceptional in its commitment to community engagement and racial inclusion.
Still, where Mr. Standley spoke more generally to a desire to "do the right thing," the theme
echoed repeatedly among other representatives of anchor institutions involved in the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative as well as other participants ranging from lawyers to
finance consultants to the mayor of Cleveland. At the same time, Mr. Standley resisted
categorization of the anchor institutions' involvement in the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative as arising from a moralistic or ethical impulse, clarifying: "This isn't a 'do-the-
right-thing' charity thing. We see this more as an economic-development initiative. If
everything stabilizes and the city grows, it's better for all of us"(Litt, 2010).
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4.2.3 City of Cleveland
Finally, at the citywide level, the development of the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative overlapped with the beginnings of Frank Jackson's mayoral administration.
Besides pledging a commitment to serving the "least of us," he also embraced a "self help"
philosophy, the latter embodying the following approach to local economic development:
Where even in difficult times, whenever we spend money in our sales and turn dollars
around in our own community more than one or two times but four and five and six
times, it really results in job retention and some job growth. And it keeps us stable and
creates a more sustainable economy even though the national economy is going
through this fluctuation (Jackson, 2012).
As an example, the mayor pointed to University Hospitals' targeted hire policy as a catalyst
of "self help" and hailed the non-profit institution as a "great corporate citizen."
A biracial African-Italian American who grew up and continued to reside in one of
Cleveland's lowest income neighborhoods, the Mayor further elaborated on the racial
dimensions of his self help philosophy:
Then ifyou're talking about African Americans and minorities, then how do we get out
of the whining position about what should be and how come I can't and get into the
investment strategy around that opportunity. That becomes the issue, because it's not
just a societal exclusionary process that has created problems; it is culturalization of
non self help... So if we are a community looking for true empowerment and if true
empowerment not only includes political but [also] economic power- and you know
wealth will always invest in politics, always, and wealth invests in politics for the
purpose of insuring its position-ifyou're not at the table in the investment of this
activity, then allyou're doing is begging. You're looking for a set aside. That's allyou're
lookingfor.
In short, he saw minority communities as stakeholders and potential participants in urban
investment and economic development strategies whose mobilizing and planning
capacities in the economic realm had yet to catch up with their political power as to require
greater attention and cultivation. In doing so, he departed from Mayor Carl Stokes'
philosophy of racial uplift, which focused on building black power through the electoral
sphere, and Councilmember George Forbes' approach to political patronage, which coopted
and squashed black community organizations for racial set asides.
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At the same time, he emphasized the role and duty of local government and his
commitment as mayor in actively spurring processes of "self help," complete with social
inclusion, stating:
We need to create economic stability and sustainability in the region [and ensuring]
inclusion is a central part of that sustainable process. And it doesn't matter to me who
does it [whether it's a non profit institution, labor union, domestic or foreign company
locating production in Cleveland, etc.]. Since I'm not coveting [political advancement]
it helps a lot too. If I'm not coveting and trying to get somewhere else it's even more
helpful. So it's irrelevant to me. What's relevant to me is the purpose. Why am I here?
What is our purposefor being here as an administrator? And what is the strategic plan
to get there, the policies to implement to do that, to keep a plan to implement those
policies, and the use of politics in that way which I believe is appropriate as opposed to
the politics of self-preservation?
While his first term overlapped with the housing and financial crisis, Mayor Jackson would
continue to target public investments to "create a kind of financial stability that allows for
businesses to be confident in their investments" into his second term, sustaining
controversies along the way as a result of his willingness to go outside the bounds of
traditional thinking around local economic development. For instance, in 2010, the
administration entered into negotiations with a Chinese LED lighting company interested
in locating production facilities in Cleveland and transitioning the City from incandescent
bulbs to LED lighting solutions at zero profit. While creating three hundred and fifty jobs
within five years, the company would have the opportunity to demonstrate product
applicability and enter the American market. The proposal met its end when the local
branch of General Electric proceeded to mobilize opposition within city council despite
their unwillingness to pose a comparable counter offer or consider relocating some of their
production from China to Cleveland. In short, Cleveland's local government appeared well
poised to comprehend and embrace the rather unconventional approach to workforce,
business, and economic development embodied by the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative.
Borne from the unusual set of economic challenges the city had faced since the Great
Depression and the mayor's unique insights into race, politics, economic development, and
gains allocation, the city's financial support would prove crucial to the success of the effort.
4.3 Converging on Greater University Circle
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As University Hospitals began its $1 billion expansion project under the Vision 2010
master plan, a number of its neighboring anchor institutions were simultaneously
undertaking physical expansions. While Cleveland Clinic broke ground on its $500 million
Heart and Vascular Institute, Case Western University was building its $111 million North
Residential Village project. In addition, the Cleveland Museum of Art was undergoing a
$200 million renovation, with the Regional Transit Authority completing its $260 million
Euclid Corridor Transportation project, complete with a new bus rapid transit system, and
the City of Cleveland making streetscape improvements and incorporating public art along
the major corridor connecting downtown and University Circle. From the perspective of
the Cleveland Foundation, the fact that the anchors were undertaking physical remodeling
and expansions totaling $2.5 billion with little coordination with respect to the other
provided a ripe opportunity for cross engagement aimed at broader urban revitalization.
The question was how to cohere the multiple university campuses, cultural venues, health
care institutions, and other anchors to generate a sort of economic engine for the
surrounding six neighborhoods "in order to establish a safe, attractive, racially and
economically diverse neighborhood without acute poverty, but also without throwing out
or throwing away the people who live there now" (Yates, 2009). For one thing, the arrival
of new leadership at University Hospitals, Cleveland Clinic, and Case Western Reserve
University created favorable conditions for collaborative relationship. As recalled by
Program Director Lillian Kuri,
We were looking around the city and saw [rooted] institutions that were growing
physically but also creating jobs. We saw an opportunity to leverage the institutions in
a way that hadn't been done before. There were three new leaders at the institutions
that the town had never seen before in terms of their willingness to collaborate. Before
they wouldn't sit in the same room. It was a totally new day (luviene & Song, 2012).
Therefore beginning in 2005, the Cleveland Foundation convened the anchor institutions
on a quarterly basis to coordinate physical expansion and improvement projects, discuss
the conditions in the surrounding neighborhoods, and find crosscutting issues around
which the group could collaborate. The Foundation was an apt catalyst and convener given
its philanthropic interests, spatial focus on the communities of Cleveland, and reputation as
an "honest broker" among both the public and private sector. India Pierce Lee described a
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core premise as being that "building trust with your partners is critical-having a
transparent and open dialogue, being critical with each other about how to do things, and
being willing to learn and listen from each side." As representatives of the different anchor
institutions got to know and trust one another, they started to share their master plans as
well as coordinate the content. Following, their focus widened to encompass their
surrounding urban environment, as described by University Hospitals Chief Administrative
Officer Steve Handley: "It quickly translated to, 'O.K. we got that out of the way, but we
really need to start working together to stabilize the neighborhoods."
In the early stage of the "Greater University Circle Initiative," the Cleveland
Foundation identified projects that were action oriented and achievable within a timespan
of three to five years, the implicit goal being to build working relationships and trust
among the partners to equip them for more complex challenges down the line. Therefore
the GUC Initiative started with a series of physical development projects, including one on
the issue of transportation that enhanced public accessibility and safety around three
transit stations. Another project focused on the issue of housing developed three mixed use
transit oriented facilities and followed up with an employer assisted housing program. The
latter represented an effort on the part of partners to couple physical development with
"Programs for the People," aimed at building the social infrastructure necessary to bring
about improvements in public education, housing, community safety and organization, and
economic inclusion. As the Greater University Circle Initiative completed its first year,
questions mounted as to how to tackle the economic inclusion piece, the premise being that
conventional approaches to economic development based on corporate subsidies for job
creation with little consideration for community wealth creation or asset development
would not suffice. India Pierce Lee clarified,
The work we are doing in Greater University Circle and Evergreen is as a result of
what I learned in the Empowerment Zone, which I'll never do again! We had this
economic inclusion as a component of the Greater University Circle Initiative, but we
did not pull the trigger, because I didn't know what we were going to do, but I did
know what we weren't going to create another program that gave lip service to the
community.
Ted Howard, Co-founder and Executive Director of the Democracy Collaborative, later
elaborated on Ms. Lee's position:
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As India tells the story, she worked for the previous mayor, and she ran the
Empowerment Zone. She was responsible for [tens of millions of dollars] in federal
funding for the Empowerment Zone that [the mayor] placed under her authority,
which are almost these same neighborhoods we're working in. Over a 15-year period,
all the money had gone into the neighborhoods and not much had changed; we had
very little impact. No more people were employed; the majority of the businesses left. It
just evaporated. She's clear, that's broken; she doesn't want to do that anymore. In
that sense, Evergreen is a bit of a reaction to that.
Another challenge had to do with directly engaging the surrounding neighborhoods. The
act of labeling the target area, comprising just over four square miles, "Greater University
Circle" signaled an unprecedented move to forge commonality not only among the anchor
institutions but also between some of the city's wealthiest economic entities and poorest
neighborhoods. However the fact remaining that few of residents in Glenville, Hough,
Fairfax, Buckeye-Shaker, Little Italy, and the eastern part of East Cleveland identified with
or had even heard of "Greater University Circle."
Figure 1. Empty storefronts in Greater University Circle
4.4 University based partners
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Meanwhile, the Ohio Employee Ownership Center at Kent State University and the
Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland were also converging on
Cleveland's University Circle. Both of the organizations traced their beginnings back to
"Black Monday," September 19, 1977, when the closing of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube
steel mill left 5,000 steelworkers without work. Political economist and activist Gar
Alperovitz described the aftermath: "No local, state, or federal programs offered significant
help. Steelworkers called training programs "funeral insurance": they led nowhere since
there were no other jobs available" (Alperovitz, 2011c). Consequently a coalition of
religious leaders, steel workers, and local activists came together around creating a plan for
community-worker ownership of the mill. Additionally engaging policy entrepreneurs and
consultants like Gar Alperovitz, who brought critical experience in the congressional
legislative process and connections to liberal think tanks, the group developed a worker
buyout plan that went on to win the support of the Republican governor of the state at the
time along with $200 million in loan guarantees from the Carter administration. Despite
the federal commitment and favorable media attention, the effort eventually failed, partly
due to opposition from the industry and the international union, the latter departing from
the local union in considering the idea of worker ownership farfetched. Still, the initiative
had resounding effects, especially in Ohio, where deindustrialization continued to take a
toll over the next three decades.
Among those who drew inspiration from the events of Youngstown was John Logue,
a political scientist from Texas who had newly joined the faculty of Kent State University.
Between 1984 and 1986, Logue conducted a series of research projects that found positive
impacts of employee ownership on Ohio's economy. In 1987, he established the Ohio
Employee Ownership Center (OEOC), which subsequently helped transition tens of
thousands of workers, many from potential job loss, into employee ownership. The center's
information and outreach activities centered on promoting employee ownership under a
variety of circumstances, ranging from succession planning to employee buyouts. Over the
years, the majority of its program content and staff time came to focus on facilitating
business succession planning, whether through Employee Stock Ownership Programs
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(ESOPs) or other means.57 While additionally offering technical assistance to existing and
start-up worker owned cooperatives, they accounted for a smaller portion of the center's
work and professional membership. As explained by Logue's successor, OEOC Executive
Director Bill McIntyre,
Historically, at the Ohio Employee Ownership Center, we have been careful about
becoming overly involved with worker owned co-ops, because they tended to take a lot
ofyour our time. Most of the time they never even got started. If they did get started,
they tended to fail. If they succeeded, they failed as soon as the key person left. And
even if they were successful, there were often less than a dozen jobs, so it was a small
scale success. The Evergreen cooperatives were different, in that the model had the
potential of being taken large scale.
In other words, the OEOC was not averse to seeding worker owned cooperatives but rather
predisposed to business succession planning given aims to maximize organizational
impact. In fact, one of Director John Logue's deepest ambitions was to take employee
ownership to scale in places like Youngstown, where economic globalization and capital
flight destabilized entire economies. In 2001, he traveled to the Mondragon Cooperatives in
the Basque region of Spain to draw significant inspiration. Shortly thereafter, he reported
to the readers of the OEOC newsletter:
Visiting Mondrag6n encouraged me to envision an Ohio employee-owned sector with
more cooperation among employee-owned firms, more involvement in the community,
a common commitment to expanding employee ownership, a commitment by firms to
incubate new employee-owned companies, and the creation of more joint institutions,
including joint strategies for responding to economic globalization (Logue, 2001, p.
17).
Among the open questions was how to translate the unique institutional arrangements and
cultural specificities back to the American context.
As for Gar Alperovitz, he partnered with Ted Howard, who brought over three
decades of experience in the not-for-profit/civil society sector, to establish the Democracy
Collaborative (DC) at the University of Maryland in 2000, over thirty years after Black
Monday. Like many of the other interviewees, Mr. Howard cited a number of formative
s The failure to plan for business succession in small and middle-sized closely held businesses is the leading
preventable cause of job loss in the U.S.; in the absence of succession planning, businesses often get sold to
competitors who may consolidate operations, reduce local employment, or simply close up shop (OEOC,
2012).
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events and experiences in leading him towards the Democracy Collaborative and
eventually the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative. He reflected:
There are a number of things that impacted me in my life. [For one thing], I grew up in
LA in a very working class family. My dad pumped gas in a gas station before
eventually becoming a manager for Chevron down in El Segundo; he finally got a
white-collar job at the main headquarters. Then at some point in the early 70s, he was
downsized out of his job, because they could hire a younger guy. So that was an
important lesson in corporate loyalty. Also, growing up in California in the mid 1960s,
I got involved in the open housing campaign. In those days it was legal to discriminate
against anybody for race, but this ballot proposition outlawed that, and I got involved
in that. I was very involved in the anti war movement of the late 1960s and early
1970s, and it was an awakening about political power and the military complex. Then
in 1972 I went to work with Jeremy Rifkin- he's a big thinker and leading public
intellectual-and we codirected a group from the early 70s until 1976 called the
People's Bicentennial Commission. Nixon was president, and his administration was
[employing the theme of the] American Revolution to sell Spirit of America Chevrolets
and red, white, and blue ice cream. Nothing to do with revolutionary change obviously.
So Jeremy and I explored the more radical strands of the American Revolution. We
wrote a little book called "own your own job" about democracy at the workplace. Then
in the 1980s and early 1990s, I worked in international development- lived in India,
spent a lot of time in Africa. I came to understand the great wisdom that exists outside
of the US- that we don't have all of the answers here. And that there are powerful
models of different ways to organize work and community that have been developed in
other settings. So its all those strands that led to this.
Like the OEOC, the Collaborative challenged the prevailing paradigm of economic
development by promoting broader ownership and stewardship over capital and
democracy at the workplace. However its focus was broader in additionally promoting
stable communities and locality, equitable and inclusive growth, and environmental, social,
and institutional sustainability. Further, where the OEOC tended to focus its informational
and outreach activities on more concrete outcomes, the Democracy Collaborative engaged
in research, training, policy development, and community-focused practice. With respect to
its core Community Wealth Building Initiative, the underlying premise, as described by Ted
Howard, was as follows:
At a time of ongoing government fiscal constraints, asset and wealth building
strategies bring more dollars into the community by helping low-income individuals to
save and reinvest in their communities, increasing the level of 'common' assets within
a community that are locally owned; and leveraging funds from locally- based
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institutions (such as cities, counties, hospitals, and universities) for community-
benefiting purposes (Dubb, 2006).
Among program curricula and public resources, the publication of Building Wealth: The
New Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and Economic Problems precipitated a four-day
conference in May 2005 (Dubb, 2005). Partnering with the Aspen Institute, the Democracy
Collaborative brought together practitioners from community development corporations,
co-ops, land trusts, and employee owned firms with social entrepreneurs, funders, and the
media. Discussing asset-based, citywide, multi-sector approaches to individual and
community wealth building that could anchor jobs locally, expand the provision of public
services, and ensure local economic stability, conference attendees speculated on practical
applications for their ideas. Following the event, the leaders of the Democracy
Collaborative reached out to their old friend and colleague John Logue at the OEOC, who
began to ponder the potential for scale and impact inherent in incorporating employee
ownership with community development in a place like Cleveland.
4.5 From chance encounters to the Community Wealth Building Roundtable
In hindsight, it might appear obvious for the OEOC and Democracy Collaborative to
partner with the Cleveland Foundation to develop a community wealth building initiative
complete with a worker ownership component as the "economic inclusion" piece of the
Greater University Circle Initiative. While such an outcome indeed materialized, the actual
process was less straightforward. In fact, it was only 16 months after the Aspen Institute
conference that India Pierce Lee of the Cleveland Foundation, who was then managing the
Greater University Circle Initiative, first encountered Ted Howard of the Democracy
Collaborative. The location was Durham, North Carolina and the venue was the national
conference of the Neighborhood Funders Group, where Ted Howard was presenting on
strategies for community wealth building that leveraged the procurement power of anchor
institutions. Listening from the audience, India Pierce Lee of the Cleveland Foundation
began to think about the implications for Cleveland. At the conference's closing reception,
she engaged Ted Howard in a conversation about the existing anchor-based neighborhood
revitalization effort in Greater University Circle and invited him to a meeting at the
Cleveland Foundation to discuss potential strategies. Prior to the actual meeting at the
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Cleveland Foundation, Ms. Lee again encountered the Democracy Collaborative, this time
while subbing for an out of town colleague at a meeting called by the Greater Cleveland
Partnership, the metropolitan chamber of commerce, to plan an upcoming roundtable on
community wealth building in Cleveland. As the Democracy Collaborative followed through
on identifying a city in which to develop a comprehensive asset-based approach to
community wealth building, John Logue had brokered a connection with his contacts in
Cleveland. Consequently the Greater Cleveland Partnership invited the Ohio Employee
Ownership Center and Democracy Collaborative to organize the community wealth
building roundtable with the sponsorship of the Cleveland Foundation, Gund Foundation,
and Sisters of Charity.
Hence the Cleveland Foundation came into contact with the Democracy
Collaborative in more ways than one as a result of which it hired the latter to conduct a pre-
assessment of the procurement capacities of the University Circle anchor institutions and
explore ways to pursue a comprehensive "economic inclusion strategy" targeted at the
surrounding low-income neighborhoods. In addition, the roundtable- "Building
Community Wealth: New Asset-Based Approaches to Solving Social and Economic
Problems in Cleveland and Northeast Ohio"- took place in December 7-8, 2006. Besides
the organizers, participants included the leading anchor institutions of Greater University
Circle as well as representatives from the mayor's office, six community development
corporations in the area, CEOs from employee owned firms from around Northeast Ohio,
and community development practitioners from other parts of the country. In delivering
the opening address, Ted Howard and Gar Alperovitz provided an overview of asset based
community wealth building along with existing Cleveland assets. In particular, they placed
an emphasis on anchor institutions as economic entities. In a subsequent interview, Mr.
Howard expanded on the concept,
What we lead with is a focus on place-based anchor institutions. We ask them, what
are you doing on your business side, beyond community education or health care
delivery? Not we'll do diabetes classes for the community, but how can we conduct our
business in a way that puts dollars into the community? If there are businesses there,
and here are the things we're purchasing, what can we source through them?
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Where one of the panels presented on innovative models from around the country,
discussants addressed implications for the Cleveland context. In particular, John Logue
spoke to the proliferation of ESOP companies (over 9000 collectively holding $6000 billion
in equity nationwide) along with their benefits in terms of anchoring capital in the
community, securing jobs with better wages and benefits, increased tax reinvestment, tax
base stabilization, and more. Finally, he called for a push to expand the employee
ownership movement (Dubb, 2006).
In the following session, a number of community development practitioners from
Cleveland spoke about existing local approaches to asset development and wealth building.
Among the speakers, the CEO of the Famicos Foundation, a local community development
corporation commented on the shortcomings of the CDC framework with respect to
community wealth building goals:
[Cleveland CDCs] are doing a good job, but we still have some room for improvement.
The funding base for CDCs is shrinking. With a population in Cleveland of 500,000
people and 50 CDCs in the city, there is a chance for aggressive competition with one
another. That competition can be healthy, but it can also be a negative factor in
getting things done in an orderly manner. Most of us depend on our CDBG (community
development block grant) allocation. Ifyou don't play your part well, you begin to lose
your independence. (Ibid.).
The CEO of a local CDC intermediary group added: "We are not able to sell housing because
there are not enough people buying. We have abandoned properties and foreclosures." As
for the City's Director of Economic Development, he underscored Mayor Frank Jackson's
electoral pledge to focus on "the least of us" in addition to soliciting concrete proposals. He
urged, "Give me actionable proposals. Help me help you. A lot of benefits can be realized if
we align our efforts. Let's try to get everyone's agendas into city plans, so we can reinforce
each other's work." While highlighting sustainable development and community wealth
building as key priorities, the Economic Development Director simultaneously discouraged
"fad-like notions that our goal should be attracting the creative class, or that the brain drain
is our biggest problem" (Ibid.).
In offering closing comments, participants like Gerald Meyer of the Greater
Cleveland Partnership expressed a commitment to moving the effort forward, "I
characterize myself as a practical guy. There are a lot of assets at the community level. But
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we don't talk about them the right way because we don't have the data we need. I'd like to
take this to the next level through a combination of research and action" (Dubb, 2006).
Likewise, India Pierce Lee asserted,
We must figure out how to connect the dots. This will take research, but we have
capacity to do that research. We must align our strategies financially, but also
intellectually. If we are serious about equity issues, then we have got to stop talking
and start doing. We've been talking about this for years. Let's move this thing forward.
There are lots offolks here at this table and beyond who want to do it (Ibid).
Hence the conference not only provided a dialogic space for diverse stakeholders on the
topic of community asset building but also enabled them to find common cause, consolidate
buy in, and derive concrete directives for future research and action.
4.5 Building the "Cleveland Model"
4.5.1 Pre-feasibility study and strategy development
In the aftermath of the roundtable, the Democracy Collaborative received a grant
from the Cleveland Foundation to follow up on its earlier pre-assessment by conducting a
pre-feasibility study and developing a community wealth building strategy over a six-
month period. The beginnings of this process entailed interviewing over a hundred
"decision makers" both at the anchor institutions and in the surrounding communities.
India Pierce Lee underscored the importance of facilitating a two-way dialogue between
the founders of Evergreen and the anchor institutions, commenting:
What was different was about our approach was listening to the needs of the anchors
instead of telling them what they needed. A lot of times, we have tendency in the
community and community development to jump on the anchors and other institutions
and say, 'You need to do this;you need to do that.' The hospitals, business is health
care, universities are there to educate... they don't understand housing and
development. So how could we create this win-win? When we started talking about
opportunities, we hired a consultant that conducted more than 100 interviews with
the anchors, their procurement staff, and other leaders. They realized that there were
not companies that could serve their, needs in the neighborhood, but if we could give
them something that they could invest in-but with the understanding that we had to
be able to deliver quality, be competitive-then we can talk about how we can work
together.'And that's really how we started. It was more about listening than telling.
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What the Cleveland Foundation and Democracy Collaborative shortly discovered was that
besides the commonality of having tremendous purchasing and procurement needs, which
totaled over $3 billion annually, many of the anchor institutions additionally shared
commitments to sustainability issues, the hospitals in particular keen on strengthening the
links between environmental and human health. According to Steven Dubb, research
director for The Democracy Collaborative, "Although Evergreen's initial goal was focused
on equity primarily, we adjusted it to focus on green business because of the interest of the
anchor institutions. We didn't want it to be green jobs just because it was politically
correct, but because it would actually make business sense-and it did" (Wang, 2010). For
instance, business suggestions from the anchors included a shuttle service to reduce
driving, an industrial scale green laundry service, facility upgrades to enhance energy
efficiency, medical waste recycling, document recycling in line with privacy standards,
rooftop solar panel installation, deconstruction (reuse of building materials for
construction), organic produce cultivation at the local scale, environmentally friendly food
services (e.g. recycled cutlery), ecologically friendly landscaping, tree farming, and green
housekeeping services. Working from this list, the leadership team, initially comprising Ted
Howard, India Pierce Lee, and Lillian Kuri, contemplated which businesses would best
support job creation and community wealth building while providing competitively priced
services and products to anchor institutions and helping the institutions meet their
sustainability commitments.
Aside from the areas of focus, questions also emerged about prospective forms of
business organization. In preparation for the December 2006 roundtable, the Democracy
Collaborative had conducted a survey of various institutional forms of community wealth
building in Cleveland and the level of financial assets each type had accumulated, a process
which reaffirmed the fact that Cleveland was home to a network of high performing
community development corporations. Therefore the initial expectation was that the CDCs
would play a leading role in any business development or job creation strategies. As
observed by Ted Howard
It turned out the CDCs in Cleveland, they're recognized nationally as a strong CDC
urban movement, but all they had ever done was housing developmentfor low-income
neighborhoods and a small bit of retail space. And they produced tens of thousands of
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units of housing, but they had never done any business development or job creation,
and they were not prepared to take that on; we couldn't convince them.
He further reflected on the salience of organizational repertoires and the opportunities for
institutional change entailed by moments of crisis along with the difficulties of breaking
existing routines and momentum:
It's an interesting moment for the CDCs because with the collapse of the housing
market and the mortgage crisis, and the ongoing loss of population (we lost 17% of the
population over the past ten years) you almost can't give away a house in Cleveland.
So the CDCs are carrying these houses that they built three orfouryears ago on their
balance sheet. And they can't sell them, but they're only just starting to move into the
question of how would we create jobs, because we know how to create houses and
people don't want them now.
Upon realizing that the CDCs were not prepared to engage "at any high level," the
leadership team explored alternative mechanisms. In particular, they were drawn to the
idea of ESOPs in light of the financial incentive provided by Section 1042 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which enables deferral of capital gains taxes if an existing business sells to
an ESOP or worker cooperative that owns at least 30 percent of the company at the end of
the transaction. While the tax provision was among the legislative outcomes resulting from
events like Black Monday thirty some years prior, much of Cleveland's industry had
relocated or closed their doors over the decades. Hence the group began to consider the
prospects of worker cooperatives, embarking upon them as start up businesses rather than
a product of succession planning. In the words of Ted Howard, "Through lots of
conversations and discussions, we hit on coops, which was a very foreign concept here in
Cleveland. It wasn't at all clear to me that people would buy that idea, but they have
embraced it over time."
4.5.2 The "Cleveland Model"
From the fall of 2007, the OEOC conducted market assessments for prospective
businesses to comprise the network of community-based cooperatives, while Executive
Director John Logue joining the leadership team to help develop the strategy for that would
become known nationally as the "Cleveland Model." In addition to leveraging the
purchasing needs of anchor institutions and pursuing strategic opportunities emerging in
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the green economy space, a core component of the model was to develop a network of
community-based cooperatives owned and operated by residents in the six targeted
neighborhoods of Greater University Circle. In pursuing the latter, they drew heavy
influence from the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation located in the Basque Region of
Spain, an area not unlike the neighborhoods of Greater University Circle in terms of their
historical marginalization. Mondragon Cooperative initiative began in 1956 with one
cooperative operated by five employee-owners making paraffin stoves. Today they are the
seventh largest company in Spain, generating almost $15 billion euros in 2010 and
employing almost 85,000 people, 85 percent being worker-owners (by 2010 figures).
Pursuing a strategy of import replacement and diversification, whereby firms produce
previously imported goods and services for local consumption and export, eventually
leading to an ever expanding and increasingly diverse set of interrelated firms that buy and
sell from one another and thus comprise a complex and interdependent local economy
(Stitely et al. 2010), Mondragon grew to comprise over 250 firms representing finance,
industry, retail and knowledge sectors. Likewise, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative
would launch an initial set of businesses designed to capture procurement dollars of the
anchor institutions that were bypassing the surrounding neighborhoods for outlying
regions. Following, they planned to expand into diverse lines of businesses enabling career
paths across different firms and generating enough wealth and spending power in the
neighborhoods to create a multiplier effect beyond Evergreen and GUC.
Among the numerous design attributes relevant to Evergreen, the Mondragon initiative
built upon the foundations of a cooperative polytechnic school, established by Father
Arizmendi, a priest working in the Catholic social justice tradition; along with a savings
bank and applied research center. By 2010, the University of Mondragon enrolled over
3,400 students, while Caja Laboral had over a million members with $25 billion in total
annual deposits, and Mondragon's budget for research, design, and innovation was over
$180 million. As the Evergreen leadership team would eventually realize, the education and
training component was critical to building a cohesive culture of shared ownership and
participatory governance. Moreover, having a financial lending institution and research
and development capacity in house supported continued growth and diversification into
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new lines of business. Besides being highly innovative and profitable, the Mondragon
cooperatives uphold shared values of human dignity, integrity, and solidarity. The firms
dedicate a portion of their profits to invest into new products and coops, maintain reserve
funds for the broader Mondragon Corporation and the individual firm (in case of hard
times), and support the university. Membership in the cooperatives requires a substantial
investment of about $18,000 per person and participation in governance in exchange for
guaranteed employment (through inter-firm mobility), career paths (98 percent of
managers are internally promoted), and pay equity (the average salary ratio cap is 5 to 1).
Over the long run, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative was designed to incorporate
various organizational features from Mondragon. For instance, the leadership team
conceived of the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation (ECC) as the holding company, which
would act as the umbrella organization for the cooperative businesses along with a
cooperative bank, R&D entity, and land trust. To insure against cooperative attempts to exit
the Evergreen network, the ECC would maintain a 20 percent equity stake in each of the
businesses along with veto power. Modeled after the Caja Laboral, the Evergreen
Cooperative Development Fund would provide low interest, long-term financing for
cooperative startups as well as identify new lines of business by assessing the financial
feasibility of proposed deals, developing business plans, and raising capital. Its technical
service arm, Evergreen Business Services would provide management, administrative,
operational, and other support for companies financed by the development fund. To ensure
continued growth of the cooperative network, each cooperative firm would allocate 10
percent of its retained earnings to the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund for
investment in new products and start-ups. For added protection against temptations to
"demutualize" and business failure, Evergreen Land Trust LLC was conceived to acquire
land and lease them out on a 99-year basis. While replicating norms of democratic
participation and leadership would certainly take time, the OEOC committed to providing
ongoing training to worker-owners as they assumed leadership positions within their
respective coops as well as on the ECC board.
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Figure 2. Evergreen organizational structure
4.5.3 Getting down to business
In the meantime, the Cleveland Foundation took the lead in convening institutional
partners on an ongoing basis, while the Democracy Collaborative spearheaded the process
of conceptual development, and the OEOC was responsible for conducting feasibility
studies, business planning, and raising capital. After analyzing half a dozen business ideas
proposed by the leadership team, the OEOC decided that the industrial laundry and solar
installation business offered the highest chance of success in terms of financial viability and
creating numerous jobs. In offering technical assistance and training related to business
exit planning, ownership succession, and employee ownership, the OEOC itself did not
provide legal, accounting, or valuation services. Rather, it maintained a professional
membership of dues paying attorneys, bankers, valuators, and other professionals who
specialized in these and related services. In exchange for membership fees, the specialists
gained referrals on relevant projects. Therefore, it brought in Hudson Consulting Group,
based out of Hudson, Ohio and led by Steven Kiel, to conduct the pre-feasibility studies. A
self described "capitalist" with a background in management consulting and specialization
in the area of capitalizing companies, Kiel had developed a relationship with John Logue of
the OEOC in the process of facilitating an employee buyout of a Ford stamping plant in
Toledo Ohio. In his words, "I got a lesson directly from one of the top experts in this
country about the power of worker ownership, and I became hooked on it." Impressed with
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the comprehensiveness and detail of the resulting proposal, Dr. Logue asked for Mr. Kiel's
involvement in conducting the feasibility studies. He further solicited help from Jim
Anderson, an old acquaintance and recent retiree with over twenty years of experience
managing employee owned enterprises in the steel industry.
By April 2008, the feasibility studies were complete, the verdict being that the
laundry and rooftop solar installation business incorporating power purchasing
agreements would indeed be profitable and create a sufficient number of jobs. Where the
interest had initially been in laundering hospital linens, the research process uncovered
new areas of opportunity. As recalled by Jim Anderson:
When we did the feasibility study, we looked at the ten county area around Cuyahoga
County. In that area, there's 250 million annual pounds of health care room linen
being processed every year. About 125 million is hospitals, and the other 125 million is
nursing homes. Typically hospitals have already made the decision to outsource their
room linen, and nursing homes have not and do it internally, and they do so at a very
high cost it turns out. And we talked to their executives and leaders of the nursing
homes to find that because of their very high costs of energy a labor and utilities, we
could save them considerable money if they could outsource to us.
At the same time, the leadership team was careful to avoid zero sum games over job
creation and economic development, particularly given their holistic and long-term
perspective on neighborhood, local, and regional prosperity. According to Mr. Anderson,
"What we asked them to do in that process is reassign their laundry workers to other jobs
in the nursing home complex so we're not having a zero sum game of unemployment. For
the most part they do that; not everyone does it, but for the most part they do, and that's
worked well for us so far."
Upon the conclusion of the feasibility studies, the leadership team requested Steve
Kiel and Jim Anderson stay on with Evergreen to write business plans and raise capital.
Eventually, they would receive follow up invitations to remain as the founding CEOs of the
respective start-ups, the former leading Ohio Cooperative Solar and the latter, Evergreen
Cooperative Laundry. Several years later, Mr. Anderson reflected on how this new
endeavor built upon his past experience:
Making steel is a process and cleaning soiled room linen is a process. So it's putting
processes together and interconnecting them. And this is a very high tech, very
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computerized. There isn't a lot of heavy ergonomic work here. In fact there almost isn't
any, except for two spots. So it was that process mentality, that process management,
the history and experience that I had that fit well with it. Also, in the steel industry, I
was responsible for significant engineering capital investment construction, so when
this build out came, it was a miniature investment experience as well.
As for Steve Kiel, he spoke to the challenge of shifting from a specialization in
private equity to public finance. In his words, "I went through the trauma of raising capital
for the laundry, which was using instruments I had never used before, like HUD money and
New Market Tax Credits." He elaborated, "Normally I'm capitalizing ownership transfers in
private companies and bringing the private equity and banks together to go do that. The
language that I speak is bank language." While facilitating the employee buy-out of the Ford
stamping plant had been a fruitful inaugurating experience, capitalizing the Evergreen
businesses nevertheless demanded a high learning curve. Given the risks inherent in
pioneering such an innovative model of job creation, community wealth building, and
urban sustainability, the Cleveland foundation took few chances in terms of hiring highly
skilled professionals to carry the program through initial implementation.
Hence the Cleveland Foundation additionally invited Ted Howard to stay on for the
implementation phase, contracting with the Democracy Collaborative to buy out some of
his staff time to do so. In reflecting on the motivating factors for his continued involvement,
Mr. Howard referred to his "feeling that the growing inequality of wealth is possibly the
most destructive trend toward the future of our democratic life." He expanded, "You can't
hold a democracy together when you have concentrated wealth patterns like medieval
Europe. And this is a really unique moment in American history that is open to a major
reconstruction of the system, even though it will take decades. Evergreen isn't the answer
but it's a building block towards where we need to go."
Mr. Howard also related the Collaborative's perspective on the Foundation's offer:
What we did see is that although there are coops across the country and anchor
institutions in every city, nothing like this had ever been done with all these pieces
coming together in this way. So this was a learning laboratory. We didn't have all the
answers. We would learn as we went. And because The Democracy Collaborative was
involved-our staff, including myself and our research director, Steve Dubb- our
intent was to learn lessons to make available nationally to others interested in this. We
built this into the design from the original strategy paper that designed the wealth
building program that became Evergreen. When we recommended to the Cleveland
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Foundation how to do this, one recommendation was that this [should] not just [be]
about Cleveland, but [about sharing] the lessons and [building] a broader movement.
This was not only because it will be useful, but because if it's positioned as having
national relevance, it will be a way to attract private philanthropic and public sector
support. So Cleveland would be the first place and [we would] move out from there.
With the Cleveland Foundation agreeable to the terms set out by Mr. Howard and the
Democracy Collaborative, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative consequently incorporated
a component of sharing lessons from Cleveland with those grappling with similar
circumstances around the country.
4.6 From Mondragon to Breaking Ground
4.6.1 Capitalization punctuated by Mondragon and supported by the City
With the business plans complete, the leadership team set upon the task of raising a
total of $5.7 million in capital for Evergreen Cooperative Laundry and $3 million for Ohio
Cooperative Solar. Despite the commitment to creating a network of competitive and
profitable businesses, accessing philanthropic funds and government finance would prove
easier than obtaining private sector loans. In early 2008, the Board of Directors of the
Cleveland Foundation committed $3 million in grant funding to the Evergreen Cooperative
Development Fund. The Cleveland Clinic, Case Western Reserve, and University Hospitals
also committed $250,000 each. Additional philanthropic investments would come from the
Kelvin and Eleanor Smith Foundation ($1 million), Minigowin Foundation ($900,000), and
the Higley Fund of the Cleveland Foundation ($50,000) to raise a total of about $6 million.
These contributions were essentially Program Related Investments that would not be paid
back to the contributing foundations but rather to the Evergreen Development Fund.
Consequently, the leadership team solicited the involvement of Shorebank Enterprise
Cleveland, the nonprofit arm of Shorebank, to manage the revolving loan fund, with Mary
Ann Stropkay, president and CEO of ShoreBank Enterprise Cleveland, joining the
leadership team. The location of Evergreen businesses in economically distressed
neighborhoods enabled access to the New Markets Tax Credit Program, which provides
federal tax credits to investors who make equity investments in Community Development
Entities targeting low-income communities. Nevertheless when Steve Kiel approached a
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number of commercial lending institutions as potential partners, he encountered repeat
hesitancy to fund start up businesses. The fact that the businesses would be collectively
owned and operated by "at risk" or "hard to employ" populations may have presented an
added cognitive barrier for potential funders.
While grappling with the financing piece, in October 2008, the Cleveland Foundation
acted on a recommendation from John Logue of the OEOC to sponsor a study trip to the
actual Mondragon Cooperative Corporation in Spain. The purpose was to distill lessons for
the Evergreen Cooperatives Initiative in Cleveland. Attendees included Ted Howard, India
Pierce Lee, Lillian Kuri, and others from the Cleveland Foundation as well as John Logue,
Steve Kiel, and Jim Anderson from the OEOC and a few representatives of the anchor
institutions. The trip had a magnetic effect on the Evergreen delegation, some of the more
compelling dimensions being the size and scale of the cooperative network; the broad
range of sectors (including high tech) in which the firms specialized; the level of financial
knowledge and sophistication among line workers in the factories; and the conviction and
commitment among senior management despite the average salary ratio cap of 5 to 1
(luviene and Song 2012). Attendees were also impressed by the educational component,
particularly the fact that the effort in Mondragon began with the founding of a school,
which then expanded into a university system that continues to socialize generations of
future cooperative leaders. Moreover, the very experience of traveling to Mondragon had a
cohesive effect on the stakeholders, who not only strengthened their relationships to one
another but also came way more committed to seeing the initiative's success. For those like
Bob Eckhart of the Cleveland Foundation and Margaret Hewitt of University Hospitals,
seeing Mondragon helped reframe their participation in Evergreen as business rather than
charity. Consequently, the Cleveland Foundation would sponsor two more visits to
Mondragon, each time strategically selecting attendees to include partners and program
advocates from the anchor institution, the City of Cleveland, and other organizations with a
pivotal role in the potential success of the initiative.
Incidentally, one of the key breakthroughs that took place during the Mondragon
trip emerged from Cleveland rather than Spain. Prior to leaving Cleveland, Steve Kiel had
managed to secure a private investor through the New Market Tax Credit Program to learn
shortly thereafter that the deal had fallen through. Since participating in the Community
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Wealth Building Roundtable, the Economic Development Department of the City of
Cleveland had maintained a keen interest in the development of the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative. For them, Evergreen presented an alternative to the tax breaks and lax standards
for labor and environmental practices perceived as necessary ingredients for economic
development. In February 2008, the department received a new director in the form of
Tracey Nichols, who only intensifying engagement in the Evergreen initiative. She recalled,
"I heard their new market funder had fallen through. So I told one of my staff to call them
up and see how much they needed, see if we can loan them some HUD 108 money.
Apparently, they were in Spain and almost drove off the road." Hired as the Economic
Assistant in the Department of Economic Development's Brownfield Program in October
2008, David Ebersole managed the process of securing the federal funds and enacting the
necessary legislation at the local level to set the deal structure for the New Markets Tax
Credits and HUD 108 loans. As described by Steve Kiel,
It took us a while to get to Tracey, but when we did, she said this is how we put this
together. I'll supply $1.5 million of HUD 108 money, and you guys go out and find a
bank or intermediary that is willing to provide the allocation for the new market tax
credit. So we knocked on a couple doors, had National City, which was bought by PNC,
so that went away when PNC bought them... back to square one. Then our accountant
introduced us to US Bank, and they were willing to do the deal directly, so we got it
capitalized. But it took a long time.
Where each cooperative business began with a $750,000 long-term, low interest
loan from the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, for the laundry, the City
committed $1.5 million in HUD 108 loans, which in turn secured the confidence of
traditional lenders and helped structure a $7 million New Market Tax Credit allocation
from US Bank providing $2.3 million in equity. The initiative also drew two market rate
bank loans for $750,000 each as well as qualified for a $250,000 loan from the
Commonwealth Revolving Loan Fund (operated by the OEOC). On the other hand, the
financing for OCS combined Solar Tax Credits and New Markets Tax Credits. Thus drawing
on a combination of philanthropic funds, government finance, and private sector loans, the
Evergreen initiative was able to capitalize Evergreen Cooperative Laundry at $5.7 million
and Ohio Cooperative Solar at $3 million.
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4.6.2 Construction and hiring
While finalizing the business financing, the leadership team also tackled design and
construction of the facilities, purchase of equipment, and recruitment and hiring. For the
laundry, Jim Anderson located a distributor in Akron, Ohio, from which it agreed to
purchase needed equipment and maintenance services. With one of their customer
representatives, Mr. Anderson then looked at five different sites for the laundry in order to
meet height specifications and other set up requirements for the equipment. Ultimately, he
chose a site in the Glenville neighborhood that happened to be owned by one of
Evergreen's financial lenders, who offered the best deal for the space. Signing a 10-year
lease on the space, Mr. Anderson next moved to build the greenest industrial laundry
possible. With the support of a dozen engineers from the Greater University Circle area and
equipment distributor from Akron, he met with various equipment supply companies,
signing purchase orders with those who responded favorably to questions and suggested
technical changes. He also hired an architectural firm that specialized in LEED buildings,
which in turn worked with the equipment supplier to create a lay out that would maximize
energy efficiency but still come in within budget. In comparison, Ohio Cooperative Solar
had fewer facility requirements, since most of the work took place off site, such that much
of the $3 million went towards covering equipment and operating costs. Moreover, the
investments, rather than being required up front, could occur on an ongoing basis as
business expanded.
As far as the terms of employee ownership, each Evergreen company was designed
to employ approximately 50 worker-owners, who would in time collectively own and
democratically manage the enterprise. Initially hired for a probationary period, each
employee would undergo a performance review after six months and in cases of success,
receive an invitation to become a co-owner of the firm along with a raise of about $2 an
hour. Where the membership cost to "buy in" to the firm was set at $3000, a payroll
deduction of fifty cents an hour would be levied over the course of three years, at which
point a full-time employee could become fully vested in the company. Moreover, in cases
where the firms produce profits, a portion of the profits would be allocated to a series of
patronage accounts belonging to worker-owners, the expectation being that each person
would earn about $65,000 in equity stakes in about seven to eight years. In fact, among the
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defining approaches of the Cleveland Model would be its measure of business viability by
the number of years needed to offer 50 employees $65,000 in assets rather than the rate of
return (Luviene and Song, 2012). Committed to paying a living wage, the leadership
conducted market research to offer hourly wages beyond the level of competitors, which
amounted to a starting rate of $10 for the laundry, with the hourly pay increasing to $12
upon initiation as a full member after the six month trial period, $14 for drivers, and up to
$23 for senior worker owner managers. For OCS, the hourly pay started at $11 for six-
month probationary workers, and then increased to $13.50 upon initiation as a full
member, $15 for crew leaders, and $17.50 for supervisors. Balancing the impetus to
generate profits with the desire to offer a health care benefits package as a matter of
principle, the leadership team decided to offer no cost health insurance for the worker
owners to the exclusion of their families.
- In order to recruit and train the workforce, Evergreen partnered with Towards
Employment, a non-profit specializing in job readiness for people facing barriers to
employment that had been regularly funded by the Cleveland Foundation. Serving the
Greater Cleveland area for over 20 years, the agency not only provided training in job
search, vocational, and "soft" skills along with supportive services needed to succeed on the
job but were also "recognized as legitimate by the community" (Anderson, 2011). Where a
gap emerged between the target population and human resource requirements for a
successful business, Towards Employment offered help with recruitment and screening as
well as ongoing support to ensure people could perform well on the job. While bringing
expertise in employee ownership training, the OEOC mostly interfaced with workers in
existing companies who had higher skill sets and were better acclimated to complex
operating environments. On the other hand, Towards Employment lacked experience in
employee ownership but specifically focused on populations with multiple barriers to
employment and were open to finding new ways to expand access to well paying jobs with
opportunities for career advancement for their constituents. Even prior to recruitment they
worked with the Evergreen leadership team to convene program enrollees and graduates
as well as others residing in the target neighborhood to present the idea of the initiative
and discuss what is a worker cooperative. Taking place at the Towards Employment facility
along with local churches on half a dozen occasions, the events included small group
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discussion on the pros and cons of being a worker owner along with requisite
characteristics, which partly initiated a self-selection process. They further provided
opportunities to gain feedback on program design. For instance, the decision to offer no
cost health care insurance to only worker owners and not their families came as a response
to feedback that partial coverage for the family might compromise Medicaid benefits.
Perhaps indicating the dire need for good jobs in the area, the openings at the laundry
alone drew about 500 applicants. Following a series of screenings and interviews, the
leadership team narrowed the list down to a set of twelve hires for the laundry and four for
the solar installation business, 90 percent of whom were African American and half, ex
offenders.
4.7 Building the plane while flying
4.7.1 Open for business
October 2009 brought the launch of the first two businesses: the Evergreen
Cooperative Laundry (ECL) and Ohio Cooperative Solar (OCS), both incorporated under
Ohio cooperative law. Located in a LEED certified 13,000 square foot former torpedo
manufacturing plant in Glenville, the ECL is the greenest commercial scale, industrial
laundry in Northeast Ohio. The state of the art washers require only 0.8 gallons of water
per pound of laundry compared to industry standards of 3 gallons. Aside from the energy
efficient equipment, the facility design incorporates conservation measures that reduce the
amount of heat used for water, dryers, and ironing. For instance, the advanced gray water
system continually filters and reuses water, which in turn heats incoming water to generate
energy savings of 35 percent. In addition, the dryers connect to ducts that re-channel
emitted heat to warm incoming air, while the ironing press also allows for savings in water
consumption and energy costs. Other "green" building features include the addition of
natural light, waterless urinals, low flow plumbing, motion sensors for lighting, high
efficiency fluorescents, low VOC paints and floor finishes, bike racks, and parking for low
emitting and carpool vehicles as well as the facility's location on a bus line. While the idea
for the green industrial laundry came from the CEO of the Cleveland Veterans Affairs
Medical Center, its client base has noticeably lacked the large health care institutions of
Greater University Circle as a result of the latter's inability to exit contracts with existing
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laundry service providers. Instead, ECL's major customers comprise large nursing homes
such as Judson Retirement and McGregor Homes along with hotels in the area. Whereas the
facility can clean up to 15 million pounds of bed linens and support 50 new jobs at full
capacity, as of July 2011, it was at 50 percent capacity with a total of 21 employees.
Operating out of the same building, Ohio Cooperative Solar performs large-scale
installations of solar panels of the rooftops of the city's largest nonprofit institutions. The
idea for the business originated from Cleveland Clinic administrators, who communicated a
concern for rising energy cost along with an interest in solar power generation as a part of
their sustainability efforts. Although federal and state tax credits for solar installation
offset costs and enhanced affordability, the hospital's nonprofit status precluded access to
such public incentives. On the other hand, OCS could install, own, and maintain the solar
panels, receive the tax credits, and then sell the energy back to the institutions for a set
term by means of Power Purchasing Agreements (PPA). Therefore the company completed
its first solar installation on the rooftop of the Cleveland Clinic building in June 2010, the
PPA with the hospital enabling access to the rooftop for a 15 year period during which
generated energy would be sold at a fixed rate of 12 cents per kilowatt hour. Consequently,
Cleveland Clinic received credit on its electricity bills for the amount of power received
from the sun as opposed to the grid. In the case of OCS, it not only profited from renewable
energy sales to the anchor institution, it received payment from the local utility for helping
meet renewable energy goals. The Ohio Alternative Energy Resource Standard requires
state utilities to source at least 12.5 percent of their energy from renewable sources by
2024, with five percent coming from solar energy sources. Following, University Hospitals
and Case Western Reserve additionally contracted with OCS for rooftop solar installations,
as did the City of Euclid. In short, the start up cooperative found no shortage of large non-
profit organizations willing to sign on as partners as well as few barriers to proving its
ability to execute the solar installation work to the high standards of health care and
educational facilities. However, it faced difficulty finding PPA developers to arrange access
to long-term, low interest capital.
Therefore to ensure year around work for its worker owners, OCS further engaged
in residential weatherization work as a preferred contractor with the Cleveland Housing
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Network, the largest energy conservation provider in Northeast Ohio whose program menu
included the U.S. Department of Energy's Home Weatherization Assistance Program
(HWAP) along with the utility ratepayer funded Housewarming and Electric Partnership
Programs. Steve Kiel had anticipated the need for supplemental work since the business
planning phase and explored areas such as roofing and snow piling before the investments
in energy efficiency made through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
shifted his attention to the area of building weatherization. Fortunately for OCS, it found a
valuable champion in the form of Liz Hernandez, Director of Property Services at the
Cleveland Housing Network who had a background in community organizing and identified
with Evergreen's social mission. Responsible for overseeing CHN's various weatherization
and retrofit programs, she provided access to work opportunities in the utility funded
Housewarming Program along with the Urban Mold and Moisture Project, funded by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which required relatively low
levels of skill to get started while enabling preliminary training. Further, Ms. Hernandez
facilitated priority access to highly coveted training slots for the Home Weatherization
Assistance Program (HWAP) so that by March 2010, OCS had gained certification from the
City to carry out work as a preferred contractor despite some hiccups in meeting initial
requirements around certification, bonding, insurance, and equipment along with assuring
consistent quality with executed work.
The fact that federal stimulus funds were due to run out by 2012 without much
prospect for renewal required OCS to seek alternative venues to continue its
weatherization and energy efficiency retrofit work. While the utility rate funded programs
would continue, HWAP work in the state of Ohio was projected to decrease threefold after
2012. Moreover, low-income residential programs, whether they were federally utility
ratepayer funded, carried low profit margins at around 10 percent. Therefore CEO Steve
Kiel sought out opportunities in the market rate sector, where profit margins were double.
For instance, he joined the steering committee of the Northeast Ohio Energy Alliance, a
consortium of forty regional stakeholders including utilities, contractors and other service
deliverers, philanthropy, and banks committed to expanding the regional energy efficiency
market. In particular, it sought to integrate outreach and education, project management,
and financing solutions to expand the scale of energy efficiency retrofits across various
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building types in Northeast Ohio. An outgrowth of Mayor Frank Jackson's Sustainable
Cleveland 2019 summit and supported by the Gund Foundation, Cleveland Foundation, and
Enterprise Community Partners, the alliance was exploring pilot financing incentive
mechanisms and peer generated marketing and education programs. Among five energy
efficiency retrofit service providers participating in the planning process, OCS was
essentially helping lay the infrastructure for demand generation as to set a direct path to
the fulfillment process. Outside the scope of the alliance, Mr. Kiel additionally explored
HVAC, demolition, and plumbing (reinstalling and fixing drainage while insulating
basements) as a supplement to weatherization and retrofit work.
4.7.2 From top down to bottom up
The unprecedented nature of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, along with the
direct shift from planning to implementation without a pilot phase, has required its
proponents to negotiate contradictory dimensions and improvise to the best of their
abilities. For instance, a fundamental premise of the initiative is that residents from the
targeted neighborhoods will largely own and operate the cooperatives, with the Evergreen
Cooperative Corporation maintaining a 20 percent equity stake to provide protection
against temptations to "demutualize. Struggling with the challenge of hiring "qualified"
managers from the Greater University Circle neighborhoods, the leadership team decided
to bring in outside management and technical expertise in the start up phase. Where the
goal was to have each cooperative's worker owners lead the senior management team
within three years of launching, the founding CEOs would play the role of "hired guns" in
the interim while worker owners attained adequate training and education to get to the
point of self sufficiency. Therefore the Evergreen leadership team invited Jim Anderson and
Steve Kiel to act as the temporary presidents of ECL and OCS respectively given their
extensive involvement in the feasibility study and business plan (as well as working
knowledge of the laundry equipment and facility set up in the case of former). Where
Evergreen drew interest from practitioners and scholars of community development and
employee ownership practitioners early on, such race and class dynamics- namely that its
workforce largely comprised low-income populations of color while the management was
entirely white, upper middle class professionals-received wide notice and criticism. On
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the other hand, many of the stakeholders themselves saw it as an act of drawing on a
variety of available resources to meet the requirements for success in which they were
deeply vested. Still, the process of incorporating outside "experts" could also be
contentious depending on the attitudes or orientations of the outsiders toward the worker
owners and other employees along with their role in the business.
Where both businesses struggled with their respective sets of problems, the laundry
saw a more dramatic escalation of conflict followed by a decisive and prompt resolution.
Upon John Logue's sudden passing in December 2009, Jim Anderson undertook a six-
month departure from the laundry (to the OEOC) during which the leadership team
responded recruited a former manager of a nursing home laundry to take his place. Despite
having 20-years experience working in the industry, the manager was unaccustomed to the
worker ownership model and experienced friction in his dealings with the worker owners.
India Pierce Lee recalled the occasion on which she received a disconcerting phone call
from one of the workers informing her that he was looking for another job: "I said, 'Excuse
me? Well, what's going on?' He started telling me what was going on, and it was a racial
dynamic. It was a racial, cultural dynamic."' She elaborated,
There were some racially tinged comments; basically this guy was walking around
saying, '1 don't have to worry because I can get a job, but you all are exfelons and you
wont be able to get a job.' They'd go out for lunch and stand in front of the building,
and he would come up and ask them, 'What are you doing out there, dealing drugs?'
And as they were giving him ideas about how to run things more efficiently, he didn't
want to listen to how they wanted to coordinate and run things, and basically it was
'Do as I say.'
Among the significant aspects of the incident is the manner of response on the part of the
Cleveland Foundation. India Pierce Lee recalled the events following the phone call,
I said, 'Would you meet with us and talk?' He said, 'No, we're afraid we're going to lose
our jobs.' I said, 'But you don't get this. You can't loseyour job. This is whereyour voice
counts!' So a co-worker and I met with them on a Saturday morning at McDonalds.
They sat down, and they weren't irate or anything. They very eloquently described
what was going on, what had transpired, how they were being treated.
In the process of soliciting candid speech and trouble shooting together, the Evergreen
leadership established better rapport with the worker owners and gained their trust. They
further deepened the worker owners' understandings of Evergreen as being unlike much of
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their previous employment experiences in terms of the level of democratic process built
into the governance structure. Following the plant manager's dismissal in June 2010, Steve
Kiel stepped in to provide temporary oversight until Jim Anderson could return.
Simultaneously, two of the most senior hires assumed greater responsibilities and
demonstrated leadership in managing different aspects of the laundry operations while
communicating openly about areas needing additional support. While the loss of a major
customer exerted pressure to downsize the operation, members of the leadership team
actively avoided layoffs. Upon Mr. Anderson's return and the addition of a temporary staff
person to play a sales function, ECL expanded into the nursing homes and hotels to grow its
client base (over six fold in a period of two years) and work towards financial recovery.
Like the laundry, OCS grappled with its share of personnel issues within the
cooperative, although in this case the tensions were subtler and the resolution was more
drawn out. Compared to the laundry, the business itself was more stable, the
weatherization and retrofit work doubling every month between October 2009 and
January 2010 and growing more gradually from then on such that the workforce grew
almost six-fold from the four initial hires to 22 within two years of operation. (During the
same time, the laundry went from having 12 workers to 21.) On the other hand, fewer OCS
hires made it past the six-month mark to enter the ranks of worker owners. According to
Steve Kiel, the higher turnover among his staff was partly attributable to the relatively
demanding nature of the work- going up ladders, climbing into attics in the summer and
atop slippery rooftops in the winter, working with power tools, using fractions to take
measurements, and the need for at least one member of the three-person crew to maintain
a driver's license in order to drive the truck to and from the worksite. At a more personal
level, he also expressed a sense of frustration in juggling the tension between the mission
of hiring from the target neighborhoods, creating career paths, and running a viable
business. For the first time, Mr. Kiel was grappling with employee attendance problems
related to spousal, childcare, and parole issues as well as instances of fighting and accused
theft. As he described, even on a daily basis, "They were facing enormous challenges like
having to take public transportation to get to the work site because they didn't have a
driver's license, owing a tremendous amount of fines or child support, paying way too
much for housing, and having bad credit. Also, a frequent problem was very low math skills.
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Our job requires measurement, and if you don't know fractions, it's a problem. I was
unaccustomed to working with such a group of people." Consequently, his personnel policy,
which was initially along the lines of "let's just jump into this thing and figure out what our
training needs are," shifted over to one of "churn and burn." In his words,
We're less likely after one incident or two incidents to hold onto somebody. Ifyou look
at the weatherization line of business, and also the solar line of business, although to a
lesser extent, it takes two years of on the job experience, repetition to get good at this.
So for us to chew up four to six months is doing the replacement a disservice. We're a
lot morefocused on getting within thefirst 30 to 45 days a reading on whether or not...
we're not giving ourselves 6 months
Beyond personnel issues, the cooperative also struggled to figure out how to
promote work quality, first experimenting with an incentive pay scheme where crews
producing a certain threshold amount of work received bonus payments atop their
monthly pay. Where the result was skyrocketing productivity to the detriment of work
quality, the next approach was to rotate crew leaders in instances of call back from CHN or
the City to fix sloppy work. Where that proved inadequate, in December 2010, Mr. Kiel
hired a supervisor with previous experience running a home building business that also
happened to be white and not a resident of the targeted neighborhoods. He described the
resulting dynamic:
So he had a building science background, and he was trying to teach people who we're
recruiting from neighborhoods how to do things. Some of them, a lot of them
responded with, 'Hey I know this.' They didn't take to the instruction very well...
Gradually, the respect for him got built. It wasn't overnight. Sort of like, why do we
need this guy? We know how to do this. Well first of all, he's older than you, he has a
tremendous amount of building experience, he's dealt with a ton of contractors... [He]
got immediate support from the agencies. You could imagine, we're hiring people
who've never done this before and we're adding him. They say, I feel better; it'll
eventually get done.
In other words, the manner in which newcomers were incorporated into the worker
cooperative and more specifically whether the worker owners had a say in the process
appeared to carry significance. Even in cases that newcomers brought valuable expertise,
worker owners maintained a sense of investment and ownership in the business and were
hesitant to accept an outsider solely on the basis of a top down decision by the CEO. Similar
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to probationary workers who demonstrated their commitment and value to the business
over a six-month period, the supervisor also had to win the respect of worker owners.
4.8 Setting the infrastructure for shared governance and decision making
4.8.1 Weekly coop meetings and the OEOC leadership training
While the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative began as a top down initiative led by
"elite" civil society actors including the Cleveland Foundation, University Circle anchor
institutions, the Democracy Collaborative, and the Ohio Employee Ownership Center, the
businesses were designed to be owned and operated by residents in the six targeted
neighborhoods of Greater University Circle. Therefore, from early on, the leadership team
prioritized efforts to build a cooperative model of shared governance and decision-making
and cultivate internal leadership. Based on his experience of managing an employee owned
steel mill with thousands of workers for over twenty years, Jim Anderson shared the
commitment to training and education, stating:
Ifyou really want to optimize the ownership potential, you must focus on ownership
culture development, and train people, and provide the training to have them
understand when do I wear my worker hat, when do I have my owner hat on, am I
really engaged and involved in the activities of managing the enterprise that I own,
and if I'm not, why not, and if I am, that's great and how can I do a better job of that,
and do I also get a chance to participate in the board governance? And here they do.
Six months into the cooperative, Steve Kiel also expressed excitement upon seeing the
positive effect of worker ownership on people who had generally had negative prior
experiences with employment:
What this is offering them is a different employment experience where they get to vote;
they have a say in what the business does and what policies it develops. I'm beginning
to see six months into it that this sense of pride coming from this sense of ownership
manifests itself in different ways. It's really interesting to watch brand new people
speak up and say, our uniforms need to be clean, and we need to turn off our cell
phones at work (Buffa, 2010).
Yet where the worker training and education piece had formal and informal
dimensions subject to the approach of each CEO, it became a source of difference between
the cooperative laundry and OCS. In each cooperative, employees, whether in the
probationary period, worker owners, or non-equity holding managers, participate in
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weekly coop meetings during which they troubleshoot company operations and
organizational dynamics. In the case of ECL, Jim Anderson incorporated into the weekly
coop meetings an exercise called "What ticks me off' to develop a healthy habit of giving
and receiving critical feedback and talking through problems. In his words,
Every meeting, we have one of the worker owners lead, and we go through old and
new business. Then in the agenda, as the last thing, we have TMO, 'What Ticks Me Off'
It's a formal part of the agenda, nothing personal, just business, but 'I want to hear
from you; what ticksyou off?' Because we believe that if we make them talk about the
negative, they'll start talking about it naturally, and they'll get comfortable [doing it].
Maybe it's, 'I don't like the work schedule; I don't like working on Saturday; There's not
enough people here.' Whatever it is, we talk them through. 'What do you think? What
do you think? Do you agree with that? Do you disagree? Let's talk! Let's be candid
here!' Becauseyou want to get that momentum going.
Outside of weekly meetings, employees, upon passing the probationary period to enter
worker owner status, received training on how to elect coworkers into the cooperative. In
the spring of 2011, the OEOC conducted a leadership training series for an initial group of
ten worker owners from the laundry and six from OCS. Among the components, the culture
module covered the following topics: (1) What does worker ownership mean to me, (2)
Team work, communication, and dealing with conflict, (3) Decision making, (4) Team
problem solving and employee owner involvement, (5) Basic business literacy, and (6)
Operationalizing fundamental cooperative principles from places like Rochdale and
Mondragon within the culture of the organization.
As for OCS, CEO Steve Kiel appeared to growingly prioritize team meetings about
company operations and other pressing practical matters over worker training and
education, his background in management consulting with a specialization in capital
markets perhaps predisposing him toward concept development rather than
implementation. While lacking a counterpart to the "What Ticks Me off' exercise, he
convened OCS crew leaders on a regular basis outside the weekly coop meetings to discuss
how to manage the workload. Almost two years after the launch, Mr. Kiel spoke to a tension
between delivering outcomes as consistent with the business plan and attending to
workforce development. Reflecting on the progress made by OCS, he expressed:
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The business is doing O.K Maybe I want too much, but I don't think we're at the point
of saying we're doing well. I think we're at the point where we're saying we're running
a low margin business here. After we pay payroll and materials, a little bit of rent- I
don't know if you saw our space, but we pay very low rent. It's not palatial by any
means-we're making 10 percent. We're making $120 a day. If we have three people
in the classroom for two hours, our profit has just evaporated.
He elaborated on the challenges of integrating leadership training into the work
environment at OCS:
To be completely practical about it, these guys start at 7:30 at the morning and ifyou
saw them come in at 430 when the trucks get returned here, they are smelly, they are
covered with insulation, and they are tired. It's kind of like a luxury to have any
classroom time with them. We do ask them to stay for crew leader meetings; we ask
them to stay for coop mtgs. We had a coop meeting three Fridays ago that was based
on a set of issues that I would say were all HR related and said the next time we could
do this is 430 on a Friday. I expected nobody to show up, and they all showed up. To
me, it was pretty impressive. It's a lot easier for the laundry and greenhouse to do it,
because they have four walls. So you can come in at lunch and buy people pizza and
they can sit around the little cafeteria. Our guys are gone. When they come back, they
are exhausted.
Hence the question arises as to whether the lack of attention to building a culture of shared
ownership and developing leadership might have accounted for the high turnover.
4.8.2 Democratizing the organizational structure
Aside from institutionalizing shared governance and decision-making and internal
leadership in business operations, another priority area related to democratizing the
organizational structure of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative as a whole. To accomplish
the transition at the firm level, each member of the ECL and OCS went through a four-hour
training seminar in preparation for the first election of worker owner representatives to
their respective Boards of Directors, which took place in Fall of 2011. Each Evergreen
company has a five member Board of Directors comprising two worker owners, two
members appointed by the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation, and a final person selected
by the other four members depending on needed expertise, each person serving a three
year term. Responsibilities of the board include approving new worker owners (after
existing members submit their vote), hiring the company's CEO, capital planning and
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budgeting, strategic planning, assuring education and training is available for the Board
and worker owners, and submitting reports to the ECC as required. The responsibility of
overseeing coop membership is more broadly distributed, with supervisors evaluating the
on-the-job performance by six month probationary workers and all worker owners voting
on whether or not to extend the invitation to join the cooperative. Following the results of
the vote go to the company's Board of Directors, along with the evaluation report from the
supervisor. Based on those inputs, the Board votes to accept the employee into the
cooperative as a member. Where Evergreen's expectation is to cultivate a cadre of
managers and CEOs that come from the ranks of the worker owners, both Jim Anderson
and Steve Kiel were tasked with identifying emergent leaders for additional leadership
training and coaching.
Simultaneously, the organizational structure of the broader Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative also settled into place. In February 2011, the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation
hired Ron Jones, an African American entrepreneur and corporate executive who brought
over 20 years of domestic and international experience at the intersection of technology
and banking, as the acting president and CEO. India Pierce Lee solicited his application for
the position based on a recommendation from Key Bank where he had worked in an
executive leadership capacity. Mr. Jones' mission was to set up the holding company (which
would in turn have oversight over the Evergreen cooperatives, cooperative development
fund, business planning services, and land trust), institutionalize the business planning
process, and develop a culture of shared ownership across all the Evergreen entities. He
would receive aid from Chief Financial Officer Robert Sorin, a Certified Public Accountant
with over thirty years experience hired to oversea the financial management of each of the
Evergreen companies. Further, Rosalyn Ciulla came onboard as the Director of the
Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund following Mary Ann Stropkey's departure from
the Evergreen Leadership Team upon Shorebank's dissolution in 2010. The Evergreen
Cooperative Corporation incorporated the ECC as a non profit organization in the state of
Ohio in 2011 before applying to the IRS for 501c3 status the following year. With a 20
percent equity stake in all the businesses, the ECC would be the keeper of the mission and
provider of the overall strategic direction for the Evergreen system. By summer of 2012,
the holding company was in the process of populating its Board of Directors to have
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representation from the anchor institutions, funders, cooperatives, and Cleveland area
businesses. Steven Standley of University Hospitals agreed to serve as the board chair for
the initial two years.58
To steer newcomers to the Board towards the Evergreen vision and mission, India
Pierce Lee, Lillian Kuri, and Ted Howard would remain on the board as founding members
although without voting rights. The original conceivers of the Economic Inclusion strategy
for the Greater University Circle Initiative, they had been at the core of the informal
leadership structure from the time of the pre-feasibility study through concept
development, market analysis, business planning, and raising capital as well as the
operation of the cooperatives since the first set of launches in October 2009. Where other
members like John Logue, Mary Ann Stropkay, Steve Kiel, and Jim Anderson might come
and go, they maintained a continued presence and cultivated relationships of mutual trust
and respect with the worker owners. Initially in 2007, the Cleveland Foundation contracted
with the Democracy Collaborative to help develop the community wealth building strategy
before requesting for Ted Howard, as the representative of the Collaborative, to help
implement the Evergreen strategy the following year. Finally in 2010, the Cleveland
Foundation created the position of Senior Fellow for Social Justice named for former
President and CEO Steven Minter, which it offered Mr. Howard for the first two years and
subsequently renewed for another two years upon the expiration of the first term in 2012.
Besides his involvement in Cleveland, Mr. Howard continued to consult with civic leaders
around the country interested in transferring the lessons from Evergreen to adapt the
anchor-based cooperative model in their local context.
Among the first tasks of the board was to hire an in-house education and training
director who would direct the implementation of a comprehensive ownership training
program beginning in July 2012. Realizing that the previous trainings with the OEOC were
perhaps better attuned for ESOP companies in addition being sporadic, the Evergreen
leadership decided to develop a more culturally appropriate curriculum as well as
5 Mr. Standley spearheaded the Vision 2010 program at the UH, which not only created more than 5,200 jobs
totaling over $500 million in wages, salaries, and benefits at the height of construction, but voluntarily
incorporated diversity hire targets specifying 5 percent of contractors would be female owned businesses, 15
percent- minority owned businesses, 80 percent-locally-based companies, and 20 percent of all workers-
residents of Cleveland.
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institutionalize training capacity within the Evergreen system. More specifically, it aimed to
create a common culture in all the companies by targeting three primary audiences: six
month probationary workers, to provide an understanding of what they were getting into;
worker owners, to provide ongoing leadership development; and CEOs, who have good
business development and management skills but may not be familiar with worker
cooperatives or working with populations with barriers to employment. As part of the
educational and team building process, the Cleveland Foundation planned additional study
trips to Mondragon for new board members and worker owners. Leadership transition also
played a role in the changing orientation to education and training. In the fall of 2011, Steve
Kiel left OCS after spending four years with the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative. Where he
had an aptitude for starting up operations but felt less excited by ongoing management, his
successor, Cliff Wood, brought over thirty years of corporate management experience and
resided in one of the target neighborhoods. As he stabilized the learning and work
environment within OCS, some of the previously departed staff returned to the company,
now renamed Evergreen Energy Solutions (E2S). Meanwhile, at the laundry, Jim Anderson
prepared to leave by the end of 2012 at the end of his three-year term, while the Evergreen
Leadership Team explored internal and external candidates to fill his place.
4.9 Community engagement
At the start of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, few residents of Glenville,
Hough, Fairfax, Buckeye-Shaker, Little Italy, and the eastern part of East had ever heard of
"Greater University Circle." However, as the companies gained a positive reputation around
the neighborhood, local residents began to recognize the Evergreen brand and seek
employment with the cooperatives. Ron Jones related his experience:
I'm standing in the parking lot, pulling in and people are coming up and asking if they
can drop off applications and resumes; they'd love to work there. I attend church in the
neighborhood, and I see members; they ask, 'Hey Ron, how's Evergreen going? What's
the next business in the pipelines?' It's there; they know it's there. The neighborhood is
watching.
Despite achieving some level of recognition particularly with respect to job creation, both
Evergreen and the complex of anchor institutions remained largely removed from the
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social fabric of the surrounding neighborhoods. For even the lucky few that managed to
gain employment with either of the cooperatives, creating such an initiative with the
capacity to leverage the procurement power of anchor institutions and command such
levels of support from the Cleveland Foundation, City of Cleveland, and other powers-that-
be seemed an infeasible task. However, with the help of community organizing and
democratic power building efforts, urban policy and local economic development programs
promoting community wealth building initiatives like Evergreen could perhaps become
more widespread. Ted Howard reflected on the existing circumstance and the potential for
political and economic change inherent in community engagement:
Right now, Evergreen is almost like an unexpected gift that happened for some people
in the neighborhood. So there is this sort of gift and people are taking ownership of
that gift. But how do we change the dynamic in the neighborhood so that in terms of
the psychology and aspirations of the residents, they start to think this is not
something that a few people are lucky enough to have access to but [rather] 'this
should be what our community is about; we want our city to be working with us to
have this approach to jobs and wealth'? Then you start to have people organizing for
that and people running for city council based on that. Then maybe some day someone
will run for mayor and say, 'We're going to take all this money we used to give to
corporations as subsidies and direct it in this way.'
In other words, the question is how to shift from a sense of serendipity where the subject
perceives the surrounding circumstance as not being of his or her own making to a sense of
ownership and creativity.
As the first step in their community engagement strategy, in 2009, the Evergreen
leadership team established Neighborhood Voice as a "hyperlocal" print and online
newspaper, which incorporated contributions from citizen journalists and representatives
of anchor institutions and other organizations from the Greater University Circle area. The
first editor in chief, Josette Compton, joined the Evergreen initiative in June 2010 (as a non-
equity holding employee) to take Neighborhood Voice from an abstract concept to a
monthly publication with a distribution network. She also initiated a popular weekly
writing and journalism workshop, where residents learned to think both critically and
prescriptively about neighborhood issues. When Ms. Compton resigned a year to attend
graduate school, the leadership team took the community engagement effort to the next
level. From 2011, Evergreen pursued a more comprehensive approach to community
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engagement incorporating Neighborhood Voice into a network organizing strategy led by a
community-based organization in Greater University Circle called Neighborhood
Connections. The network organizing method, developed by Bill Traynor and Jessica
Andors at Lawrence CommunityWorks, a CDC in Lawrence, Massachusetts, connects
residents of historically marginalized and disinvested communities to each other to "step
into public life" (Traynor & Andors, 2005). For instance, a network organizer may
encourage neighbors to convene over a shared meal to get to know one another, discuss
concerns about the neighborhood, and formulate a plan to address them. As various social
events and activities foster dialogue among neighbors and get them to address different
issues of common concern, the resultant strengthening of personal ties and connections
along with linkages among different groups leads to a healthier civic environment. To
facilitate such a process in Greater University Circle, the Cleveland Foundation has engaged
Neighborhood Connections, established in 2003 to extend small grants that fund citizen-led
neighborhood projects, events, and activities. With funding from Living Cities, a
collaborative of 22 of the world's largest foundations and financial institutions,
Neighborhood Connections has dedicated a project manager and community organizer to
the initiative while operating Neighborhood Voice as a media platform that supports the
network organizing strategy.
In addition to strengthening community organization and civic activism in Greater
University Circle, the other piece of the puzzle entails getting the worker owners of
Evergreen to play a leadership role not only within the company but also within the
broader Greater University Circle community. Many continue to emphasize the positive
impacts of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative on their own lives. In the words of worker
owner Joe Massey, "[Evergreen] gives me a sense of confidence, sense of pride, makes me
feel like I'm doing something positive with my life. A few years ago I wasn't able to say that.
A lot of people look at me with respect. A lot of people look up to me. I can walk with my
head high" (Cleveland Foundation, 2011). Here, Mr. Massey defines his achievement
beyond the level of individuality to encompass the improved quality of his interrelations
with others. Similarly, worker owner Tracie Marsh connects her experience working at the
laundry with her role within the greater community and society in stating, "It's allowed me
to be a contributor, not only to the community, but to society as well. It gives me a sense of
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confidence knowing I can get up in the morning and come to work. To me, that's freedom"
(Ibid.). Likewise, the following quote by Medrick Addison, operational manager of ECL,
emphasizes the difference that Evergreen has made in his life: "As a younger man making
bad choices, going to prison, that sort of thing, I look back on that person to who I am
today... total difference! I was a recluse; I was bitter. Now I'm more outgoing; I can speak to
people; I love telling them about Evergreen, what Evergreen has done for me, what I've
done for Evergreen, and what we've done together" (Ibid.). Thus part of Mr. Addison's
personal development has to do with a newfound ability to hold conversations with others
about Evergreen and the coevolution he has experienced with the company. In a PBS
documentary called "Fixing the Future," Mr. Addition additionally remarks on his
attachment to one of the Greater University Circle neighborhoods where he was raised and
the contribution Evergreen makes to its potential regeneration:
This is my neighborhood. This is where I grew up at. This is the building I grew up at.
This is one of the neighborhoods that was really hit hard by the foreclosures and
whatnot. You know, you kind of feel cast aside, thrown away in a sense, and to have
something positive like the Evergreen Initiative come about, it was like a godsend! It
was just what the neighborhood needed. We can't help everybody but we're helping
somebody.
Hence where worker owners of Evergreen may already see themselves and their company
as playing an important role in the Greater University Circle community, the remaining task
is to integrate the worker education and training component with the community
engagement strategy to enable worker owners to translate such inclinations to help build a
broader base for Evergreen and initiatives like it.
4.10 Green City Growers
Within the first five years of operation, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative aims to
launch ten new businesses, each with up to 50 worker owners, to generate a total of 500
jobs. The long-term goal is to create a network of 100 businesses to employ up to 5,000
worker owners and ultimately stabilize and revitalize the targeted neighborhoods. While
seemingly lagging behind in terms of the number of businesses started almost three years
in, the leadership team actually made an early decision to begin with the more capital
139
intensive businesses as to set sturdy foundations for the developmental infrastructure and
solidify institutional commitments. With the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation up and
running, acting president and CEO Ron Jones assures that a dozen anchor-related business
ideas are being vetted for feasibility at any given moment. Projects in the works include a
medical waste recycling business and document scanning firm as well as a cooperative
housing initiative. Among recent milestones, Green City Growers (GCG) opened in October
2011 as Evergreen's third cooperative business and most ambitious capital investment. In
this case, $1.4 million from the Evergreen Development Fund leveraged $8 million in HUD
108 loans and $2 million in Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (BEDI) grants,
secured with the help of the City Economic Development Department. In addition, the
project received an $18 million New Markets Tax Credit Allocation through PNC Bank,
providing $3.5 million in equity. GCG also benefited from $1 million ARRA grant funding.
Figure 3. Picture of Green City Growers greenhouse (Source: Cleveland Foundation)
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On October 17, 2011, Green City Growers Cooperative broke ground on their 10-
acre hydroponic greenhouse, five acres of which is under glass. Located at the corner of
Kinsman Road and Ensign Avenue in the Central neighborhood on a site that was once
home to a sweater factory, it is the largest such project based in an American city. At full
capacity, the greenhouse will have the capacity to produce three million heads of red leaf,
green leaf, and bibb lettuce and 300,000 pounds of herbs year around through hydroponic
agriculture. Developed in close collaboration with the anchor institutions, the City of
Cleveland (including the Mayor himself, the Department of Economic Development and the
Department of Sustainability), and other local stakeholders, GCG has commitments to sell
produce to GUC area hospitals and schools that currently buy from places as remote as
California and Hawaii. They will additionally supply grocery store chains, wholesalers, and
food service companies within a 150-mile radius. Aside from offering competitive prices to
large institutions and retail outlets that can meet sustainability commitments by buying
locally, it will additionally use wind and geothermal energy along with LED lighting to
minimize greenhouse gas emissions and energy costs. Designed to employ 25 people at
start up and 43 people as GCGC begins hand packing herbs and creating value-added
lettuce products, the business plans to begin hiring from the targeted neighborhoods and
planting 18,000 plants per day upon the conclusion of construction in October 2012.
Available positions include crop managers, customer service representatives, harvesting
and packaging personnel, production supervisors, truck drivers, and quality assurance
technicians. The first crops are due to be picked and sold in late November or December of
2012.
In March 2010, the Evergreen leadership hired Mary Donnell to be the founding CEO
of Green City Growers. In addition to bringing expertise in business planning and
development in the national produce and hydroponic greenhouse industries, Ms. Donnell
has also worked in education and training capacities while directing the Ohio State
University Extension Agricultural Business Enhancement Center, Ohio Hydroponic
Vegetable program, and Ohio Good Agricultural Practices Program. In hiring the remaining
staff, the Evergreen leadership team has changed their approach from partnering with a
workforce intermediary like Towards Employment as in the case of the ECL and OCS.
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Recognizing the drive for leadership and community service in Medrick Addison, a lifelong
resident of Glenville and emerging leader within the Evergreen initiative and American
cooperative movement, they raised foundation dollars to dedicate half of his staff time to
working with Mary Donnell to conduct conversations and tours with neighborhood
residents as well as take resumes. Mr. Addison hired most of the people at the laundry and
has run a variety of personnel functions for the business. As viewed by Ted Howard, "We
have a person who is a worker owner who has gone through this. So he knows what to look
for but also what to share with a worker owner as far as what it takes and what you need to
be up for to succeed here." Besides believing in the community wealth creation model
based on targeted anchor procurement spending and a network of cooperatives based on
shared ownership and governance, Mr. Addison sees the target demographic as key to
Evergreen's continuing success. In his words, "When Evergreen got started, they said we're
going to fail because who [we] hired. But our bet is we're going to succeed because who we
hired. If you hire people [for whom] this is their last chance of having a productive future
or doing something for their children, their backs are to the wall, they can't mess this up."
4.11 Cleveland and beyond
As for the City of Cleveland, it has properly integrated a strategic focus on
institutional procurement activities into its repertoire of local economic development in
the aftermath of the Greater University Circle Initiative and the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative. The following segment from an interview conducted with Mayor Jackson in early
2012 reveals some of the new thinking on the part of the administration:
Ifyou look at the medical industry in Cleveland itself, Cleveland proper, they probably
procure, in terms of goods and services and fixtures and furniture and stuff like that,
they probably procure six, seven billions of dollars ayear between University Hospitals,
Cleveland Clinic, Metro Health, Sisters of Charity, and all of their network Working on
how do you influence those suppliers of those goods and services to have a presence in
Cleveland would be a significant advantage... Many of their suppliers are the same
companies, they're the same vendors. Their influence and their saying to those
suppliers, look we've spent several hundred million dollars a year with you, you need to
have a presence in Cleveland. That's part of what I believe is next. Now community
benefits is around construction, but there's also community benefits around
procurement activities.
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In addition to partnerships with "good corporate citizens[s]" like University Hospitals,
historically marginalized communities are at the center of the City's vision for Health Tech
Corridor. In referring to targeted procurement activities, the Mayor emphasized,
The inclusion of people of all different groups for access to that wealth, not just in
terms of opportunity, but in actually receiving of it is the sustainable part of that
initiative. Because ifyou don't do that and its under the same exclusive policies and
behaviors, then you would not have a sustainable economic system or sustainable
wealth creation.... So you have to make that an essential part of the initiative. If it's
not, it doesn't work. It works for a moment and then that's it. If you want
sustainability, you have to have inclusion. It's essential to sustainability.
Appropriating the rhetoric of sustainability, he symphonizes the goals of social inclusion
with economic development and broader wealth creation beyond empty promises of "equal
opportunity." Earlier we touched on Mayor Jackson's notion of "self help" and the role of
minority communities as stakeholders and potential participants in urban investment and
economic development strategies that set off multiplier effects beginning in inner city
neighborhoods. Along with the University Hospitals Vision 2010 project, Evergreen
provides a concrete precedent that might inform continued efforts along these lines.
With respect to the Cleveland Foundation, its pioneering efforts at aggregating the
procurement power of anchor institutions brought an invitation to join Living Cities, a
consortium of 22 of the world's largest foundations and financial institutions committed to
improving the lives of low-income people and the cities where they live. Simultaneously,
Cleveland won designation as one of five metropolitan areas- besides Detroit, Baltimore,
Newark, and Minneapolis-St. Paul- that would share $80 million in grants and loans for
initiatives aimed at reinvigorating poor urban areas. The $14.75 million in awards from
Living Cities are slated to go towards improving Cleveland's Health Tech Corridor, running
from the edge of downtown to University Circle. The Cleveland Foundation has partnered
with the City of Cleveland and other local stakeholders to attract and grow businesses in
the area that create 800 new jobs by 2013, with thousands more to follow (Litt, 2010).
Collaborative partnerships between institutional partners and leveraging the procurement
power of anchor institutions based strategy are an integral part of the strategy. Hence the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative appears well poised to enjoy greater synergies around
expanding community wealth in Greater University Circle with a growing number of
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partners. On the other hand, the Cleveland Foundation, City of Cleveland, and institutional
partners have formed a "learning community with their counterparts in Detroit, Newark,
and Baltimore to share and further develop the Cleveland Model. Ultimately, they intend to
adopt the model for application in Youngstown, where the occurrence of "Black Monday"
decades prior set off the chain off events resulting in the formation of the OEOC, Democracy
Collaborative, and ultimately the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative.
At the same time, Ted Howard and other members of the Democracy Collaborative
continue to share lessons from Cleveland with those grappling with similar circumstances
around the country. So far they have provided outreach and advice to civic leaders in places
as diverse as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Richmond,
California; and Amarillo, Texas.
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CHAPTER 5: THE LOS ANGELES GREEN RETROFIT AND WORKFORCE PROGRAM
5.1 Laying the ground
Where the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce Program grew out of a policy
campaign waged by a coalition of 25 community, labor, and environmental organizations,
its beginnings trace back to multiple strands of social movement traditions, organizational
histories, and policy accomplishments. At the same time, no single organization played as
central a role in the program's early conception and development as SCOPE. Action for
Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives (AGENDA) had
been established in South Los Angeles in the aftermath of the 1992 urban uprising as part
of the community-based movement to address the serious conditions of poverty,
unemployment, and violence faced by the city's inner city communities through grassroots
mobilization and policy advocacy. The organization was founded based on four principles:
(1) building vehicles for collective action for historically marginalized communities; (2)
democratically developing transformative public policy; (3) constructing strategic alliances
at the intersection of race, class and single-issue efforts; and (4) organizing policy
campaigns that ignite broad social movement, win structural change, and begin to realign
power relationships toward democracy and justice (SCOPE/AGENDA 2012). From its
original focus on the African American community based in South Los Angeles, the
organization shortly convened the Los Angeles Metropolitan Alliance, a regional coalition
consisting of over fifty community-based organizations, unions, faith-based organizations,
and public sector employee unions (SEIU Locals 347 and 660), to organize low-income
communities throughout the Greater Los Angeles region around social and economic
justice. While pursuing a series of workforce and economic development campaigns
targeting regional growth industries,59 AGENDA spun off CIPER in 1997 as its research and
training arm. Next, AGENDA created Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education
59 Over the years, Metropolitan Alliance waged a series of workforce development campaigns linking low-
income communities to good jobs that brought several policy victories, including: (1) Workplace Hollywood, a
$10 million workforce development program created in partnership with the Dreamworks entertainment
corporation to train and place income inner city residents in the entertainment industry; (2) The Los Angeles
City Jobs Program, a job training and placement program targeting welfare recipients for entry into living
wage public sector jobs with long-term career paths (more on this later); and (3) Healthcare Careers Ladder
Training Program, a job training program that places low-income residents in health care related fields (later
embraced by the City of Los Angeles as a blueprint for sectoral workforce development strategies).
145
(SCOPE) to coordinate local and regional efforts with progressive social movements and
policy advocacy networks nationwide.
In integrating grassroots organizing and leadership development with coalition
building around policy advocacy campaigns, SCOPE/AGENDA (henceforth referred to as
SCOPE) ventured into the area of green collar jobs while searching for its next issue focus
in 2005. At the national level, the formation of the Apollo Alliance the year before had
brought together organized labor, community-based organizations, environmental
organizations, and the private sector around the Apollo 10 Point Plan for creating good
jobs, a fairer economy, and energy independence. SCOPE's founder, Anthony Thigpenn, as a
member of the steering committee for the California Apollo Alliance, was involved in
discussions about the possibility of building an Apollo Alliance in Los Angeles. At the city
level, Antonio Villaraigosa had just been elected mayor of Los Angeles and was taking
active steps to make Los Angeles the greenest big city in America. Further, SCOPE was
interested in forging connections with environmentalist organizations and other "non-
traditional partners" for the larger purposes of progressive movement building. However,
before making any commitments, the organization first checked with its constituency to
confirm whether the issue of green collar jobs was even of relevance. Surveying over 1,000
constituents, the majority of whom were African American and Latino South LA residents
with annual incomes below $30,000,60 SCOPE soon learned that respondents indeed
desired green jobs paying wages that led to economic self-sufficiency, providing employee
benefits, such as health insurance, paid vacation, and sick days, and providing a safe and
healthy working environment. As recalled by Campaign Director Elsa Barbosa, "At one
point, we thought, will folks see good jobs and job creation as balanced with environmental
justice goals? And so we were really happily surprised and really motivated by the great
reception that we did receive at the grassroots level from our own membership and the
grassroots community."
60 The results of the survey are summarized in a report entitled, "Under the Line: An Assessment of Los
Angeles' Employment and Training Needs Based on a Survey of Over 1000 Residents."
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Simultaneously, SCOPE analyzed workforce and economic development opportunities for
low-income communities of color in the green building sector in Los Angeles. 61 As
elaborated by Ms. Barbosa,
We believed in [the Apollo Alliance approach], but needed time to do our own research
around what were the possibilities. Since this was a national effort, we took a lot of
time exploring, doing our own research in collaboration with the National Apollo
Alliance around what were the regional opportunities for transforming the economy
here in Los Angeles. So we did a lot of research around solar, fuel, cells, and green
building along with many other issues and aspects. We asked whether the potentialfor
scope and scale was really there.
While partnering with graduate student researchers in the UCLA Department of Urban
Planning to encounter reassuring findings, SCOPE simultaneously approached prospective
partners to build the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance for which it would serve as the anchor.
5.2 Converging on the green economy
The green economy had been decades in the making prior to the launch of the Los
Angeles Apollo Alliance in February 2006. Largely the domain of energy conservationists
amidst the oil crises of the 1970s, the field incrementally expanded to encompass
proponents of climate change mitigation as well as place-based economic development,
poverty reduction, neighborhood revitalization, and public health. By the mid 2000s,
widespread excitement over potential gains, whether in terms of job creation, energy
savings, or curbed greenhouse gas emissions, posed a backdrop for structuring processes,
complete with strategic and opportunistic action. The building trades were among the
quickest to assert their respective claims on the emerging field, beginning at the national
level through participation in strategic alliances such as the Blue Green Alliance, Apollo
61 Through its partnership with the UCLA Department of Urban Planning, SCOPE obtained research support
from Sigalle Rosner, a graduate student in the Department of Urban Planning, who as part of her final year
"client project," analyzed workforce development opportunities for low-income communities of color in the
green building sector in Los Angeles in part by conducting case studies on three select green buildings along
with interviews with key green building industry representatives. The final report, entitled "Job Implications
in Los Angeles' Green Building Sector" (Rosner, 2006), identified potential campaign strategies including one
centering on a policy that would require all appropriate existing municipal buildings to be retrofitted for
energy efficiency and other green building elements. SCOPE also teamed with UCLA Urban Planning graduate
students Michael Matsunaga, Polo Munoz, Nirva Parikh, Marcel Porras, and Jennifer Tran, who assessed the
potential of the green building materials manufacturing industry in Los Angeles County as part of their final
report for Professor Goetz Wolff s Fall 2006 course on sectoral analysis (Matsunaga et al., 2006).
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Alliance, and Emerald Cities Collaborative. In Los Angeles, Assistant Business Manager Kim
Craft of IBEW Local 11 underscored the longstanding tenure of electricians in the field of
green retrofits:
Everyone seems to think this green economy just sprung up over night. It's been
something we've been talking about- building automation and smarter homes- for
a decade now. The rest of the country came in along the time President Obama got
elected. Al Gore started talking about global warming, and then the Clintons got
involved in greening our environment We're talking 6 to 7 years that the focus has
been developing on green technology. Well we've been looking at smarter ways of
lighting more energy efficiency all along.
Executive Director Mike Massey of the Piping Industry Progress and Education (PIPE)
Trust Fund conveyed a similar position with respect to his specific trade,
My first job in the plumbers and pipefitters union back in the 1970s was down near
San Diego at a power plant, where you see the great big smokestacks by the beach. I
was supposed to convert them over to natural gas, because it was cheaper and cleaner.
They used to use two types of crude; when the sun went down they switched over to a
really dirty one that put all the stuff out at night when you couldn't see. So I've been
involved directly in the green economy because I'm an industrial pipefitter in the oil
and energy industry, whether I knew it or not We didn't use the word green. We knew
ifyou switchedfrom crude oil to natural gas to power a plant, that it was cleaner.
Jim Irwin, an organizer with the Painters District Council 36, also characterized green
retrofits and workforce development as a preexisting field in which painters and various
other trades had long been operating:
Greening buildings and all the hoopla! I see it as part of the regular cycle; when they're
'greening' buildings, they're upgrading them. Short version is we've always been doing
upgrades. The word green to us is like the word upgrading and modernizing. We do a
lot of modernization work. It means making buildings more efficient and high
performing. 'Greening' is just a new term. We anticipate making some changes to our
curriculum but its part of regular events happening every now and then. Whether it's
material based or work modernizing, updating our curriculum is a natural occurrence.
We call it apprenticeship. Each trade has a training center. We've had a long history of
apprenticeships, all the trades actually. So that fits right into what we've been doing
all along, which is that whenever we have new technologies, all the construction
companies are ready to grab the latest as they come.
In part, the aggressive interest on the part of the building trades in the green economy
grew out of the need to find work for their respective members amidst a flailing economy.
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John Choi, Economic Development Director of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor,
commented on the apprehension felt by many of the building trades unions and their
leadership.
Things are heightened because right now because the economy is struggling so badly and
California, and within that, LA County have particularly high unemployment rates.
Construction workers have extremely high unemployment rates. They're averaging
between 30 to 40 percent unemployment. So there's an incredible amount of pressure on
the building trades leadership to get their members back to work.
Kim Craft lamented the recent rise in inter-trade rivalries extending into green sectors of
the economy:
The reason we're getting pressure from the laborers is because of the damn economy.
They got 40 percent of their people unemployed. So they say, 'Hey there's work out
there. The new work is solar and we're going to do it.' The people in the state who
work with all the trades have already addressed the issue. There's room for everybody.
Of course, there's room for them to handle a lot of the material, leave it at different
locations... Traditionally, we've had great rapport with the rest of the building trades.
It's just because the man-hours in traditional work are down. There's this desire to
keep our members employed.
Jim Irwin of the Painters District Council 36 described a similar situation facing the
painters and allied trades as well as the resulting impetus for forming strategic
partnerships and exploring new areas of work:
When it gets hard like this, most people fight more. Doesn't need to be that way but
that's what's apparently going on. The reason I can't be aligned with the carpenters
right now is because they're trying to take our work. I don't know why people do that,
but they do. So we've drawn alliances with community groups, day laborers, the UCLA
Labor Center, the LA County Federation of Labor, and LAANE. We want to get more
PLAs and more alliances to get more work
The last quote partly speaks to the competitive advantages offered by partnering with
community-based organizations such as SCOPE and entities such as the Los Angeles Apollo
Alliance in accessing large-scale projects and work in emerging economic sectors. In the
specific area of building energy efficiency retrofits, the pending challenge of aggregating
retrofit projects and executing efficiency measures at scale created a sense of openness on
the part of the building trades to forging collaborative partnerships and trying alternative
economic and workforce development approaches. Issues related to their declining
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membership might have also created an impetus for building trades unions to participate
in the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and its green jobs campaign. However, with the
exception of a Laborers Local 300 official, who remarked on the underrepresentation of
racial minorities in the skilled crafts, five of the five interviewed building trades members
avoided speaking directly to their organization's troubled histories of racial exclusion and
resultant trend of membership decline. In the case of Jim Irwin, he simply highlighted the
role of immigration in maintaining the ranks of the painters union and allied trades along
with the construction industry more broadly. In his words,
New immigrants, that's who comes in to do our work, immigrants from anywhere in
the world. There's a lot of money in construction so people are going to gravitate
where the money is. Say your children don't want to be in construction, they're going
to go to college. It means someone else will come in and do the work. When I was a kid,
you went to high school, if you weren't college bound, you had the option of taking
shop classes, industrial arts, something like that. You had the option of doing that kind
of a program that let you into the construction trades. Well they gutted that out of the
education system so those kids that would have chosen that option now don't have
that avenue. So in many cases, our recruitment now is a result of that. Now we have a
lot of immigrants. Immigrantsfill that gap. If they criminalize new immigrants, that'll
shut that off too.
Mike Massey additionally referred to the trend of shifting demographics in the construction
sector, presenting the pattern of racial succession as a natural, conflict-free phenomenon:
In Southern California, you can look at the Latino community, and I think you see
almost a playback to several generations of white workers that came on that were
able to buy a house and send their kids to college. You see so many Latino people doing
that now in the construction trades. My number one exec beneath me, for example, he's
got his son-in-law, oldest son, and youngest son who will all be in the trades. He sees it
as an opportunity to buy a house and have a career and health care, pension, and
welfare benefits. But their children may not.
Yet he also indicated a sense of urgency with respect to accommodating shifting
demographics in the construction sector, relating, "During the boom time, my boss came to
me and said we're going to have a giant labor shortage. I thought that'd be great. He said,
'It'd be the worst thing to happen to us."' In contemplating modes of redress, Mr. Massey
made note of the growing traction and salience of the green movement among younger
generations newly filling the ranks of the piping industry unions:
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I've yet to talk to any young people anywhere who aren't excited about doing green
things. I'm convinced you could take people and show them how all these pipes fit
together and say this is a great job. They'll say, 'I don't want to do this.' You can tell
them, 'This is your chance to make a high performance building that's going to save a
lot of energy.' They'll say, 'If it's green, I want to do it.' There's something that needs to
be pursued about this.
Hence, the above labor representatives stopped short of articulating a need on the part of
their unions to actively recruit from minority communities in the face of aging
memberships and declining white interest in building trades careers. The surrounding
context of economic recession and steep decline in construction work might have enhanced
their hesitancy. Yet one could sense an increasing openness to diversifying the
membership, at least with respect to Latinos, as well as growing concern over the
impending labor shortage. In turn, the green economy appeared to provide a neutral space
to address issues of membership decline and replenishment while skirting contentious
politics and painful histories.
Likewise, environmental and community-based organizations converged on the
green economy partly as a result of problematic circumstances. Environmental policy
expert and Green Retrofit Advisory Committee member Jane Paul shared her observations
of how widespread deindustrialization in inner cities, exacerbated by the recent economic
recession, changed the focus of local organizations partaking in the environmental justice
movement:
The campaigns around environmental justice in LA have taken on a different strategy
from those in the past because of the economic downturn largely. They're looking at
how to open new doors as opposed to closing old ones. You can't just talk about
shutting down industry if people have jobs in those industries even if its community
members themselves who are suffering. Now if the children are sick but thefather goes
to work in the toxic industry, he cannot leave his job, so the El folks are looking at
these new strategies for transforming their communities with either new green
industries or cleaning up old industries and making them green. So there are a lot of
these different organizations coming into the green economy work and movement
with their perspectives.
Reflecting on the factors and conditions underlying Sierra Club's newfound interest in
environmental and social justice work, community organizer Byron Gudiel partly
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attributed the shifted approach to the organization's attempt to address its falling
membership. In his words,
Chances are that ifyou attend a typical Sierra Club meeting, the average age is 65, and
the person is white middle class. Well over time people have started retiring. So the
membership, volunteer pools are shrinking and so is our power, because the
demographics are shifting in the US. So I'm imagining that kind of was an eye opening
experience for [the leadership]. And now that we have to replace some of the folks
we're losing, do we do it with more white older middle class people or do wefigure out
a way to bring in and work with communities of color? So the environmental justice
program began five or six years ago. Still, Sierra Club isn't seen as a place where
people of color can come and really fight to improve the realities in their communities.
And the culture of the organization is hetero, very white, predominantly led by men.
Internally, the Sierra Club at the national level has gone through diversity training,
looked at power dynamics in the US, how to engage communities of color, working
class communities around the US. A lot of this has been very academic or theoretical
and really only touched the surface. Now we're starting to roll out a training program
for our volunteers at the chapter level as well.
An 18-year veteran of grassroots organizing around educational justice, racial justice, and
immigrant rights in LA's inner city neighborhoods, Mr. Gudiel further commented on the
imminent transformation of the regional economy and the need for working class
communities of color to partake in shaping its future. In accentuating the gravity of the
problem, he juxtaposed the positive rhetoric accompanying initial development with the
actual outcome of perpetuated economic disparities:
Communities of color have seen it before- the new industries that are developed with
promises of pathways out of poverty and rebuilding of communities. This was Silicon
Valley. But then the entire economy got pushed into a suburb of California and became
professionalized, completely leaving out working class people of color. An entire
economy made billions and billions of dollarsfor a section of our population that is not
working classfolks of color. So seeing that, wefeel like this is an opportunity to create
a new economy with different kinds ofjobs, trainings, and education opportunities. We
feel like we have a moral obligation to make these jobs and trainings available for
communities of color, working class communities in LA but also use the fruits of the
labor to help rebuild the communities themselves.
Bill Gallegos, Executive Director of Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), expanded
on the practical imperative of ensuring public investments in green economic development
benefit historically marginalized communities:
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Since it's going to be developed with a lot with public money, lets insist that a
significant proportion of the benefits go to communities that need them the most. Let's
insist that the educational infrastructure that it requires be built in our communities,
that the R&D money, some of those resources come into our communities, that the
business opportunities need to come into our communities, which means credit,
technical assistance, access to markets... that the whole range of job opportunities
should be made available to our communities... not just solar installation but training
to become environmental engineers and architects and so on.
As for policy research and advocacy organizations like SCOPE, Los Angeles Alliance
for a New Economy (LAANE), and the Construction Career Academy (CCA) at the UCLA
Center for Labor Research and Education, exposure to the national green collar jobs
movement and related policy discourse made them eager to operationalize models of green
retrofits and workforce development producing tangible impacts at the local level. As
recalled by Jennifer Ito, Research Director at CIPHER/SCOPE at the time,
[We realized that] we could get at the forefront of defining what the green economy
would be and making sure that there were systems, programs, institutions, a kind of
alignment around making sure that communities left out of the dirty economy would
be at theforefront of the new economy, [but] that we had to lay the groundwork pretty
quickly.
Cynthia Strathmann, Research and Policy Analyst at Los Angeles Alliance for a New
Economy (LAANE) pointed to the wide circulation of national models as peaking LAANE's
interest in the field of green retrofits and workforce development while also speaking to
the challenges of accommodating local specificity:
We jumped into this because of the national model for energy efficiency, but this is LA;
we are famous for not having weather. More than sixty percent of users have monthly
electrical bills under $40. How am I going to walk in and say, 'You know what, I'll give
you a $10,000 retrofit, and you'll save 20 percent offyour bill?' Behavior change may
have more resonance but that doesn't create any jobs. Unlessyou're training customer
service people, which many be another place to go. I could live in a tent in my backyard
if I wanted to. But once electric vehicles come down the road, I mean every time you
put several of them on the road, you need another transformer to accommodate them,
so in a town like LA, that's another huge source of power use.
As for Director Daniel Villao of the Construction Careers Academy at the UCLA Labor
Center, he noted the opportunities for fresh thinking and leadership around green
construction and maintenance policy:
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In terms of who the real players are, it's up in the air; it's whoever can get projects
done, whoever can implement policy, whoever can actually attract dollars to LA in a
real meaningful way that creates projects and policy to actually put people to work. I
think that's who the leaders are. I feel like the established core group of leadership
that exist in LA- folks like the LA/OC Building Trades, the LA County Federation of
Labor, LAANE. The City, the County, School District, and community colleges- have
been really progressive and really aggressively thinking about this and have been
doing wonderful work around it. But I also think that the traditional ways that we
approach policy development in LA has to evolve just like the construction market is
evolving around green. There is cutting edge work being done by organizations like
the CCA, groups like the Apollo Alliance and others. The young minds that we employ
to do thinking around urban planning and social equity and social entrepreneurship
put us in a very good position to provide thought leadership around how policy and
projects should roll out in the greening of LA.
Finally, from the stance of Teresa Sanchez and Jason Elias at SEIU 721,62 the union
representing Southern California public sector workers, the City had a clear role to play in
the evolving field. In the words of Ms. Sanchez,
When everyone's talking about shrinking the public sector, people in this city have
been fighting contracting out and privatization for 30years now. We'vefound that the
public sector can be more efficient because we don't have to make a profit. We can do
the same work at same costs or even cheaper than the private sector, especially on
services and maintenance. On huge construction projects it doesn't make sense if the
city doesn't have the equipment, but when it comes to our own services and
maintenance it really makes sense for the city to do it.
She referred to historical precedents, "We have a tradition or history of the City taking
leadership in large ways around economic development. From stealing the water, to
developing public power, which was a very progressive idea, in the late 19th and early 20th
century, a public owned utility." In fact, less than twenty years prior, Ms. Sanchez and other
members of the Metropolitan Alliance had evoked the same civic tradition in advocating for
the City to transition welfare recipients into public sector employment with livable wages
and career advancement opportunities. As President Bill Clinton signed into law the 1996
federal welfare reform act as a fulfillment of his promise "to end welfare as we know it,"
SEIU Locals 347 and 660 (the precursors to 721) partnered with AGENDA and a series of
community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, and welfare advocacy groups,
the latter united under the banner of the Metropolitan Alliance to advocate a policy
62 SEIU Local 721 encompasses workers previously represented by SEIU Locals 347 and 660.
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alternative. In contrast to a "work first" approach, which pushed welfare recipients into low
wage dead end jobs to increase economic insecurity in Los Angeles' low-income
communities of color, the proposed City Jobs Program served to transition qualified
applicants, namely city residents receiving federal assistance or living under the poverty
line, into civil service via six months of basic workplace/life skills training, tutoring,
counseling, and other social supports. Where the traditional method of hiring and
advancement relied on a written and verbal exam followed by a verbal interview, a process
that rewarded test-taking ability while penalizing lack of literacy proficiency, the newly
created "vocational worker" category, represented by SEIU, offered participants career
advancement opportunities based on supervisor evaluation and demonstrated progress in
the classroom setting.
Following extensive research, community mobilization, and policy advocacy by the
alliance, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously voted in November 1998 to approve and
fund (through a one time Welfare to Work grant followed by Workforce Investment Act
monies) the development of the City Jobs Program (complete with a City Jobs Taskforce
and Welfare-to-work Oversight Board to ensure public engagement in strategic planning
and program oversight). By August 2002, the program had trained 237 participants for
placement in seven different city departments with a 71 percent retention rate (Aaron et al.
2002). Still the task remained for policy advocates, in collaboration with city departments,
to assemble the rungs of vocational worker career ladders. For instance, the construction
and maintenance occupational series of the City of Los Angeles Civil Service classification
system were not contiguous but rather bifurcated between highly skilled journey level craft
classifications and entry-level "helper" trainee classifications. Where the vocational worker
classification stood below the "helper" classification, the former could become maintenance
and construction helpers after a two-year probationary period. In turn, a helper could
theoretically accumulate enough training and work experience to move into journey level
status. However, in practice, helpers rarely managed to do so given the difficulty of leaving
civil service employment in order to participate in a state certified apprenticeship program.
Hence questions arose as to whether civil service green construction and maintenance
might provide a vehicle to formalize the transition from vocational worker status to careers
in the building trades. Among the major challenges was the unprecedented task of driving
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demand and developing the market as opposed to simply imposing demands on the
"powers that be" to alter workforce arrangements in existing sectors.
5.3 Individual level enablers of agency
Still, the motives for engaging in the work of green retrofits and workforce
development and green economic development more generally were not simply
instrumental or situational. Biographical factors, reflective thinking, and human creativity
were also at work as illuminated by a quote from Mike Massey of the Piping Industry
Progress and Education Trust Fund, who recounted a formative experience that
contributed to his in the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program:
There were a lot offights going on in the 1970s. I'd hear, 'Hey, there's this big project,
and all the tree-huggers are going to stop it and put us in the unemployment line.'
That's pretty inflammatory language, especially when you're coming out of an
industrial craft and you're militant, because they're going to let you go when the job's
over. You have a lot of'I don't give a shit'factor. That's why we're so quick to strike in
the pipefitters union. They'll fire us anyway. But then we began to notice something.
We would support the industrialists and they wouldn't use us anyway. They would
bring in cheap out-of-state labor. They'd take all our money, say there was going to be
a refinery built or a big addition, while the enviros would say they're going to shut it
down. And we'd side with Chevron or whoever. Next thing you know we'd still be
unemployed and they'd have people working for half our wage from southeast Texas.
So it became the scorched earth policy for us; the industrial unions started saying, 'No
we're not going to support you anymore; you're not going to use us anyway. Watch
this, we'll bring you to your knees!'
Hence lessons gleaned from a series of traumatic betrayals by employer organizations
helped orient Mr. Massey along with his colleagues towards collaborative partnerships
with nontraditional allies as well as green workforce and economic development work.
Sudden displacement and unemployment provoked breakage from "unconscious habits,
routines, and accustomed perceptual modes" and redirection towards reflexive agency and
an alternative approach to collaborative partnership around job creation (Joas and Knobl
2006: 528).
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Kim Craft of IBEW Local 11 also underscored personal experiences as partly
motivating his work in collaborative partnerships such as the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance
geared towards promoting racial inclusion in the building trades, sharing,
I came from the hills of West Virginia, where most people worked in the mines. My
ancestors were coal miners; the oldest living relative was 63 because of black lung.
When I came out here, my wife and I lived in Hawaiian Gardens in a 1000 square foot
house for 25 years. We all shared one bathroom, my wife and two kids. I paid for my
wife to go to nursing school. It's taken all my life to get to where I got now. Lucky for
me, I had an opportunity if I was willing to work hard everyday I could get to where I
was. I tell the young men, many of them are Hispanics, how far is Mexico City? I came
from 2000 miles away, twice as far as you did, looking for an opportunity to provide
for my family, same as you. I'm not different from anyone else. I went into the Marine
Corps when I was 17, and they only had one color. Ifyou're in a war situation, and you
get hit, everyone bleeds red. You got to look beyond the color of a man's skin-you got
my back I got your back So I was fortunate in that in my life I had these experiences.
Everyone just wants the same thing.
In highlighting his sense of commonality with aspiring minority entrants, Mr. Craft related
another anecdote about his own experience as an "outsider" within the building trades:
I came out of the military in 1974, applied to the apprenticeship program but didn't
get into Local 11 until 1979. By the time I got my journeyman ticket, I had 12 years
experience. I've had some hands put in my face. I was on book five here. It wasn't just
about only white people being taken it. Predominantly 80 percent of the people here
were white. They had kids; they had son-in-laws. That's the thing with nepotism; it has
negative connotations until you become a parent, and the first thing you want is to
secure an opportunity for your children.
Upon joining the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, Mr. Craft would find added inspiration to
advocate inclusive green workforce and economic development during a visit to South LA's
Dorsey High School to participate in the Green Economy Forum in April 2008.63 He
described what he found to be a resounding incident:
One young man got up about 15 years old, tattooed up, was wearing gang colors, had
his hat on sideways-obviously in LA, a sign of possible trouble. Got up on the
microphone and it was like a pin dropped. He said,' everybody in here know what's the
best way to stop a bullet?' We didn't know what to expect next. I'll never forget what
63 Organized by the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, SCOPE, and the AD47 Environmental Commission, the Green
Economy Forum brought together state lawmakers and community/grassroots, labor, and environmental
leaders to discuss how best to ensure inner city communities benefit from green jobs and new technologies.
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he said, 'With a job.' Here was a kid who experienced a lot of the bad sides of LA, and
he was saying, 'Give me a chance to show you I can be a productive member of society;
give me a chance; give me a job!' I've heard a lot of people say a lot of things, but I still
think about it a lot. When I walked out, I said, 'Today was one of my lucky days.' What I
saw is that everybody here is just like me; they just want an opportunity to show what
they can do. They just want to provide a roof over their kid's heads.
In the case of Jason Elias of SEIU 721, he traced his involvement in the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance and labor organizing and social justice movement building more broadly to
formative experiences growing up in a working class household in LA's San Fernando
Valley.
My mom is a retired public sector worker. Though she was not involved in her union,
she did bring home stories about helping people find access to housing and jobs
through her work with the California Employment Development Department and the
LA City Housing Authority. My dad was a salesman who made fairly good money
working 16 hours a day before he had a breakdown from the stress of long hours. He
worked way too hard, so I saw the impact of negative work environments. My family
went bankrupt a couple times because they had overextended their credit. I was the
first in my family to go to college. I grew up in the San Fernando Valley. There was a
sense that something was missing from the experience, growing up in this 'anti-urban
wasteland.' We'd go hang out in these new developments that were in the far reaches
of the North Valley, looking out over the entire valley at these little planned
communities so devoid of any organic structure, and we would dream about
something more. I went to a public humanities magnet high school and in classes
learned to think critically about everything. Instead of traditional history classes we
had 'social institutions.' We had an art history class, a philosophy class, and as high
school students we began to interrogate the world. I became an activist in high school,
and then going to Berkeley in 1988, where students had just successfully organized UC
to divestfrom apartheid-era South Africa in 1985, I naturally gravitated to the activist
community up there, linking my critical thinking to the action that was happening in
the world. Our struggles were defending the ethnic studies programs at Cal, supporting
graduate students trying to organize a union, and protesting the first Gulf War in
1991.
His subsequent trajectory spanning community organizing in Detroit and graduate studies
in social work and public administration before arriving at electoral and labor organizing in
Los Angeles, Mr. Elias garnered from the initial juxtaposition of a liberal high school
education with a displeasing social context a methodology and penchant for problematizing
and transforming privatist urban policy and planning processes.
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For Cynthia Strathmann of LAANE, her participation in energy efficiency planning
and the movement for green collar jobs at first appeared to be more conceptually motivate
in partly stemming from what she found to be troubling inconsistencies in the dominant
narrative about the economy and economic life. She explained,
Another thing that I think is at the heart of this is Americans claim to value hard work
but a lot of our structures of capitalism aren't set up to value work; they're set up to
value capital, which is fundamentally opposed to the value of labor that goes into it.
There's this inherent contradiction. I think the sort offorces of capitalism that have
been hugely successful [have been good at] pitching their point of view as being
valuable to workers even if its not. I actually find it somewhat enraging [when I
encounter assumptions that] private enterprises are more efficient when there's no
evidence for it. It's just a fantasy world. Not that I don't like fantasy worlds, but they
just have a time and a place. That's what brought me to energy efficiency. So I have an
academic way of explaining it, but I come out of an academic background.
She further underscored the link between biography and perceptions of social structures
and class stratification before touching on her own background:
I think a lot of people who grew up in homogenous insular middle class neighborhoods,
it's easy for them to buy this rhetoric that poor people just don't work hard enough,
and life is really fair. They don't see their own privileges. So I think when you come out
of a background that's not like that, a lot of the contradictions are so stark in a way
that they aren't for people who grow up, not simply privileged, but also in a
homogenous environment where there's cultural agreement that this is just the way
life is. This is, of course, what hegemony is, in a nutshell. I think the notion of privilege
becomes key to this. Part of privilege is thatyou don't have to see it;you don't have to
ever acknowledge that that's the case. When you come out of a background like mine
where so many of my peers didn't have academic support, it becomes really obvious
why people go to better schools than others. It's not to say you can't transcend it, but in
all honestly I'm never going to be Bill Gates. I think that's probably where that comes
from.
Ms. Strathmann also spoke to the role of her biracial status and identity in elucidating the
artificiality and tenuousness of class and race hierarchies as well as the nature of human
agency. In her words, "Having my racial status change all the time, like every time I move to
a different place. You realize a lot of the stuff is really arbitrary; it's not really the way it is,
its the way we make it, and if its the way we make it we can change it."
Likewise, Teresa Sanchez of SEIU 721 described a commitment to exploring
alternatives to the dominant mode of economic development.
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I think a lot of times when people use the term economic development, the mainstream
understanding of that is business development. There's nothing wrong with that per
say but for me it's a much broader question... about quality of life, things like
education, health care, andfood policy. For me the key question is, 'What is going on in
the economy?' as opposed to 'How do we get someone to build a building downtown;
what kind of tax incentives do we give them; how do we get them access to capital?' It
sort of ends there and you don't even think about who's going to work there, how are
they going to get there, what's going on where they live so they can sustain
themselves... So it's not just about living wages, all of these things we think of as
economic development.
In explaining the rationale for transformative workforce and economic development
initiatives, she stated,
I've always been interested in these issues, probably since I was a teenager, and I had
different opportunities in my life to get involved with organizing efforts. So by the time
I got to [SEIU Local 721], I already had a strong interest in workforce and economic
development. Fortunately they let me explore a lot of those interests in addition to my
day-to-day organizing work. I was lucky to have an organization that was able to
share that mission and allowed me opportunities to work on that.
Reflecting on the emergence of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and other sectoral policy
campaigns waged by progressive coalitions alliances at the local and regional level, Ms.
Sanchez further remarked on individual level enabling conditions of agency while drawing
out the implications of LA's particular demographic attributes:
I think people come to it from different background experiences, life experiences. We
just sort of found each other after working on different things around LA. Maybe the
fact that LA is such a diverse place that people come here from all over with different
life experiences. And all the different campaign we've done over the years, we've
developed a sort of network offolks who see things from that perspective.
Other interviewees remarked on the transformative potential inherent in the fact
that cities such as Los Angeles bring together actors reflecting considerable racial, ethnic,
class, and cultural diversity. Going back to Jason Elias, he noted the shared experience of
racial exclusion by the white majority as a binding factor for minority groups and catalyst
for critical thinking:
I'm a white Jewish guy from the Valley, so what was I doing in the struggle to defend
ethnic studies? Well, my experience was that I grew up with a Filipino family on this
corner, an African American family down the street, my neighbors were Thai and
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Argentinian, my partner now is Argentinian. This was the multi racial experience that
I had growing up, where the Valley was a bastion of whiteness, and I wasn't "white" to
the white people, I was Jewish. So growing up, we 'others' congregated together, this
multiracial group offriends asking what is this environment that we live in? This was
the type of community I gravitated towards in college, and my hooking up with
activists of color was both welcoming and empowering.
As for Cynthia Strathmann, she contemplated the ways in which actors' marginal identities
and multiplicitous locations in various fields might facilitate insights into systemic
contradictions and tensions but also spur projective, inventive capacities, hypothesizing
It could be that in places like Los Angeles, we get all kinds of people who come from
[various] realms, and this mix of people calls into question the fact that, well these
[dominant] narratives [about economic development and income and wealth
distribution,] aren't coherent; they're narratives that don't match. And when you get
people who are in these social spaces, where these things are more obvious, those are
the people who reconcile by creating these alternative models that are for them more
reasonable.
5.4 Building the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance
Finding no shortage of willing partners, SCOPE pursued the task of building the Los
Angeles Apollo Alliance methodically. As described by Elsa Barbosa:
We did a lot of research type meetings and investigations around what the potential
landscape could look like in terms of who would be interested in putting together an
alliance of these non-traditional sectors that didn't usually work together. In SCOPE's
history we've always built strategic alliances and have explored and tested and were
involved and engaged in community labor relationships and campaigns. So we really
did a lot of meetings with other organizations to see what their kind of theories were
and what kind of issues they're working on, who their audience was, you know have
they worked well with other organizations, really kind of put together the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance.
Among the twenty-five alliance members that comprised the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance,64
many of the community-based organizations shared a number of commonalities as noted
by Ms. Barbosa:
64 Labor organizations in the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance include unions such as AFSCME District Council 36,
IBEW Local 11, IBEW Local 18, Laborers Local 300, P.I.P.E. Trust Fund, Painters District Council 36, and SEIU
Local 721, as well as the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, the second largest central labor council of
the AFL-CIO. Member organizations such as the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, UCLA Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Program (UCLA-LOSH), Black Worker Center, and California Construction
Academy likewise advocate worker interests but largely operate outside union jurisdictions. On the other
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All of the community organizations are mature and have done lots of their own
campaigns, whether they were [dealing with the] private sector or public sector, so
there's a lot of experience under our belt. And they are all more mass based organizing
community-based organizations... so not just advocacy.... And we have relationships.
We have our own expertise; we all represent different communities within LA, but we
also have a history together as well as with [some ofi the labor unions.
In terms of spatial and demographic focus, the majority focused on distressed inner city
neighborhoods and low-income communities of color and other historically marginalized
populations.65 In some cases, overlapping organizational constituencies united community
and labor interests. In the words of CBE Executive Director Bill Gallegos, "Many members of
labor unions live in the communities where we work, and they're impacted by the
environmental problems that we try to address... especially poor air quality, which affects
the health of tens of thousands of our children and our residents. So we consider our
alliance with labor a very important alliance." Jason Elias of SEIU 721 related a similar
perspective but from the stance of organized labor: "With union members and SCOPE, it's
always been that our members, public sector workers in the city of LA are living in the
communities that SCOPE organizes in, and whether its SCOPE, CBE, or Community
Coalition... we have really bought into each other's bottom line."
hand, organizations whose work pertain to the environment, whether focusing on urban sustainability, clean
energy, public health, environmental justice, or other issues, include Center for Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Technologies, Coalition for Clean Air, Communities for a Better Environment, Environmental
Defense LA, Green LA Coalition, Sierra Club, and Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles. Finally,
community organizations include Community Coalition, East LA Community Corporation, Korean Resource
Center, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy, and Strategic Concepts in
Organizing & Policy Education (SCOPE/AGENDA).
65 For instance, the Los Angeles Black Worker Center (BWC) strives to "change public policies and corporate
practices in Los Angeles in order to advance economic justice for African American workers and the families
and communities that rely on them" (BWC, 2012). On the other hand, "Community Coalition works to help
transform the social and economic conditions in South LA that foster addiction, crime, violence and poverty
by building a community institution that involves thousands in creating, influencing and changing public
policy" (CC, 2012). Likewise, Communities for a Better Environment organizes in urban working class
communities of color with disproportionate exposure to environmental pollution and toxins. Finally, Legal
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles "is the frontline law firm for poor and low-income people" in Los Angeles
County (LAFLA, 2012).
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Figure 4. Vacant lot in South Los Angeles
On the other hand, the historical relationship between the building trades and
community and environmental organizations was more contentious. Mike Massey of the
Piping Industry Progress and Education (PIPE) Trust Fund reflected:
I've been around long enough to remember when the environmentalists had to be
destroyed because they were after us. I don't want to think that way, and I never felt
that way. But the way we look at it is, as construction workers, we're often out of work
When we get a chance to work and the enviros want to shut it down, they say, 'Just
crash the oil industry in the LA harbor.' We say to that, 'What about all my guys?' They
tell us, 'I don't care. They'll get green jobs.' And our response is, 'Where are they going
to get those jobs?'
He also described the competitive dynamic among the building trades:
There's natural competition in the building trades and always has been. Some groups
historically have better relationships than others. The plumbers and pipefitters, we
have our own problems inside our union. Sometimes the plumbers claim work and its
actually the pipefitters work or vice versa. Then you have air conditioning guys, and
then you have underground, the sprinkler guys. We all squabble amongst ourselves
sometimes.
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Therefore, SCOPE put forth significant effort, particularly in the first year, to establish a
shared vocabulary among the disparate sectors and interests as well as bridge traditional
differences. The Los Angeles Apollo Alliance also established the structure of organizational
governance to feature a steering committee including a representative from each member
organization and a planning committee comprising a representative of each sector as well
as a system of collective decision-making based on consensus. Where the planning
committee took the lead on crafting proposals for discussion, SCOPE helped ensure
authentic dialogue among the alliance partners as they moved forward by asking each
member organization to share their honest reflections on how the proposals would affect
their sector and their self interest (Liu, 2009, p. 11).
Touching on the real politics of job creation and employment, Mr. Massey expressed
his appreciation for the potential for mutual understanding and collaborative relationship
building promoted by the Apollo Alliance's coalition-based framework:
Something you have to remember through all of this is someone who might be your
worst enemy at 9:30 in the morning might beyour bestfriend at 1:45. You can'tforget
that. You can't fight these highly idealized partisan fights. It'd be nice if you could;
that's not the way the world works. That's one of the great things about the Apollo
Alliance. You get a chance to get out ofyour own silo and learn how others view things.
It's a transition period, but it's good for us to hear other people's stuff There's a really
healthy exchange of attitudes, opinions, views, and perceptions. Because unless you
know their perception, you cant work with them.
Likewise, Sierra Club organizer Byron Gudiel underscored the importance of the personal
relationships traversing Los Angeles Apollo Alliance member organizations in mediating
organizational conflict:
The activist network is pretty small. So I think it helps. For example, the Sierra Club is
struggling with [one of our partners in the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance]. There's clearly
some tension but we all go to the Apollo Alliance meetings and sit together and hang
out. It helps that we know each other outside of our political roles. There's a bit of
camaraderie that goes beyond thefundamental rift. It helps that there's a community
offolks who've been working together for a while.
Nona Randois, Senior Attorney in the Community Economic Development unit at the Legal
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, acknowledged SCOPE's skillful approach to managing
divergent interests:
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The organizers of the Apollo Alliance do a good job of having individual meetings
towards the beginning or key points in a campaign to get at [tense] issues. Every so
often during a campaign, there will be a go around the room, how does this advance
what you're working on, how does this fit with what you're doing, what is your
organization getting out of it- this is a topic of conversation at key points. So I think
that they do make efforts to build that into the conversation.
Jennifer Ito described SCOPE's position, "For us, it was part of a long-term strategy in trying
to change the nature of the conversations and the relationships around these sectors to
build more common alignment on the broader progressive agenda." The inclusion of
mediating organizations like the California Construction Academy also soothed potentially
troublesome dynamics. Director Daniel Villao reflected on the CCA's interstitial location
with respect to various stakeholders in the future of the green construction and
maintenance sector:
Community groups, religious organizations, and policy makers often don't care how
the construction industry works. They don't necessarily understand the hurdles that
have to be overcome to create entry into apprenticeship and create green policy
development that meshes with the business design of the contractors association. And
the construction industry doesn't necessarily understand how to interact with them.
Yet it's criticalfor the evolution of the construction industry that these different worlds
can actually interact together to move the conversation forward. That's where we can
be the most help- marrying these different areas of thought, acting as an
intermediary to create spaces that allow people to interact with each other and gain
understanding in order to create and develop policies and agreements that hit the
triple bottom line impacts of energy savings, reducing carbon impact and creating
economic opportunity. This may not necessarily produce as many jobs as we want to
create but really develops careers that are meaningful, that are true pathways out of
poverty. I think our strength is our intimate understanding of the building trades, on
the national, state, and local levels. Our ability to interact directly with the building
trades and conduct conversations in a way that enhances understanding, I think is a
value that we add to the discussion.
While SCOPE valued the Apollo Alliance framework of bringing together organized labor,
community-based organizations, the environmental movement, and private sector around
a shared vision and leveraging public investments in facilitating the transition to a more
equitable, green, and prosperous economy, it also tailored the right fit for the Los Angeles
context. As described by Ms. Ito,
165
We had a different modelfrom a lot of the other Apollo Alliances. At that time, it was
almost like a franchise model, we used to say. As long as you subscribe to some of the
basic tenets, you can use this brand of the Apollo Alliance. So we were different in
terms of being actually driven and managed by independent orgs. Some of the other
alliances are more staffed by Apollo Alliance staff Ours was anchored by SCOPE. It was
much more of an organizing, base building strategy compared to other Apollo
Alliances, which were more policy advocacy oriented.
Another distinct attribute of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance was the absence of the
business sector. Far from happenstance, this intended feature was in part informed by
CIPHER/SCOPE's background research on the growth possibilities of green building and
manufacturing in Los Angeles as well as member organization strengths and capacities. As
explained by Ms. Barbosa,
What really rose to the top of the potential campaign was the issue of greening
buildings, particularly those owned by the public sector... The public sector was where
we really had leverage and the public sector was where there was potentialfor scope
and scale because the large municipal buildings that the city of Los Angeles has. So we
weren't starting with a campaign that was about private sector. We weren't saying
that all of the private sector should retrofit their buildings, because that would have
been an automatic flag for opposition. You have to build that kind of power to make
that kind of mandate. So for us, the focus was on the public sector, and private
businesses and companies weren't as relevant in this campaign because the city is the
employer.
In speaking to the longer run direction of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, she added:
We thought that we needed to take some time to build the relationship [among
community, labor, and environmental organizations] and have more of a joint shared
regional analysis before we would even consider bringing the business sector on. Just
overall, we're not all equal. Business has a lot more power in the outside landscape. So
we didn't pretend like we were all equal. We thought we needed to take that time to
educate ourselves and be politically aligned ourselves, the three sectors.
As for Mike Massey, he shared an alternative perspective:
I notice when Igo to the [Apollo Alliance] meetings, its a bunch of college lefties more
and more, rather than people that can really bring in experience, the money, the savvy,
the know how of how to grease the wheels ofgovernment and stuff I don't think it ever
got to a point where it was a stool with three legs; the business component was lacking
and labor's kind of been there. You go in there and see more community and enviros. I
think it needs more energy. I'm not criticizing. I'm worried. I want to see it work and it
needs to have more parts to it.
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He drew a connection between his position and past work experience.
I'm a business as well as a labor guy. I work with my contractors all the time, on
project acquisition. That's much more targeted and direct than idealistic. Let's say
there's going to be a big project coming up and they need environmental issues
addressed, labor issues addressed, they need financing for it, and political approval, I
get involved with that stuff too. The thing is labor unions don't bid work.
According to industrial relations scholar David Weil, comprehensive market recovery
strategies by building trades unions grew out of the continuing erosion of union density in
the construction industry from the late 1960s. Initially devoting more resources to
organizing to increase the percentage of workers covered by union contracts, building
trades unions have additionally incorporated market recovery strategies focused on
increasing the percentage of work undertaken by contractors operating under a union
agreement (Weil, 2003). Where close coordination between union efforts to ensure the
supply of skilled workers and business activities such as finding and bidding work have
proven most effective, such comprehensive market recovery strategies have gained
traction among various building trades unions. Assistant Business Manager Kim Craft of
IBEW Local 11 described related practices in his union:
We put together a classfor our existing members about how to become a contractor.
And that goes from working as professionals, setting up your payroll, doing your
estimating, meeting with the manufacturers and purchasing, your taxes, whether you
become a self proprietor or incorporated. If a member goes through this class and
becomes a contractor and hires one of our members, we contribute $5000 to their
business to buy ladders and tools, because in any construction industry business, the
first two years are the toughest. What happens is a young man goes out and hires one
member, maybe an apprentice, maybe two or three, so you have a small crew working
together. You make it through that first year with some revenue. Now he's trying to
move in and then there's that second growth spurt. Now when he moves into an office
and sets someone up and hires more people, the question is whether he's going to be
successful. So we try to help donate seed money, because if he goesfrom 1 to 5 to 10 to
50 to 500, that's the 'Bob Meadows' of the future. We just lost a great pioneer, one of
the best contractors in the US.
Daniel Villao of the Construction Careers Academy at the UCLA Labor Center offered yet
another perspective. As a journey level electrician turned Business Agent for IBEW 11 and
principal negotiator for the Los Angeles and Orange Counties Building and Construction
Trades Council, he had extensive experience negotiating contracts and agreements with
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public and private sector entities and major non-profit institutions. Therefore where Mike
Massey and Kim Craft indicated a preference to include business partners within the
boundaries of the green retrofit and workforce development field, he went one step
further, directly to the source of labor market demand-private or public- to emphasize
its centrality in developing the green construction and maintenance market. 66 He
explained,
The reality is that in everything that I do, I point to market development as the real
key. In other words, investment in the work is what generates demand for training. If a
government or private sector, whoever it is who is generating investment in the
construction sector, if they would just focus on utilizing their dollars to create work
projects, whether its doing the retrofitting of infrastructure or whether its greening
buildings or building from the ground up, those investments generate work for
workers and that demand generation for workers creates training opportunities.
When you invest $400 million in the extension of a train project for example, that
creates work opportunities, and that then drives demand for apprentices, because the
balance ofjourneymen workers to apprentices has to be met on those work projects. So
that's what creates the training opportunities and the opportunities to engage
disenfranchised communities.
As it turned out, such differential experiences and knowledge with regards to what it takes
to drive progressive economic development in addition to workforce development would
prove consequential to the practical viability of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program.
In the meantime, the community, labor, and environmental partners of the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance pledged a common commitment to the general idea of retrofitting publicly
owned buildings to improve environmental quality and public health while creating family
sustaining jobs with career paths, particularly for low-income and other historically
marginalized communities. Meeting regularly to discuss ideas and clarify campaign goals
produced the effect of strengthening relationships and facilitating mutual learning among
member organizations.
5.5 The Green Retrofit and Workforce Development Campaign
66 Mr. Villao would additionally play a leading role in anchoring a Los Angeles-based initiative of the Emerald
Cities Collaborative (ECC). ECC is similar to the Apollo Alliance, Green for All, and the Blue Green Alliance in
offering a model for "'greening' our metropolitan areas in high-road ways that advance equal opportunity,
shared wealth, and democracy." However it is also distinct in encompassing businesses, major institutions,
and development intermediaries with discretion over urban real estate.
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In anchoring the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, SCOPE coordinated policy research,
coalition building, and program design with deep community engagement. For instance, in
2006, SCOPE mobilized 45 African American and Latino residents from South and Central
Los Angeles to conduct door-to-door outreach and house meetings to discuss health
conditions and contributing environmental and economic factors. Besides serving purposes
of public education, the visits also yielded a total of 400 surveys, which in turn shaped the
content of the Apollo Alliance campaign. Sectoral analysis also unfolded as a highly
participatory and dialogic process, as told by Jennifer Ito:
We researched I don't know how many different possible scenarios around how this
could look like. We went through an iterative process of doing the surveys, getting
feedback through one-on-one meetings [with SCOPE members], holding leadership
team meetings... We came up with multiple versions... and for each one, we got input
and feedback, coupled that with research on what's already out there, conducted
power analysis and [considered] the political landscape, making sure it was feasible
and it would be a valuable fight and all of that. We also got information by meeting
with [Apollo Alliance partners]. In some cases, grassroots leaders ifrom SCOPE's
membership base] were in those meetings as well... then we took the input and the
implications from those meetings back to inform a specific policy proposal or update
our strategy.
Hence the process of program development held the experiences and perspectives of those
most marginalized by the urban political economy, namely inner city communities of color,
at the center. Thus harnessing their "double consciousness" or "second sight" into greater
facets of the economic and workforce development system, SCOPE and the Apollo Alliance
engaged in critical reflection and simultaneous expression, complete with mutual
engagement, contradiction, contention, and debate, to sift through alternative program
ideas.
As the public sector focus of the green jobs campaign became clearer in the course
of 2006, SCOPE also began to set the foundations for political mobilization. They gathered
over 5,000 signatures from South LA residents asking elected officials to create green jobs
while also meeting with Council President Garcetti and Councilmember Wesson, both
supporters of SCOPE's past policy initiatives, to garner political support for the emerging
green jobs campaign. Such resourcefulness, democratic accountability, and coordination in
collaborative problem solving proved invaluable when the mayor shortly responded by
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asking the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance to submit a program proposal to the city (Liu, 2009).
As the nascent coalition hurriedly met the mayor's request, Councilmember Herb Wesson
(representing Council District 10, which includes parts of South Los Angeles, Koreatown,
and Palms) introduced a motion on August 16, 2006 asking the City Attorney to work with
the Apollo Alliance to translate their proposal into a city ordinance. Principally, the
proposal called on the City of LA to "green" existing public buildings, adopt a project labor
agreement to ensure high standards for contracted labor, to upgrade the skills of
incumbent workers, and to hire low-income residents for new jobs created in green
construction and operations/ maintenance sectors. Later that day, Mayor Villaraigosa,
Council President Eric Garcetti, and Councilmember Herb Wesson gathered at a church in
South Los Angeles with Apollo Alliance members and 500 residents to announce the city's
commitment to leading the fight for energy independence and job creation by promoting a
green, sustainable and equitable economy.
Following, SCOPE conducted research to further hone the policy proposal and
encourage discussion among various stakeholders, policy-makers, and civic leaders. As an
example, "Green Cities, Green Jobs," published in May 2007 (Lee et al., 2007), explored how
the City of Los Angeles could: (1) address the need for clean inner-city communities and
good jobs, particularly for low-income residents, by greening its physical infrastructure; (2)
use local green building policies and standards to encourage local hiring and purchasing;
and (3) fund capital improvements by leveraging State and Federal dollars, municipal
bonds, private sector investments in future savings from energy efficient capital
improvements. Besides its impact at the local and regional level, "Green Cities, Green Jobs"
helped raise the visibility of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance within the national green collar
jobs movement.
Another publication, released in April 2008, spelled out the details of the targeted
workforce development policy component for policymakers and other key decision
makers. Entitled, "The Green Career Ladder Initiative: A Concept Paper and Proposal" (De
Roy et al., 2009) it outlined three career tracks for participants, the first preparing low-
income, less skilled individuals for apprenticeships in the private sector construction
trades, the second preparing incumbent, underemployed city workers and new recruits for
public sector positions in maintenance and operations of resource-efficient city owned
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buildings, and the final providing intensive case management and other re-application
support for those failing to meet the minimum requirements for the former two pathways.
For the second career track, it built upon the foundations set by the Los Angeles City Jobs
Program in conceptualizing a "green landscaping and maintenance pathway" beginning
with the vocational worker classification.67 Additional elements in the report that would
subsequently find practical application included a first year goal of piloting three programs
with 20 participants each as well as the recommended formation of a taskforce with
diverse stakeholder representation to provide oversight, make strategic decisions, conduct
long-term workforce development planning, and secure additional sources of funding.
Where the typical period between the introduction of a city council motion and
passage of an ordinance lasts six month, in this case, almost two years after the
introduction of the city council motion, there was yet no verdict on the ordinance. The
general protocol for local legislation entails the city attorney creating an ordinance that
then receives approval from relevant council committees before being put to a vote before
the city council. According to Larry Frank, Deputy Mayor of Neighborhood and Community
Services, the comprehensiveness of the program, namely its impingement on multiple issue
areas including energy and environment, personnel and animal welfare, and budget and
finance implicated multiple council committees, as to delay its legislation. On the other
hand, an account related by Applied Research Center researcher Yvonne Yen Liu attributes
the delay to political contention at the citywide level around local hire provisions including
racial and gender quotas (2009). In her words:
[What was originally a] 35-page proposal, authored by members of the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance, had to be condensed and simplified in order to pass political muster.
The original proposal detailed equity mechanisms to get people of color and single
mothers into green employment, similar to the policy recommendations found in
SCOPE's 2008 report on green career ladders. Those specifications made consensus by
city officials and stakeholders difficult to obtain. The city wanted minimal obligations
spelled out in the ordinance...
67 According to Jennifer Ito, "Once we landed on really looking at the public sector as a driver to really lead
and stimulate the economy and kind of this [building energy efficiency retrofits] sector. It just made sense
that the jobs would be in-house and could build off the City Jobs model." Consequently, SCOPE hired
environmental policy and planning expert Jane Paul to examine potential connections between the City Jobs
program and green career ladders associated with energy efficiency retrofits of city owned buildings.
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Ben Beach, an attorney who legally advised the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and
spearheaded the drafting of the ordinance language commented that while city leaders
were ready to embrace the core principles of the coalition and their green jobs campaign,
they were less prepared to obligate the city to undertake specific measures with respect to
work volume and content as well as targeted employment opportunities.
In the interim, SCOPE ensured that the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the green
jobs campaign carried momentum and stayed on the radar of city officials and other
decision makers. While conducting research and sharing findings, SCOPE continued to
"[galvanize] community support for green jobs, with grassroots members going door to
door, engaging residents about the need for green jobs as a way to address both the
environs and poverty, collecting thousands of surveys, sending postcards, and making
phone calls to elected officials" (Ranghelli & Craig, 2010). Between October and November
2008, SCOPE completed a survey of 9,097 voters in South Los Angeles. The results,
summarized in a report entitled "Growing a Grassroots Green Jobs Movement in South Los
Angeles" released the following spring, indicated an overwhelming belief on the part of
South LA residents that: (1) clean energy investments made at the local level could improve
their community through job creation, cleaner air, and green and open spaces; (2)
government should be the leader in reducing air pollution and funding jobs programs; and
(3) green jobs would not reach their communities without targeted policies and programs
(Lee and Ito 2009). According to Jennifer Ito, "All of this was toward demonstrating broad-
based support for this ordinance, and continuing to put the pressure on. I would say it was
both an inside/outside strategy." She elaborated,
The process of working with attorneys from the city to actually craft this ordinance
[was] going on at the same time [as we were] trying to build political leadership
among city council and the mayor. [All throughout, we were] trying to demonstrate
that this was kind of a grassroots, you know, that there was broad base support from a
diverse stake of stakeholders. Also, it was really around [showing] that this was
coming out of the need to address some of the ongoing problems happening in some of
the low-income communities of color around LA.
Besides participating in the surveys, hundreds of South LA residents also formed
delegations to attend council meetings and other public events (Lee & Ito, 2009).
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Finally, in the early months of 2009, city officials communicated that the Green
Retrofit and Workforce Ordinance would shortly see enactment. In turn, the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance began to shift from organizing and policy advocacy to consider the process
of implementing the ordinance. The research, publications, and community mobilizations
undertaken in the course of three years demonstrated that the ordinance was developed
with wide citizen input, particularly from historically marginalized groups, and innovative,
not only in integrating workforce development with demand generation and
environmental improvements, but also in terms of its planning process. For the first time in
the city's recent history, a coalition of community, environmental, and labor organizations,
had come together in a positive or prescriptive sense to set the foundations for a new
economic sector based on shared principles and values. Rather than taking a back seat to
the private sector, civil society actors took the lead in structuring an emerging market and
designating an active role for the city, not only as an owner and manager of urban building
stock, but also as a normative influence and trendsetter with respect to the national green
cities movement and the private sector. However whether the policy would actually
operationalize in a way that upheld the aims of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance when push
came to shove was an altogether different question.
Having grappled with the disjuncture between "theory" and "practice" while
implementing the City Jobs Program, members of the planning committee such as Elsa
Barbosa (SCOPE) and Teresa Sanchez (SEIU Local 721) took precautionary measures to
promote program sustainability and democratic accountability with respect to the Green
Retrofit and Workforce Ordinance. As elaborated by Ms. Barbosa
What we put in the ordinance was actually based on lessons learned from our past
campaigns. So what was key in this ordinance was establishing the program in the LA
City mayor's office and calling for the hiring of the director of the program to be
housed in the City of LA Mayor's office as well as the creation of the LA City Green
Retrofit Advisory Council made up of different experts and appointed by different
leaders in the mayor's office and on city council so that it wouldn't be something that
SCOPE or the LA Apollo Alliance had to implement... and also bringing together this
task force of all these different departments of LA City to come together to develop a
policy and eventually develop a large scale program.
In other words, institutionalizing the Program Director seat along with the Advisory
Council and Interdepartmental Taskforce placed the onus on the City of Los Angeles to
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implement the ordinance while affording SCOPE and other members of the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance a sense of closure. Following a measurably successful campaign, alliance
members could retreat to an advocacy capacity if they so chose to. They could further
utilize their influence over the Mayor and City Council to influence the appointments of the
Program Director and Advisory Council members. What remained to be seen was the
extent to which such measures could ensure delivery of an actual program in accordance
with the "heart and soul" of the alliance and its green jobs campaign.
5.6 Community Scholars
As a first step in the transition towards playing a more auxiliary role rather than a
leading one, SCOPE engaged the Community Scholars Program, a joint project between the
UCLA Department of Urban Planning, Labor Center, and Institute for Research on Labor
and Employment (IRLE), 68 to create a roadmap for policy implementation. Taking place
over a two quarter period split between the UCLA campus and the Labor Center, located
downtown, the program brought together urban planning, public policy and public health
graduate students along with local community and labor leaders to conduct practical
research on pressing issues at the intersection of social justice and economic development.
The year prior, the class had focused on the topic of Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) with
local hire provisions on large scale, publicly subsidized construction projects as a means to
generate pathways to viable construction careers in low-income communities. It thus
provided an effective segue into the topic of green retrofits with union jobs completed with
a targeted hire component on city-owned buildings. The instructor for the 2009 course,
Linda Delp, had worked with Teresa Sanchez and Elsa Barbosa on the SEIU regional
campaign to organize homecare workers in the 1990s and was now the Director of the
Labor Occupational Safety and Health Program (LOSH) at the IRLE. 69 In preparation, she
68 Community Scholars was established in 1992 by activist scholars Jacqueline Leavitt and Gilda Haas, both
on the Urban Planning department faculty.
69 As a popular education expert with an interest in occupational health and safety, Dr. Delp had previously
worked with SEIU as the Western Region Director of Health and Safety, which entailed supporting union
organizing efforts of homecare workers. While subsequently pursuing her Ph.D. at the UCLA School of Public
Health, she took the Community Scholars class with Jackie Leavitt to develop a keen interest in using the
underlying research and pedagogical model to explore issues at the intersection of urban planning, public
health, and labor. Later, as the director of LOSH, Dr. Delp partly oversaw worker health and safety trainings,
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met with Elizabeth Stewart from the UCLA Labor Center/California Construction Academy,
along with Elsa Barbosa and Joanna Lee from SCOPE to clarify the objectives and structure
course content.7 0
Among the goals of the Community Scholars course, entitled "Green Collar Jobs,
Green Buildings & Social Justice: Pathway to a Sustainable City," was that of researching
and elaborating policy content for the Green Retrofit and Workforce Ordinance to accord
with the overarching vision of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance campaign. In delegating such
a task to the Community Scholars, the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance obtained political
insulation for the last leg of its green jobs campaign. As recalled by Clare Fox, then an urban
planning graduate student:
The Apollo Alliance hat is more about policy advocacy and movement
building, whereas wearing the Community Scholars hat is about leveraging the
resources of UCLA and communicating that this is a university-based research
initiative to promote the best implementation of this ordinance we can generate...
there's a certain level of credibility that comes with that relationship to the university.
So the LA Apollo Alliance can come to the UCLA Community Scholars arena and says,
'OK university partners, willyou look into this and come up with recommendations and
best practices? Will you create a research document to support the new director and
the committee as the ordinance unfolds?'
Through the first quarter, the class elaborated on how the Green Retrofit and Workforce
Ordinance might contribute to the prevention of climate change in Los Angeles, existing
as well as a minority worker training module (that emerged as part of a broader federal response in the late
1990s to demands by the environmental justice movement to not only conduct hazardous waste clean up in
communities of color but also employ local residents).
70 As a university affiliated community-based center for research, education, and policy development, the
UCLA Labor Center's aims to develop working partnerships between labor, community, the university, and
students to advance the goals of creating good working standards and healthy workplaces as well as to
develop economic strategies (Le, 2012). In staying abreast of emerging trends in the broader economy, the
Labor Center had become involved in discussions at the national level with the founding leadership of the
Emerald Cities Collaborative (ECC) since 2007. Like the Apollo Alliance, Green for All, and the Blue Green
Alliance, ECC offered a model for "greening" metropolitan areas in high-road ways that advance equal
opportunity, shared wealth, and democracy" through broad-based partnerships forged at national and more
local scales (ECC, 2012). However, it was also distinct in encompassing development intermediaries with
discretion over urban real estate. Also, they had gained unprecedented commitment from the AFL-CIO
Building and Construction Trades Department to in the form of multi-craft core curriculum development and
outreach to their state, regional, and local level constituents to allow young people and entry level workers
from historically marginalized communities unprecedented access to career paths in any of the Building
Trades in return for those communities contributing to the support for unions and labor standards. In
parallel, the Labor Center had been working with the building trades at the local, regional, and state levels,
through its California Construction Academy and Black Worker Center programs, to promote environmental
sustainability, inclusion, and diversity through coalition-building, advocacy, research, and popular education.
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landscape of workforce development programs, promotion of worker and community
health, and democratic engagement and progressive movement building (Delp et al.,
2009a).
In the process of convening on a weekly basis a diverse mix of students including
UCLA graduate students from the departments of Urban Planning, Public Policy,
Community Health Sciences and Mechanical Engineering, as well as representatives from
local environmental and social justice organizations, service sector unions, and the building
trades, the Community Scholars course additionally strengthened the multi-sector alliance
at the heart of the policy campaign. In the earlier stage of coalition building, SCOPE helped
distill shared concerns and forge a common alignment on the vision of green economic
development and broader progressive agenda in Los Angeles among Apollo Alliance
member groups. Now that the policy outlines and stakes were becoming more concrete, the
situation called for continued buy-in and collaboration on the part of the multi-sector
alliance. In particular, the task of forging a clear pathway from the vocational worker
category, represented by SEIU, to journey level careers in the various building trades
required a multi-trade agreement with the City. The fact that several of the unions were
engaged in inter-trade jurisdictional battles over green construction and maintenance
work only complicated the matter. Clare Fox later clarified the contribution of the
Community Scholars course, "With the organizing to support the retrofit ordinance, there
were unions that were part of that coalition, but the length and depth of the engagement
with the trades maybe wasn't quite there yet. So I think the Community Scholars class was
where that began to deepen." Besides the diverse mix of students, teamwork cutting across
sectors and areas of expertise promoted an interactive and integrative dynamic.
A few weeks after the Community Scholars mid-term presentation at the UCLA
Downtown Labor Center to a group of distinguished guests on March 18th, 2009, the
Deputy City Attorney finally approved the Green Retrofit and Workforce Development
Ordinance. Subsequently put up for vote before the city council on April 8, 2009, the
initiative won unanimous approval. According to the terms of the ordinance, the Green
Retrofit and Workforce Program would be housed in the Office of the Mayor and overseen
by a Program Director, Green Retrofit Advisory Council, and Interdepartmental Taskforce.
The goal of the program was to retrofit all city-owned properties that were over 7,500
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square feet or built before 1978 to meet standards of LEED silver or higher. 71 The
ordinance contained no formal Project Labor Agreement or Local Hiring Provision, stating
only that "the proprietary interests of the City will be advanced by the use of project labor
agreements, where the legal criteria for their use exists" and "to the extent feasible and
permissible by applicable law, the Program will require the work performed under the
Construction Contracts associated with the Program be performed by local residents,"
meaning those residing "within the zip code containing at least part of one census tract
with a rate of unemployment in excess of 150 percent of the LA County unemployment
rate." At the same time, it specified as part of the Interdepartmental Taskforce and
Advisory Council's responsibility the provision of recommendations on PLAs, memoranda
of understanding, and local hire for all work required by the program as well as on how to
promote green career paths and inner city economic development, the latter though
"supporting small and disadvantaged green businesses." It further required half of the first
five years' retrofits to take place on city facilities located in areas with relatively high levels
of poverty and unemployment.
Where the language of the ordinance with respect to the scope and content of
efficiency measures as well as workforce development was fairly ambiguous, the
Community Scholars focused the second quarter's research on specific steps to implement
the ordinance in accordance with the ethos of the Apollo Alliance campaign and the
framework laid out during the previous quarter (Delp et al., 2009a). As part of the research
process, the student teams reviewed existing literature as well as conducted a detailed case
study of the Vernon Branch Library, a future project site, auditing the building's energy use
using LEED criteria and interviewing building users. In conducting the building audit, they
worked with a LEED Accredited Professional (AP) along with staff from the General
Services Department, which was the city agency responsible for building maintenance and
ultimately administering the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program. Through the course of
the summer, the students shared their findings in two major presentations, the first
71 Toward this end, the ordinance required consideration of thirteen elements in developing the retrofit plan,
namely water efficient landscaping and irrigation, HVAC systems, mechanical systems, water conservation
systems, refrigeration systems, retrofitting lighting and electrical systems, retrofitting all energy consuming
elements, improving indoor air quality, sustainable carpet, sustainable maintenance, titanium dioxide
window treatments, solar, geothermal and other renewable energy systems, and cool roofs.
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addressing an audience of 85 policy makers, labor and community leaders at City Hall. The
second presentation took place as part of a community conference called "Working in
Unity, Greening our Communities," which drew over 100 attendees and focused on the
question of how to move the ordinance forward in the given sociopolitical and economic
environment.72 Following, Linda Delp and Elizabeth Stewart summarized the results of the
Community Scholars' two quarter long research in a final report entitled "Green Buildings,
Good Jobs, Safe Jobs: Social Justice Pathways to a Sustainable Los Angeles" along with a
technical working paper entitled "Roadmap to Retrofits" (Delp et al., 2009b; Delp and
Stewart 2009) Intended to guide the Green Retrofit Program Director, Advisory Council,
and the Los Angeles General Services Department in their initial stage of "creating a model
program that can be adapted in other cities, in the private sector, and beyond" (Delp &
Stewart, 2009). The two documents stood more as a testament to the hopeful aspirations of
the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and Community Scholars than the thorny challenges that
would accompany the process of implementation.73
LA Green Retrofit and
LA Apollo Alliance Green Community Scholars Workforce Program-
Jobs Campaign (2005-2009) (Winter and Spring 2009) Implementation (Fall 2009-
present)
Figure 5. Program Timeline
72 Additional speakers at the conference included L.A. Deputy Mayor Larry Frank, Krista Kline from the
Mayor's Office, Romel Pascual of L.A. City, Andrew Westall from Councilman Wesson's office, Elsa Barbosa
and Gloria Walton of L.A. Apollo Alliance/SCOPE, Teresa Sanchez of SEIU Local 721, UCLA-LOSH Director
Linda Delp, Jane Paul of the Green L.A. Coalition, UCLA Labor Center Director Kent Wong, and Daniel Villao of
the California Construction Academy (CCA), Senior Labor Advisor to the CCA David Sickler, Richard Slawson
of the L.A./O.C. Building and Construction Trades Council, Professor J. Phillip Thompson of MIT, USC
Professor in American Studies and Ethnicity Manuel Pastor.
73 In Ms. Fox's words, the first report was intended to "[ensure] the retrofit advisory committee understood
the full extent of the buildings, good jobs, all the potential within that but wasn't as precise to energy
efficiency building retrofits." On the other hand, the latter document was "more technically precise around
the building mechanics and the needs of energy efficiency retrofit and moments within the retrofit process
that could be leveraged for social goals" (Fox, 2011).
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5.7 Program implementation
5.7.1 Funding challenges
The Green Retrofit and Workforce Program built on some of the strengths and lessons of
the City Jobs Program but also faced similar financial hazards in focusing on public sector
employment. The City Jobs program initially relied on the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program
to confront dramatic decreases in funding over the years before accessing Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) funds (Aaron et al., 2002). Moreover, the program saw a decline in
overall civil service job opportunities when the City placed a hiring freeze on all
departments amidst the economic uncertainty of the early 2000s. In the case of the Green
Retrofit and Workforce Program, the City Council passed the ordinance shortly after
President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in
February 2009.74 By the spring of 2010, the City received $34 million in Energy Efficiency
Conservation Block Grants (EECBGs) of which $13.8 million went to the General Services
Department to cover initial material and labor costs for the Green Retrofit and Workforce
program. In addition, the Community Development Department and Workforce Investment
Board received WIA appropriations through the Stimulus Act and subsequently issued a
Request for Proposals to solicit applications for a series of competitive grants totaling $7
million.75 In tandem, the same forces of economic recession that brought the Stimulus
began to take a toll on the city's general revenue fund. Los Angeles and other Californian
cities were particularly inclined towards budget challenges in the wake of the housing and
financial crisis since Proposition 13 had constrained the ability of the state and local
governments to raise revenue for basic services beginning in 1978.
The start of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program unfolded in a general
political climate of fiscal austerity within the city while overlapping with a temporary
windfall brought on by the Stimulus. As the Community Scholars gave their final
presentations in the summer of 2009, the City Council approved a plan to initiate early
74 In addition to $500 million in WIA funding for green jobs training, the "Stimulus" allocated Energy
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants (EECBG) funds to states and cities to support initial planning
processes.
75 This included $4 million to support development of vocational training/bridge programs to serve a total of
1,000 dislocated workers through the WorkSource System and $3 million for training another 1,000
individuals in designated High Growth, High Wage employment sectors.
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retirement for 2,400 workers and postpone raises for thousands of workers in order to
"balance the budget without laying off workers or closing City Hall two days a month"
(Zahniser & Reston, 2009).76 Among the core recommendations of the Community
Scholars had been that of beginning with a mix of ten to fifteen buildings (representing a
range of building categories) in a pilot stage financed by public monies obtained through
the Stimulus Act. The idea was to not only perform efficiency measures on the buildings but
additionally document and track reductions in energy use and green house gas emissions,
water conservation, job creation and enhancement, cost savings and improved health and
safety conditions. Based on the quantified energy savings, the City could expand the scale of
the program, partly by bringing in private sector funds from socially responsible investors
for a municipal revolving energy fund. To the extent the program became self sustaining,
with monetized energy savings covering future retrofit work and the cost of additional
retrofit workers, it could expand public sector jobs in green construction and maintenance
leading to building trades careers regardless of the city's fiscal circumstance. The key was
to maximize use of Stimulus funds in the pilot stage to emerge with the measurement and
verification system, finance mechanism, and hiring and workforce development system in
place.
5.7.2 Planning the Green Retrofit Career Academy
76 As told by Jason Elias, Regional Coordinator at SEIU 721, in 2007, the Coalition of LA City Unions,
representing 22,000 workers including librarians, 911 operators, traffic officers, maintenance workers,
wastewater treatment operators, and others had negotiated a series of employment contracts with the City
that guaranteed raises of five percent and other enhancements for five years. However, in 2008, the City
Administrative Officer informed the City Council and Mayor of a $200 million budget deficit looming on the
horizon. In response, the coalition of unions supported the creation of the Early Retirement Incentive
Program (ERIP), which would shrink the workforce and thereby offer structural relief on the deficit. When
the Mayor showed an unexpectedly negative response, the unions offered a deal the following year that
would defer for two years the raises negotiated as part of the previous contract to instead increase overall
wages by 25 percent over 7 years rather than 5 percent per year over five years (essentially exchanging early
retirement for pay raises). While an agreement was finally signed in October 2009 that guaranteed no layoffs
or furloughs during fiscal year 2009 and 2010 in exchange for transitioning 2,400 employees into early
retirement and union members paying off 1 percent of their respective retirement plans for 15 years, the City
Council and Mayor reneged the following year by deciding to layoff 240 workers (the number went down
from an initially proposed figure of 2,000 to 400 and finally 240) to save $11 million. In fact, this move cost
them $98 million as a result of a clause reinstating the original terms (negotiated in 2007- of five percent
raises for five years) in the event of failure to meet contract terms. Where the layoffs appeared as a political
choice rather than a necessary action, the City provided affirmation in the form of vilifying public sector
unions with the help of the media during the process.
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From fall 2009, Teresa Sanchez and Elsa Barbosa began to convene stakeholders to
plan the worker training component of the pilot green retrofit program. Despite the wide
consensus among the Apollo Alliance and city officials early on about the suitability of
Teresa Sanchez as a candidate for the Green Retrofit Program Director, the City took an
entire year after the passage of the ordinance to make the formal appointment
(interviewees repeatedly mentioned the challenges of operating on "bureaucratic time").
Aside from her work experience as the Policy Coordinator at SEIU 721 and Political
Director at SEIU 347, Ms. Sanchez was an active member of the Los Angeles Workforce
Investment Board. As one of the chief architects of the City Jobs Program and the Apollo
Alliance campaign, she brought extensive expertise on workforce development models
combining public sector leadership and union career pathways for low wage, unskilled
workers of color. As delineated by the ordinance, she would bear the primary
responsibility for development and implementation of the program, her tasks including
convening and chairing meetings of the Interdepartmental Taskforce (cutting across 12
different City departments) and nine-member Advisory Council (which would only come
together a year later). 77 To plan the "Green Retrofit Career Academy" in absence of the
Advisory Council and even prior to her formal appointment, she worked with Elsa Barbosa
of SCOPE and Linda Delp from the Labor Occupational Safety and Health Program at UCLA
along with three workforce intermediaries- the Southeast L.A. Crenshaw WorkSource
77 The Green Retrofits Advisory Council took another year to come together for its first meeting. After hiring
the Program Director, the City followed the terms spelled out by the ordinance in assembling the Advisory
Council to encompass two labor representatives (one appointed by the Mayor and the other by the Council
President), one LEED AP (appointed by the Energy and Environment Committee Chairperson), a
representative of an environmental organization (selected by the Mayor), representative of an environmental
justice organization (selected by the Mayor), workforce development expert (appointed by the HCED
Committee chair), a representative of an community organization (selected by the Mayor), representative of
an philanthropic organization (selected by the Council President), and academic in the field of architecture,
engineering, or energy (selected by the Mayor). Among the Advisory Council members, Kim Craft from IBEW
Local 11, Jason Elias of SEIU 721, Jane Paul from the Green LA Coalition, and Elsa Barbosa from SCOPE
participated in the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance. Taking place once a month at City Hall, the Advisory
Committee meetings additionally called in technical experts on an as needed basis in addition to receiving
public attendees. As described by Teresa Sanchez, the committee structure was designed to encourage
democratic accountability and control: "If you look at the ordinance, we built into it a transparent public
process... the advisory council is a public meeting; we put up agendas everywhere and let people know to
come. The advisory council meetings are in the daytime." While the daytime meeting arrangement raises the
question of accessibility, especially for low-income working families, Ms. Sanchez estimates public attendance
as totaling up to 30 in some cases.
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Center/UAW-LETC, Los Angeles Trade Technical College, and Worker Education and
Resource Center, Inc. (WERC).
Where the initial conversations around the Green Retrofit Career Academy
remained relatively abstract through the spring of 2010, it was only when the City of Los
Angeles put out an open call for applications following its receipt of WIA stimulus
allocations for green jobs that the group began to hash out logistical details. Following an
initial rejection, Linda Delp from LOSH took the lead in putting together a second
application. Learning of an opportunity to obtain funding through the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), Dr. Delp submitted an application for a minority
worker training program that would "train individuals for jobs in the environmental field
and construction industry with a focus on recruiting from underserved urban communities
disproportionately affected by environmental exposures" (UCLA IRLE, 2011).78 The
proposal, which shortly won approval, assigned LOSH the responsibility of conducting
worker health and safety from a popular education approach and put WERC in charge of
basic skills training. Concurrently, Teresa Sanchez, occupying her new seat as the Green
Retrofit Program Director inside the Mayor's office from the summer of 2010, obtained
supplementary Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) funds through the Community Development Department. As a rule, the funding
could not be utilized for research and planning but rather only for actual job placement or
training, which in turn had to be completed within the grant period. Where the allocation
required administration through a designated WorkSource center, the Southeast L.A.
Crenshaw WorkSource Center/UAW-LETC stepped in to play the role. Los Angeles Trade-
Technical College, on the other hand, offered training capacity in green certification and
more basic, hands-on construction skills along with teaching facilities and other resources
5.7.3 From job creation to job retention
Initially, the group had hoped to spend some time sorting out the curriculum,
preparing the career ladder (going from the vocational worker classification into building
trades apprenticeships), and working with the General Services Department to designate
78 The application was submitted in partnership with the University of Washington as a two-city program (in
Seattle and Los Angeles).
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the initial set of buildings to be retrofitted in the pilot phase; instead, the funding
stipulations required direct advancement into training. The pressing need for practical
action only intensified into the fall, as the City prepared to lay off 240 workers, 107 of them
from the General Services Department (GSD). The layoffs fundamentally shifted the nature
of the problem from one of job creation to job retention, posing questions about of
continued pertinence and survival for the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program. In
hindsight, the signs were there from the beginning when the city council approved the plan
for the Early Retirement Incentive Program. However, it was only when GSD, the city
agency that would be administering the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program moved to
let go some of its own staff that the impossibility of hiring new workers, at least in the near
future, settled in.
Approaching the Green Retrofit Career Academy planning team with news of the
layoffs, Teresa Sanchez requested that they work together to train forty of the reassigned
GSD workers for the Green Building Retrofit program. 79 The impending layoffs made the
situation especially urgent, as the training program needed to proceed quickly in order to
ensure reassigned workers had continued employment. Despite initial deviation from the
original plan of creating new jobs for disadvantaged workers and residents of low-income
and other historically marginalized communities, they could presumably create more green
retrofit jobs down the line by running a successful pilot and raising private capital to
expand the program to the citywide level. Deputy Mayor Larry Frank summarized the
situation,
Initially we hoped these jobs, especially the ones funded with these ARRA dollars,
would be able to hire new folks from the community. But when the early retirement
happened, it was premised on us not hiring new workers, because if we did, then our
pension liability would be greater and then all the evaluation that went into figuring
out the program would be undercut. So the only way to use these dollars to hire people
in the city was to hire peoplefacing layoffs.
As it played out, staff from the Community Development Department (CDD) led the
selection and hiring process, as the General Services Department appeared reluctant to
assume ownership of the process. As Teresa Sanchez described the proceedings,
79 The number was based on the amount of available funding.
183
They kind of focused on that group of 107 and let them know this opportunity was
available. The workers had to go through an application and interview process. It
wasn't just a transfer to another job. So there was a self-selection as well as an
interview process. The interviews were done by [CDD staffi, so they were hopefully
technically neutral. Not everyone made the cut.
Recalling the events two years later, Jason Elias of SEIU 721 addressed the failure on the
part of the Program Director and himself, despite holding the most knowledge among Los
Angeles Apollo Alliance members about the city workforce system, to exercise more
oversight over the process. He commented, "I think Teresa had just moved from the union
to work for the mayor, so she didn't want a perception that she wasn't being 'objective' or
stalling the process. I wanted to be careful too... unions choosing people for jobs! But
what's ironic is that we would've been more fair and objective in choosing participants for
the program." Teresa Sanchez added that she had in fact represented some of the laid off
workers while working for SEIU 721 and sought to avoid potential allegations of bias in
selection and hiring. In hindsight, she indicated, " I should have brought my expertise. I
could have better explained what the program was about and helped inform their choices
to participate. CDD didn't really understand the full scope of the Green Retrofit Program
and ended up getting some people who didn't want to do the kind of work involved."
As for the other coalition members, the occurrence of layoffs and reassignments
internally within the system of city bureaucracy limited the extent to which they could
exercise any discretion. For some, the developments came as a surprise. In the words of
Clare Fox, who had moved into her new position as Project Coordinator of the California
Construction Academy at the UCLA Labor Center following completion of her graduate
studies at the UCLA Urban Studies Department,
[The training program] was coming together. We had the funds for it. That was great.
Then it became clear that we didn't really have space for community members,
because how could you bring in new community hires when 240 city staff were about
to be laid off? Then thefocus became rerouting, saving peoplefrom lay off, at least 40
of them, rerouting them to a new career path in green retrofit and construction. In the
end 40 people were selected. The pitch to them was, 'You won't be laid off ifyou go in
this direction. Here's this great opportunity... you can apply for it.' There was a lot of
transition so it wasn't always very transparent as far as what information workers
were getting and how they were being selected.
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Understandably, the Program Director was undergoing a transitional process as a policy
advocate entering city hall from the "outside." The long-term viability of the program partly
hinged on her ability to cultivate collaborative relationships with the General Services
Department management and other city staff. However, being "objective" and respecting
"the process" also carried consequences in the form of loosened democratic accountability
and control over the policy implementation process. While the coalition had planned from
early on to institutionalize the Green Retrofit and Workforce program within the
administrative jurisdiction the city, which inevitably entailed working within its system of
governance, whether formal or informal, some of its members were unprepared for such a
sudden shift in dynamics or the lack of transparency.
Following the reassignment of incumbent workers, the Program Director took the
bold step of assuming public accountability. Given the countless hours spent by the Los
Angeles Apollo Alliance and its grassroots membership campaigning for employment
opportunities for low-income communities of color, the divergent outcome placed a
potential strain on relations between coalition members and the city. She described the
experience,
I've been going out to community public meetings with the Mayor when this comes up
for discussion. So people want to know what's happening; why can't we hire more
people; why can't we do it quicker? It's a challenging education process with the
community in terms of what's happening but its worthwhile because the more people
understand, the more they can help us.
Deputy Mayor Larry Frank shared his perspective on the matter, "It was definitely a
compromise for the community, in my opinion, in terms of what they got, but when they
found out who these people were- that they live in their communities- it suddenly
changed the feelings of those people working hard on this effort."
Linda Delp also spoke to some of the overlaps between the demographics of the
reassigned workers and the original policy aims in commenting, "It was very clear that
certain percentages of the people are from the communities we want to be hiring from... we
know what zip codes they came from." In fact, the zip codes in which the Green Retrofit
trainees resided had an average poverty rate that was 50 percent higher than the county
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average.80 Moreover, according to data collected by the City of Los Angeles, the forty
reassigned were disproportionately African American and Latino, the racial breakdown
being 30 percent African American (compared to the citywide average of 10 percent), 55
percent Latino (compared to the citywide average of 49 percent), 10 percent white
(compared to the citywide average of 29 percent), and 5 percent Asian Pacific Islander
(compared to the citywide average of 11 percent). The group was split between 24 men
and 16 women, with the majority having worked as entry level Custodians, Clerk Typist
and Messenger Clerks prior to their reassignment, although there was also a small number
of journey level painters and other skilled workers. Based on self-reported data, we also
know that six of the workers had criminal records, and the highest level of education
completed by the median person was a high school diploma or GED equivalent. The median
age was relatively high at 43, perhaps due to the city's particular approach to layoffs, which
Deputy Mayor Larry Frank described in the following manner:
Instead of laying off new workers, how about having people close to retirement retire
early? So they're paying for the cost of early retirement, instead of laying off young
people, low-income families. We laid off at the top. Instead of downward pressure,
when we downsized city government, everyone had a chance to move up. And we didn't
lay off at the entry level, which is where there's more diversity... so we made some
headway on the bottom...
All in all, the mode of incumbent worker reassignment might have been consistent with the
ethos of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program in prioritizing the most marginalized
groups of workers. In their absence, the layoffs might have exacerbated the high rates of
unemployment and poverty in the communities represented by the Los Angeles Apollo
Alliance. While certainly plausible, such summations were largely rhetorical in the face of a
significant setback with respect to new community hires, complete with a lapse of civil
society engagement and oversight. Yet they served a valuable role in cohering and retaining
community support, critical to the program's advancement.
5.7.4 Structuring the training curriculum and Civil Service Apprenticeship
80 This figure was tabulated using combined statistical data from the Labor Occupational Safety and Health
Program at UCLA and http://www.city-data.com.
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While the General Services Department and other internal city staff proceeded with
the selection and hiring process, Teresa Sanchez and her partners at LOSH, WERC, UAW-
LETC, and LA Trade Tech spent the month of August ironing out the structure and content
for the training program. Having transitioned into a support role, SCOPE representatives
were present at many of the planning meetings as the "eyes and ears" of the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance, but they did not actually work directly on the development of the training
program (Fox, 2011). In designing the curriculum, the planning committee drew upon
previous research by SCOPE and the Community Scholars while using the requirements
posed by the NIEHS Minority Worker Training grant (i.e. so many hours of various subjects
plus occupational safety trainings, etc.) as guiding posts. They additionally met with
various city agencies that had a potential stake in program implementation, a process
ridden with challenges as described by Vanna Tran of Worker Education and Resource
Center, Inc. (WERC):
In the city, everyone appears to have direct impact, which was so confusing to try to
decipher who actually really has input that's valuable and who has the power to
actually make some changes. [The Program Director] would find some person in the
city that was willing to be able to work with us and give us good feedback and who
was willing to help us. But someone who was their lateral partner would totally be on
a different page. So she had to spend a lot of time trying to figure out who are our
champions and who can help us, and getting them to escalate this to the top.
Vanna Tran particularly struggled to adapt WERC's workforce development approach to
her newfound context. WERC was initially established in 2002 by the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) Local 721 as part of an effort to provide training and education
as well as promote high road job opportunities and career pathways in the health care
sector for lower wage workers and job seekers in partnership with the Los Angeles County
Department of Health Services. While not a member of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance,
WERC had received an invitation from SCOPE to participate in discussions about the Green
Retrofit Career Academy given the latter's interest in replicating WERC's training model in
the green retrofit sector. Where as work source centers like UAW-LETC tended to focus
more on job placement and community colleges such as the Los Angeles Trade Technical
College provided training oriented towards certification, the WERC training approach
emphasized labor-management partnerships that began with addressing worker and
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employer needs in setting educational pathways spanning family sustaining employment
and progression up career ladders. Despite attempts to understand the needs of both
employees and employers in designing the training program, Vanna Tran was only able to
meet with representatives of GSD for the first time in early September. She recounted the
meeting,
We sat down and let them know we were doing this training for some of the workers
that were being laid off We asked, 'What do you envision them doing? Can you give us
feedback?' No one really said anything. Everyone was just being coy. And finally the
GSD representative said something along the lines of them not doing much work
beyond what helpers do. So we said, 'Wow. O.K Well can you explain to us what are
day-to-day functions they could do?' They basically said sweeping, very menial tasks.
So we said that we'll train them to know the basic concepts of what green construction
is, what retrofit means, integrate some job readiness, expose them to skills that would
allow them to preparefor a pre-apprenticeship. So that was tough.
In the end, Ms. Tran felt the City's failure to share the details of the trainee selection and
hiring process led to a lack of awareness about student background and expectations,
which compromised her ability to prepare students for educational pathways and careers
as opposed to providing simple training.
Where the trajectory of program participants beyond the Green Retrofit Career
Academy remained unclear, Teresa Sanchez also enlisted the help of the California
Construction Academy (CCA) at the UCLA Labor Center to research gaps in the existing
workforce development pipeline for civil service construction and maintenance work and
facilitate an agreement between the City, SEIU, and the LA/OC Building and Construction
Trades Council around a Civil Service Apprenticeship to formalize the transition from
vocational worker status to careers in the building trades. The Green Retrofit Career
Academy embodied the first phase in training incumbent city workers and community
residents in basic academic skills and concepts of green construction. The next phase of the
workforce strategy entailed access to union pre-apprenticeships and apprenticeships
enabling work in either the public or private sector. Therefore, CCA Project Coordinator
Clare Fox uncovered various trade occupations related to the work of comprehensive
building audits, green retrofits, and maintenance and operations. The intent was to
essentially inventory specific trades in which vocational workers could enter pre-
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apprenticeships with aims to "graduate" into apprenticeship. In concert, CCA Director
Daniel Villao, a former business agent for IBEW Local 11 and a journeyman electrician,
proposed the idea of the Civil Service Apprenticeship (CSA) as a pathway from entry level
trainee to journey level craft positions along the green retrofit workforce development
pipeline. Mr. Villao elaborated on the significance of this innovation,
In most municipal environments across the country, apprenticeship programs don't
exist. They only hire journey level workers or technicians and helpers, so the transition
from a technician or helper position to a journey level position is sometimes impeded.
Almost in all cases it's very difficult for a person who gets hired on as a helper or
technician to move up. It takes years to move into a journey level role. There's no
career track, and what the creation of Civil Service Apprenticeship does is allowfor a
career pipeline to be created and allows employers, or the municipality in this case, to
control who moves into that process, as long they meet the criteria set by the joint
apprenticeship training council, they can move bodies into those positions. They can
hire workers as they need into each classification according to the skills they seek to
fill. In the end, those folks are in a 40-hour workweek environment but they go to
school with the building trades apprenticeship program according to their trade. So
what the municipal employer ends up with now is a developed career track that moves
workers from trainee positions to journey level worker positions, trained on their
specific systems and generating savings along the way.
The CCA helped clarify the mutual gains inherent in the Civil Service Apprenticeship for
both the City and the building trades. For one thing, the City would accrue cost savings, as
repairs on city infrastructure systems would no longer be performed by two journey level
workers, as done previously, but rather by a journey level worker paired with a civil
service apprentice for a fraction of the rate. The CSA would also help the city retain skill
and knowledge with respect to its byzantine infrastructure, in turn alleviating burdens of
the impending retirement of aging baby-boomers. As for the building trades, the CSA would
enable quality control with respect to the hired workforce, which would represent a shift
from the existing practice of representing municipal employees through memoranda of
understanding without controlling how the municipality does the hiring. They would
further benefit from increases in construction work and maintenance services undertaken
by the City as a result of cost savings.
Despite significant progress on the part of CCA in gaining buy-in from both the City
and the LA/OC Building and Construction Trades Council, the Civil Service Apprenticeship
required a Memorandum of Understanding between the two entities, which would
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inevitably entail rounds of back-and-forth between their respective teams of lawyers. On
the other hand, the timeline for the Green Retrofit Career Academy was more immediate as
to render its relation to the landscape of building trades pre-apprenticeship and
apprenticeship programs ambiguous. According to Vanna Tran,
They were like we have pre-apprenticeship training, what are you guys doing? So we
made it clear that we are not claiming to be a pre-apprenticeship program. We value
the pre-apprenticeship and apprenticeship programs that they have. We just want to
make sure that people have basic skills in order to actually access these programs.
Because [we know ofl people who apply or try to take their exams and don't make it
because they cant meet the 10th grade level [math and reading requirements].
In other words, the Green Retrofit Career Academy went as far as becoming politically
palatable without actually counting towards any of the pre-apprenticeship or
apprenticeship requirements posed by the building trades.
5.8 Commencement of the Green Retrofit Career Academy
In September 2010, the Los Angeles General Services Department hired 40 workers
previously slated for layoff by the City under the vocational worker classification. The
participants received a maximum salary of $28,065 and had access to full family health
benefits and the Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System (LACERS). As a first step,
the participants registered for WIA services at the South Los Angeles WorkSource
Center/UAW-LETC, where they also received skills assessments in math and reading levels.
Following, they received classroom and "hands on" instruction in construction skills for
forty hours per week for a total of ten weeks, the curriculum covering English, Math and
Science, Computer Technology, Construction Technology, Green/Sustainability
Construction Theory, Industrial Health and Safety, Occupational Health and Safety, and
Environmental Justice. Basic skills training took place at the WERC Van de Camp campus
and the remainder of the program, at LA Trade Tech, with the course instructors
comprising faculty from LA Trade Tech, WERC, and UCLA LOSH. According to Vanna Tran,
there were multiple instances of miscoordination, partly resulting from the rush to begin
training combined with there being "too many cooks in the kitchen." For example, students
were subject to numerous orientations by various groups of instructors and
administrators, the latter in some cases disrupting classroom instruction with human
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resources protocol. On the LA Trade Tech campus, students were unexpectedly denied
library access and other student services as well as relocated (after the first week) to old
classrooms lacking air conditioning and surrounded by ongoing construction on the basis
that not all of the instructors were adjunct faculty at the community college (Tran, 2011).
During the course of 10 weeks, students were exposed to a variety of
epistemological frameworks and pedagogical styles ranging from direct instruction to
popular education. The incorporation of the latter, despite its indirect relation to the
practical execution of green retrofit work, to some degree resulted from the ample time
frame afforded by the General Services Department's delay in lining up the initial set of
retrofit projects. As described by Linda Delp,
We had an opportunity to build in political education and activism into the class,
partly because the City said, 'We need the training to take up this much time, because
we're not quite ready for them to go in jobs.' Normally there isn't enough time to do
what you would like to do. We could have just have easily been told, 'We want you to
train them so they can get their 40 hour Hazwoper certificate, and get their lead
certification and asbestos certification period. You have no more time.' Then we would
have incorporated bits of that political education and activism into more technical
certification classes, but we were lucky that we could do a week of environmental
justice to give people a bigger picture.
In what follows, we focus more on the content of the popular education component of the
Green Retrofit Career Academy, given its relation to the theme of building civil society in
the economic sphere to further economic democracy. As we discuss the implications in
fuller detail in the final chapter, here we will provide more of an overview of the approach
and content.
Among the trainers of the Green Retrofit Career Academy, one section led by Dr.
Linda Delp and including other representing LOSH and WERC, believed that "job training
program in general should not be just teaching people to do certain skills so they can get a
job" but additionally about "consciousness raising, critical thinking, critical analysis, [and]
cultivation of an ability to take action to influence [one's own life" (Delp, 2011). Carrying
her pedagogical approach into the classroom, Dr. Delp helped students situate the Green
Retrofit and Workforce program in the context of broader environmental and economic
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issues and the social movements, in part highlighting the role of collective action and
human agency in engendering social change. In her words,
We talked about the fact that these jobs didn't just drop out of the sky but that they
were going into these jobsfor a couple reasons. One is that we have an environmental
crisis on our hands in terms of climate change and natural resources conservation and
the conservation of our planet. At the same time we have an economic crisis on our
hands. So green jobs is all about, bringing those together and addressing both of them.
But that doesn't just happen. People are organizing around that. We did a whole
timeline for environmental justice to make the links historically to the fact that
nothing's ever happened without some kind of movement or without community or
labor or both of them together organizing for some kind of change. And that's what
the LA Apollo Alliance is all about.
Hence the lessons helped dispel any sense of "phantom objectivity" that might surround
the participants' conception of the green retrofit jobs, underscoring the human actions that
brought them into being. Moreover, they illuminated the broader significance of the work
with respect to tackling global climate change and resource scarcity along with the
economic recession.
To localize and concretize some of the discussed social trends, Communities for a
Better Environment (CBE), one of the environmental justice organizations participating in
the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, took the students on a "toxic tour" around Los Angeles that
exposed them to local sites of environmental contamination as well as groups that were
organizing to improve to bring about improvements. A subsequent mapping exercise
revealed the locations of environmentally hazardous sites around Los Angeles County to
overlap with where many of the students lived. As recalled by Dr. Delp, "It was clear that
environmental justice was not just an issue that affected other people. There were students
who said, 'Oh, I live right in the middle of the superfund site."' Where the intent of the class
was to go beyond presenting an ominous circumstance to additionally stimulate ownership
of the issue and involvement in seeking solutions, the mapping exercise incorporated
discussion about the various activist groups in the respective geographic areas to gauge
familiarity with local activists along with willingness for engagement. Dr. Delp described,
"So one guy was really involved in his kids' schools. He's been a little bit involved in
environmental issues. He said, 'I should take this to the activist parents groups at the school
so they're more aware of stuff like this too."' Where the Toxic Tour was paired with a visit
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to Tree People, an environmental non-profit organization in Coldwater Canyon Dr. Delp
recounted, "They [came back and] said, 'That was amazing! It's really nice to see that
there's hope and that things can be done in a different way.' It was this feeling that through
their jobs they would be contributing to improving the environment of the city."
Incidentally, the most difficult but perhaps resounding lesson came about
unexpectedly at the eleventh hour. As the tenth and final week of training arrived, the
General Services Department had yet to line up the retrofit projects for the trainees to
begin work the following week. The second to the last day of training, a departmental
representative met with the participants and when pressed to offer directions, conveyed a
sense of uncertainty, intimating that some of the former custodians may even go back to
their old jobs. Linda Delp recalled the response from the students, "They were absolutely
demoralized. Some people showed up late [the following day]. Then people were just
sitting there." In Clare Fox's words, "They were basically told, 'Welcome to your new career
in green construction. This is a doorway into journey level trade work in the city system.
You'll work on green retrofits.' For many of the re-hired city workers, this was an entirely
new career path." Then suddenly, it appeared as though the green retrofit trainees would
continue as vocational workers under the employ of the General Services Department, with
the prospect of a civil service apprenticeship and green career in the building trades
seemingly out of sight.
Rather than resign to defeat, Dr. Delp shifted the tone of the classroom by "[hosting]
a process to get at the different concerns and anxieties" (Fox, 2011). As she described,
We created a kind of power analysis on the board. We said we'd talked about 'the City,'
which consists of different departments, the mayor's office, city council... The one
person you met doesn't represent the whole city. We had just finished talking about
environmental justice and how different groups in the community are players in
making government decisions. So we said where did this program come out of in the
first place and we drew a picture on the board. Now it's the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance
that was the one pushing the ordinance to make this program happen. So what is the
Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, what are the different organizations, and what's the
status right now? We talked about representatives from the Apollo Alliance
organization on the Green Retrofit Advisory Council established by the ordinance and
meeting monthly to oversee this project. And what we did is broke them into groups
and said what you're going to do is pretend that you're preparing to go to a city
council meeting to talk about why this program should moveforward and why you're
interested in doing the work and whyyou're the best person to do the work.
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Asked about the response, Dr. Delp responded that she saw "a combination of hope and
skepticism, kind of like, 'We'll believe it when we see it. We don't really believe the City
really has their act together for this." At the visceral level, GSD's cursory approach towards
the Green Retrofit and Workforce program had broken the buoyance that affected the
students through the course of the training. Yet as some of the trainers saw it, the students
were also fortunate to have avoided layoffs and continued employment with the city
regardless of the uncertainty surrounding their future career trajectory. They had not only
gained classroom and hands on construction skills training but also undergone popular
education as to access the preliminary means to deal with potential setbacks. At the
conceptual level, the Green Retrofit Career Academy disrupted reifying tendencies that cast
"the City" as monolithic and public policy as being handed down from above, pre-packaged
and ready for implementation. The participants knew that the Green Retrofit and
Workforce campaign and ordinance only came to bear through the hard work and
coordination of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and its allies. In turn, they could expect the
implementation of the program to demand concerted efforts by not only the General
Services Department but also various other stakeholders, including the green retrofit
trainees, as key beneficiaries of the program. Yet the fact remained that the trainees had
only signed up for the green retrofit careers in order to avoid layoffs and never actively
sought to become social activists or policy advocates on their own initiative. To what extent
could strong buy in and willpower counter adverse practical circumstances?
5.9 Taking the pilot to scale
5.9.1 From fifteen to fifty-two
After months of delay during which the green retrofit workers performed basic
building maintenance functions, the General Services Department worked with the newly
appointed Green Retrofit Advisory Council and Program Director to finalize the list of 15
buildings for the pilot phase.81 A few years prior to the Apollo Alliance campaign, the
81 The 15 buildings comprise the Lincoln Heights Recreation Center, Lake View Terrace Recreation Center,
Fire Station 73/Reseda, Hollywood Police Station, Fairfax Senior Center, Van Nuys Recreation Center, Fire
Station 91/Sylmar, St. Andres Recreation Center/South Los Angeles, Vernon Branch Library, Vineyard
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department had hired a consultant to audit its building stock for basic retrofits. Of the
entire sample of surveyed buildings, the group prioritized a set of one hundred and thirty
from which it picked the initial fifteen. Following, the forty green retrofit trainees began
executing green retrofits on the first fifteen buildings while gaining on-the job training in
the process and meeting with the Program Director every six weeks to check in about their
status. Given the basic skill levels of the green retrofit trainees, GSD additionally hired five
superintendents to manage the 40 vocational workers along with journey level workers
and outside contractors to execute the higher-level work.
Eager to unveil the initial results of the landmark Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program, the City planned a celebratory event for February 14, 2011. On this occasion,
Mayor Villaraigosa and Councilmember Herb Wesson visited the Vineyard Recreation
Center in the 10th district of South Los Angeles with over a hundred community, labor and
environmental supporters in attendance. The Mayor announced, "With the support of the
City Council, we are investing in a local economic stimulus program that addresses the
challenges of long-term poverty and pollution through a comprehensive program that
trains and puts Angelenos to work greening city buildings." Council member Wesson
claimed, "The success of the city's Green Retrofit and Workforce Program is going to
provide good jobs in low-income communities while facilitating the growth of the green
economy. I'm proud that Los Angeles is the first city in the nation to develop this innovative
program, and that we will be setting an example for other cities to follow our lead." The
elected officials further acknowledged the unique contributions of civil society actors-
namely the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the community-labor-environmental coalition
at its core- in spearheading the green economic and workforce development program.
SCOPE President Gloria Walton thanked the elected officials and hailed "the celebration of a
model training program" that was "symbolic of what public investment could and should
look like and really a prime example of how local and public ARRA dollars should be spent"
(SCOPE, 2011).
In fact, the creation of "good jobs" had yet to materialize and the impending passage
of House Resolution 1, which aimed to cut the federal budget for fiscal year 2011 by $61
Recreation Center, Brentwood Library, Platt Library, Cahuenga Library, Costello Youth and Senior Center, and
Watts Senior Center.
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billion, threatened the more immediate future of the Green Retrofit program. Where the bill
was slated to rescind nationwide EECBG allocations, including the $14 million that was
supporting the Green Retrofit and Workforce program, SCOPE mobilized the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance to join with other civic groups and leaders in mass protest against the
measure. 82 Despite eventually passing the house vote, H.R.1 underwent significant
amendment as to leave LA's EECBG allocation in tact. Freshly reminded of the need for
more sustainable sources of funding beyond Recovery Act funds, the Green Retrofit
Program Director, Advisory Council, and General Services Department leveraged $4 million
of the $14 million EECBG allocation to issue Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds (QECBs)
for the second round of green retrofits. 83 To initiate the process, they hired third party
auditor Partner Energy to glean from General Services Department's comprehensive list of
energy audits on the city's building stock a subset of buildings for the next phase of green
retrofits. In turn, Partner Energy recommended that the City take out an initial allocation of
about $12 million in QECB to retrofit a set of 52 buildings that would guarantee energy
savings of at least 20 percent. Such savings were necessary to meet federal requirements
for QECB issuance as well as demonstrate a return on investments for potential private
sector investors for future rounds of green retrofits. In other words, it was the keystone to
taking the Green Retrofit and Workforce program city wide towards the fulfillment of its
82 On March 23, 2011, thousands of Angelenos joined Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, Councilman Richard
Alarcon, Congressmembers Maxine Waters, Lucille Roybal-Allard, Karen Bass, Laura Richardson, and Judy
Chu, and actor/activists Tim Robbins, Mimi Kennedy, and James Crowell in demonstrating their opposition to
the proposed federal budget cuts. Local filmmaker Tess Cacciatore culled together images from the rally with
photographs depicting the present widespread economic insecurity in America to produce a compelling
seven-minute video entitled "Wake Up, Everybody!" which local activists widely distributed using email,
websites, Facebook and other social media.
83 As part of the Stimulus Act, the State of California received the authority to allocate $381,329,000 in "tax
credit bonds" to municipalities who could then use these sources of low cost debt to leverage private sector
investment in energy efficiency retrofit projects. In August 2010, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously
voted in favor of a resolution approving the issuance of up to $37.7 million in QECB's (out of the $39.8 million
allocation made available by the State). According to Teresa Sanchez, "We started with a portion of the EECBG
formula grant the city received from the DOE. Then we realized we could use a portion of that allocation to do
a bond issue, which is also a part of the stimulus package the qualified energy conservation bond, which we
have a certain allocation the city is allowed to access. We'll leverage that grant money into bond funds and
that's at a subsidized interest rate and we are also exploring public private partnerships. As you know
everyone across the country is figuring out how to make money on this stuff. So we are hoping to attract some
private investment as well. We need to figure out how to measure their savings to roll that into an ongoing
fund."
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original aims to create new jobs for disadvantaged workers and residents of low-income
and other historically marginalized communities in the process of greening city buildings.
Through the summer of 2011, the Advisory Committee drafted formal
recommendations to the City on how it should proceed with a full scale, citywide
implementation of the Green Retrofit and Workforce program (GRAC, 2011). 84 In
particular, they recommended building retrofit and maintenance protocols, workforce
development strategies, and long-term financing options. Their final report expressed
concerns that "[hitherto] efforts have focused on low-hanging fruit-lighting retrofits,
minor HVAC upgrades, and installation or tune up of energy management systems."
Lamenting "the limited scope [that] falls short of the comprehensive building retrofit
program envisioned by the ordinance," they recommended that buildings be analyzed for
deeper energy savings and comprehensive water use audit as well as transition to indoor
air quality management regimes emphasizing green cleaning and maintenance upon
completion of the retrofits. In the area of workforce development, the Advisory Committee
recommended more comprehensive and ongoing training for Green Retrofit workforce
along with negotiation of two major agreements between the City and the LA/OC Building
and Construction Trades Council to establish (1) the Civil Service Apprenticeship, and (2) a
PLA to ensure any jobs outsourced through the Green Retrofit program are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement and provide low-income community members access to
local hire opportunities (GRAC, 2011). Finally, with respect to financing, the Advisory
Committee's recommended that GSD work with Partner Energy along with a subsequently
contracted financial advisor, Justin Morehead of Seslia and Co., to establish a clear work
plan for the 52 buildings (complete with a time line, list of prioritized buildings, and
projected energy and cost savings) and institute a separate account for capturing
monetized savings along with a measurement and verification program to ensure the long-
term success and stability of the program. In what follows, we examine each of these
recommendation areas more closely as well as the general dynamic between GSD and the
Advisory Committee.
84 In part, they were following the letter of the ordinance, which charged them along with the Program
Director and Interdepartmental Task Force with the responsibility of submitting to the City Council and
Mayor for approval a plan to retrofit all city-owned properties that were over 7,500 square feet or built
before 1978 to meet standards of LEED silver or higher.
197
5.9.2 Working with and around the General Services Department
Among the major hurdles involved in deepening the scope of green retrofit work
was the gap between the organizational culture inside the General Services Department
and the holistic and creative thinking called for by the Advisory Committee and Green
Retrofit and Workforce Program more generally. Where the nature of GSD's work was to
manage city owned facilities and equipment, their strength was in consistency and
reliability rather than pushing the envelope or thinking outside the box in any capacity. On
the other hand, the Green Retrofit Advisory Committee consisted of various "trailblazers"
whose myriad specializations included environmentalism, environmental justice, collective
bargaining, community organizing, workforce development, LEED building standards, and
climate change science and policy. Working on a volunteer basis, Advisory committee
members not only attended monthly meetings but also met with council members, city
staff, and other stakeholders on an as needed basis to advance the development of what
they saw as a groundbreaking program at the nexus of sustainability, public health, and
workforce and economic development. Among the unanticipated challenges was that of
getting General Services Department to share their sense of investment and willingness for
experimentation. Jane Paul, the Advisory Council member occupying the environmental
organization seat, conveyed her perspective,
It is difficult to institute new facility practices, to move away from what has
traditionally been done. Instead you could look more deeply and comprehensively at
the whole building - such as the building envelope, daily operations and maintenance
to really make a difference for the building. Ifyou go into a building and only look at
four things, you're only going to come away with four ideas. But ifyou go in and also
think about restoring theflooring, windowfilm... and with that would come a different
culture.
Attempts to contact the General Services Department for comments on the Green Retrofit
and Workforce program failed to generate a response. But Teresa Sanchez remarked on the
challenge of mediating the dynamic between GSD and the Advisory Committee:
I'm still trying to figure that out. GSD has a job to do, they have a certain amount of
money that they have to spend, and that's what they want to do. Part of that's
understandable, because they may not want to be responsible for making a mistake.
Because I worked as the union representative for such a long time and have a
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relationship with thesefolks, I can understand their problems. It's not that they don't
want to do well; they just have other constraints. Then I've got these great GRAC
members who want to do so much, and I have to help them understand what the
constraints are in working with the City so they don't get frustrated and say why are
we here, why are we wasting our time? I'm almost like a translator.
Where the two sides appear to harbor different levels of commitment to the program, a key
factor may have to do with the fact that the Advisory Council is a volunteer group that
chose to participate in the initiative, while the management and staff of the General
Services Department did not necessarily choose to administer the green retrofits of city
buildings.
What might have been done differently to peak the enthusiasm of the latter to the
level of the Advisory Council? Going back to the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and its green
jobs campaign, the focus of policy aims on enacting the ordinance rather than carrying out
the entire Green Retrofit and Workforce program limited relationship building to focus on
labor, environmental, and community organizations along with elected officials and less so
on executing agents such as the General Services Department. As for the Community
Scholars, some of the students met with staff from the General Services Department while
conducting the energy audit of the Vernon Branch Library. However, as consistent with the
objectives of the course, which centered more on a research and advisory capacity rather
than policy implementation, the nature of interaction was transitory and transactional
rather than being part of a long-term strategy of relationship building. Assistant Business
Manager Kim Craft of IBEW Local 11 shared his insights as a participant in the Community
Scholars class as well as the Green Retrofit Advisory Committee on the uneven
understanding of the construction and building maintenance sector as relates to the city.
He commented,
I don't think people in the [Apollo Alliance] really understood how thingsfunctioned or
took place in the city. A lot of the people hadn't dealt with GSD. I had through MOUs.
On a lot of the jobs that were contracted out [by the department], we weren't doing
that work, so we had some adversarial dynamics with GSD. So I understood and knew
going in that it wouldn't go as easily or smoothly as everyone else thought.
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Asked why he failed to actively intervene within the dialogic space of the Community
Scholars class to change the relational dynamics between policy advocates such as the Los
Angeles Apollo Alliance and the General Services Department, Mr. Craft responded,
I would have to be cautious because I didn't want to seem like I was negative and I
didn't want to quell the hopes and aspirations of the younger people in the class who
wanted to think out of the box. It was like, 'look, don't tell us what [we] can't do,'
because no one wants to hear that... Some see obstacles others see opportunities about
how to improve on how things were done in the past. A lot of the young people who
had come through [the university], only a few had bought into the philosophy of the
building trades and organized labor or even knew much about us. Not only did we
have to start and create a program, we had to educate people why it has to be union
jobs, why does labor have to be involved?
In other words, Mr. Craft's past experiences working with the General Services Department
had led to a particular understanding of its construction workforce arrangements that
differed with that of the larger group of Apollo Alliance members and Community Scholars.
At the same time, he was privy to an internal culture within the Community Scholars course
that prioritized positive thinking and inventiveness. He also noticed a sense of ambivalence
on the part of some of the members towards the employment relations and workforce
development models embodied by the building trades and organized labor more generally.
Therefore Mr. Craft felt hesitant to push the dialogic exchange from mutual engagement
towards contradiction, contention, and debate. In the final chapter, we will revisit the
significance of this position, which poses a contrast to the traditional dominance of
organized labor in their partnerships with community organizations and other civil society
actors in the final section. More immediately, Mr. Craft established a working relationship
with the General Services Department in the course of serving on the Advisory Committee,
during which he noticed a positive progression. In June 2012, he acknowledged, "The
leadership of the GSD has come a long way. Before this ordinance was passed and this
committee was formed, GSD pretty much did what they wanted to do, and no one had
influence over what they did. So there's been a lot of improvement on that." At the same
time, he injected a dose of realism, "Sometimes we have to be more aggressive; we have to
apply more pressure here and there. Everyone likes to be nice, but sometimes nice guys
finish last."
200
5.9.3 Setting green retrofit career paths
With respect to the workforce development component, the contract language for
the Civil Service Apprenticeship had been completed in the fall of 2011. The next step was
for a city council member to introduce a motion instructing the personnel department and
other relevant city agencies to operationalize the Civil Service Apprenticeship.
Consequently, two of the Labor Representatives on the Advisory Council, along with
representatives of the LA/OC Building and Construction Trades Council, approached
Councilmember Bernard Parks with a request to introduce the motion. An African
American former police chief now representing the 8th district, which covered a large
portion of South Los Angeles and parts of Watts, the Councilmember Parks, carried a
reputation for allying with downtown growth interests in the city. Consequently he had a
tenuous relationship with many of the environmental, environmental justice, and
community-based organizations on the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance, who often took
oppositional stances on questions of corporate-led economic growth.85 On the other hand,
the building trades, given their more cordial relationship with the councilman's office,
sought to extend him the opportunity to introduce the motion to create the Civil Service
Apprenticeship program, which offered widespread gains among Angelenos. As explained
by Green Retrofit Program Director Teresa Sanchez, "Our allies can have different
relationships with different policy makers, and we can mobilize the coalition to get policy
makers to work as an alliance." Where cultivating council members could help strengthen
relationships over the long term, Green Retrofit and Workforce program advocates were
strategic about dispersing the use of political capital among Apollo Alliance member
organizations.
After almost nine months of inaction on the part of Councilmember Parks' office, the
group decided to ask Councilmember Paul Koretz, chair of the personnel committee and
representative of the 5th District, encompassing the City's West side and parts of he San
Fernando Valley, to introduce the motion. Finally on June 6, 2012, Councilmember Koretz
85 For instance, Council member Bernard Parks helped bring Walmart into the 8th council district and later
opposed a proposed ban to keep a Walmart supercenter out of Inglewood. He also received campaign
donations from the retail giant.
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introduced the motion calling for "the City Administrative Officer and the Department of
Personnel to meet with the Los Angeles and Orange County Building Trades Council and
craft a Letter of Agreement with regard to the establishment of a Civil Service
Apprenticeship program and procedures" (City of Los Angeles, 2012). As part of the
agreement, the City would be authorized to utilize the services of building trades
apprentices along with journey level workers on maintenance and operations work on its
facilities. Among the bases was to "offer and create pathways for local residents desiring
entry into a skilled career with the City of Los Angeles" as well as "facilitate significant cost
savings not currently being realized" (Ibid.).
Earlier in the year, Teresa Sanchez and the Advisory Committee members had
arranged an orientation for green retrofit trainees to gain a more in depth understanding of
building trades apprenticeships. Kim Craft described the "open house," which took place at
the IBEW Local 11's Electrical Training Center in the City of Commerce, "We had all the
different building trades come over and do presentations, an all day event, 'this is what our
apprenticeship program is all about,' to see if the original group of forty would be
interested in moving in to the different bldg. trades. Some of the problems you have with
that, there are minimum requirements for different building trades." He specifically
referred to the requirement for a high school diploma and one year of algebra or
equivalent. Mr. Craft also spoke to challenges posed by older aged workers, stating:
It was amazing; a lot of people who came here said, 'my son, my daughter... now that
I'm familiar, I would love to get them into it, but I'm at a point in my career where I
don't have the time or energy to put into it.' I think GSD will do a parallel position [to
the civil service apprenticeships]; I don't think that out of the 40, even 25 percent will
move into the building trades. A lot of them are older, and when they look at the
physical aspects of the work, they want to work maintenance, and don't want to work
construction.
Jason Elias, Regional Coordinator at SEIU 721 and now Green Retrofit Advisory Committee
member affirmed, "This program is good but we only created 40 jobs and 20 are going back
to their old jobs." As it turned out, GSD restored twenty civil service occupations, and
Teresa Sanchez and Jason Elias met with the green retrofit workers to offer the option of
returning to their old jobs, which half accepted. He added,
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Teresa and I realized that we allowed management to choose the people to go into the
program, and they bullied a lot of people to go into the program without giving
thought to who were the most qualified or likely to succeed. Management said, 'You'll
get laid off if you don't take it.' And some of the workers were already vocational
workers, and they didn't have a choice... they needed to move some folks out and into
this program to mitigate the layoffs. The problem was the way they did it. The top said,
'Just find me some people.' It funneled down, 'You have to go to this program or you'll
be laid off' instead of, 'Who is interested?' So out of the people we got, about half of
them were ready to go to a craft job.
Hence the green retrofit trainees might have completed applications and interview
processes after receiving solicitation from management, but this was a fundamentally
different mode of engagement than one beginning with active interest and consideration on
the part of applicants. The warning signals initially appeared during the Green Retrofit
Career Academy when the General Services Department haphazardly handled worker
reassignment towards the end of the training. However, the newfound energy and
commitments radiating from the completion of the popular education module together
with the continuing momentum of the Green Retrofit Program, despite its deviance from
the original plan, partially muted signs of trouble. With the consequences of the selection
and hiring process much more apparent, the task now was to ensure that the twenty
remaining workers entered Civil Service Apprenticeships. According to Teresa Sanchez, the
reduction of the Green Retrofit workforce was, in some ways, a "blessing in disguise," as
she doubted that the program could support more than 20 full time Civil Service
Apprenticeship positions at the current stage. Next steps would include the General
Services Department deriving a schedule of continued manpower with respect to green
retrofit work and ensuring that apprentices have adequate hours of work along with a well
rounded training experience to successfully complete the apprenticeship program. A
critical piece of that would be implementing green retrofits at a deeper scope and broader
scale.
The final component of the initiative's workforce development framework had to do
with instituting a Project Labor Agreement to cover green retrofit work outsourced by GSD
in areas of lacking in-house capacity. Recently, the Public Works Department had adopted a
PLA modeled after the landmark CRA/LA Construction Careers and Project Stabilization
Policy. The policy compelled publicly subsidized developers and contractors on projects
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exceeding a certain threshold to partner with the Building Trades Council and community-
based organizations to ensure projects get completed in a timely and economical manner
and create jobs for members of surrounding low-income and other historically
marginalized communities. Where GSD projects including the green retrofits were smaller
in size, the plan was to execute projects in aggregates of 25 to exceed the minimum size and
budget threshold to warrant a PLA under the discretion of the Board of Public Works. In
addition to the challenge of raising more funds was that of gaining buy in on the part of GSD
management. As described by Kim Craft,
We've been in several conversations, and we're running into opposition with the GSD
structure. One of the problems in GSD is that they have people controlling the
contracting and are not used to having anybody monitor them. Now we're saying there
should be a PLA and that the board of public works should monitor those projects.
Then comes in compliance; they have to pay a certain level of wages and benefits. So
they say are saying, 'if it comes in on time and on budget why do we have to do all this
other stuff? We don't want to get into it, we never had to.' It's the middle managers
right now, because that's where the buck stops. The people at the top are told this is
whatyou have to do. And middle management says we have all these restrictions, and
all these relationships we've established, here's all these reasons why it won't work for
us.
Again citing the organizational culture of GSD as a barrier to the program's advancement,
Mr. Craft highlighted the importance of balancing education with more coercive measures
to help managers conduct their work to as a public service and maximize the "true benefit
to the community." He posed the following questions as a guiding post for GSD, "Did we in
fact expand a service to the community by building this? Yes we did. Did we benefit by
putting people in the community to work? No. But under this new ordinance we suggest
you are responsible for that." Beyond arguing on the basis of political correctness, Mr. Craft
assured that the Advisory Committee was pursuing the channel of political demands.
.5.9.4 Long-term financing
In the area of project financing, the City Council first issued a resolution to approve a
plan of issuance for Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds around the start of the Green
Retrofit and Career Academy. Following, the City hired Partner Energy, which
recommended an initial issuance of about $12 million in QECB to retrofit a set of 52
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buildings that would guarantee energy savings of at least 20 percent. With the bond
issuance finally complete in December 2011, the City immediately sold $12 million in QECB
to Wells Fargo. At the same time, the General Services Department looked to the Los
Angeles County to help implement a measurement verification system to meet QECB
criteria as well as demonstrate program viability to potential private sector investors. In an
effort to define major areas of energy use and improve energy management, the County
had launched the Enterprise Energy Management Information System (EEMIS) project in
the late 2000. Now the City of Los Angeles obtained contract agreement from the County to
incorporate the former's building stock into the EEMIS system for a set fee.
In addition to measurement and verification, the Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program required a revolving loan fund in which to deposit monetized energy savings in
order to finance citywide retrofits beyond the first two phases supported by ARRA dollars.
Following the sales of the QECB, the Program Director and Advisory Committee learned of
a program run through the California Public Utilities (CPU) Commission based on the
public goods charge that would enable issuance of an additional $27 million in bonds.
Submitting an application in the summer 2012, the group waited to hear back from the CPU
Commission on whether they might immediately qualify for an additional $3 to 5 million in
funds over the next fiscal year. Either way, the revolving loan fund would enable monetized
savings to feed back into future retrofits as explained by Teresa Sanchez,
The idea is you wall off a certain amount of money, you generate money in a certain
way and you try to separate it out so it can be used for a specific purpose. Otherwise
the problem you face is as you generate savings in dollars, that money would go back
to the generalfund, just cutting down what we have to pay in utilities. But we want to
generate the savings and actually fund future investment, which is why we set it up
that way.
With dozens of Special Revenue Funds already existing in the city for various other
projects, the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program could build on a number of helpful
precedents including an existing energy efficiency and water conservation fund set up for
the Department of Water and Power. Instructed by a city council motion, GSD staff worked
with the city attorney to prepare an amendment that would restructure the fund to receive
monetized savings through the Green Retrofit program to receive city council vote in
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August 2012. Given the broader context of economic recession and public budget deficit,
Kim Craft again maintained a pragmatic stance,
I don't believe the city political system will allow all the funds generated to go back
into the fund. But give us 50 or 60 percent of it. I think 100 percent ought to go back,
but in the real world they won't give us 100 percent of anything. The [deputy mayors]
will have to get in there. They have the biggest clout with the mayor's office and city
council. You'll need one of them to really push to say, 'Hey, if we really want to give this
thing the opportunity it deserves, 100 percent of thefunds need to go back.'
Teresa Sanchez was more optimistic particularly in light of the fact that the initial
monetized energy savings would be no more than thousands of dollars as to temper
incentives to divert their flow away from the special revenue fund. She also expressed
confidence in Councilmember Paul Krekorian, the new chair of the budget and finance
committee, who had a record of supporting progressive policy initiatives. As for Deputy
Mayor Larry Frank, he related a stance of combined optimism and pragmatism:
It's a very powerful argument to say this is a one-time opportunity to create the
infrastructure for us to actually save residents money in terms of energy efficiency, and
if we walk from the special revenue fund, we probably walk away from the program.
It's a chance to take a one-time fund and turn it into permanent benefitfor the city of
LA. If the economy starts coming back, it's the perfect time to create the special
revenue fund. But the deeper question is whether we can convince all the critics that
the savings are there. So having the pieces in place to do so is in my mind an even
deeper question. That question will go before council, but they have the perfect
person- we are working with the council member-of the 10th district, who happens to
be the president of the city council, in developing this. So it's perfectly positioned as it
could be.
Besides connecting the special revenue fund back to the measurement and verification
system as different pieces of the same puzzle, he also spoke to the role of the Program
Director in ensuring the program's sustainability past the expiration of Villaraigosa's
mayoral term. He stated, "Having Teresa [Sanchez] is the key to continuity. I'm gone in a
year. The council president is here till 2019, which is very fortunate. Teresa could survive
the transition, because she's paid off the mayor's general fund. She's not on the mayor's
general fund." Simultaneously, the Advisory Committee and Program Director also
explored the prospect of hiring a designated staff person to ensure deeper financial
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expertise in monitoring the monetization of energy savings and manage the Special
Revenue Fund.
5.9.5 The Los Angeles Apollo Alliance
Lastly, SCOPE and the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance continued to see an evolving role
with respect to the green jobs campaign and enactment of the Green Retrofit and
Workforce Development ordinance. Upon transitioning into a support role in the
implementation of the ordinance, they continued to convene on a monthly basis. On these
occasions, SCOPE delivered regular reports on the status of the Green Retrofit and
Workforce program and holding "educationals" on various issues related to progressive
movement building and other overlapping longer-term objectives. Green Retrofit Advisory
Council member Jane Paul described the division of labor and coordination of efforts
between official policy leaders (i.e. Program Director and Advisory Committee) and alliance
members, "We've been working with the Apollo Alliance to look at communications,
education, and outreach around the green retrofits. We want to raise the visibility of the
program, build people's understanding and knowledge around it. We're working on a one
pager that the member organizations can put in their newsletters about the program." In
other words, where widespread public awareness and support of the program stood to
advance the program in its current stage, the coalition began with its constituent base in
working towards such an outcome.
Teresa Sanchez explained the compelling nature of the community engagement
model at the heart of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program,
You don't see too many programs in the city where you have an outside constituency
for a program, especially not something like this. In community development, for
example, there are programs in the non-profit sector and they have a community
constituency. But [elected officials are] definitely not used to something like this. Here
they're not getting any money. They're the organizers saying we wantyou-the City-
to do something for the city. So it's not a patronage model at all. With the elected
officials, they see their constituency demanding something but it's not in the context of
an electoral campaign per say or any kind of quid pro quo. It's more of a 'we're
expecting you as city leaders to do something to benefit the create jobs and
environmental benefitsfor the community.' So when we need to have a council meeting
or a meeting with the mayor, it's very helpful to be able to call the troops who say this
is what we want, this is what we need-to be able to show community support.
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In other words, the fact that civil society groups were proactively framing a community-
based green economic development model as opposed to demanding social programs or
other political patronage enhanced the program's appeal to elected officials. As for the
Green Retrofit Program Director and the Advisory Committee, their ability to mobilize
community presence at public events and hold city agencies and leaders democratically
accountable translated into significant social and political capital in the policy realm where
they otherwise lacked the upper hand. For instance, on February 7, 2012, SCOPE organized
a Lobby Day where some of its members approached City Council members to underscore
the importance of creating a Special Revenue Fund for the sustenance of the Green Retrofit
and Workforce program and broader aim of job creation, environmental improvement, and
economic development particularly in low-income and other historically marginalized
communities. Following, the actual drafting of the ordinance claimed additional
"bureaucratic time," complete with back and forth between the program advocates and
various city agencies about the portion of cost savings due to accrue in the allotted fund as
opposed to the city's general fund (still ongoing at the time of this writing). At the same
time, if there was any question as to whether the passage of the ordinance appeased the
Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and anybody was left to follow policy discussions on policy
details as specific as the Special Revenue Fund for energy savings on retrofitted public
buildings, Lobby Day eliminated potential ambiguities; policy makers could be sure that at
the least, many of their constituents in South Los Angeles, were watching.
As for SCOPE, it maintained its commitment to advancing the Green Retrofit
program while also pursuing broader organizational directions. Elsa Barbosa stated,
In terms of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the direction we're going into, one is
again still having in front of us the larger vision of the Green Retrofit program in large
scale as an economic engine for unionized jobs and entry level jobs for community
people. So that's on the horizon. What's also on the horizon is that at the end of the
day, there is also a feeling in terms of resources, that we could pass all the policies we
want but there are less and less resources available to put these policies into place. So
we really want to update our regional analysis as well as start to expand our thinking
around the green economy and public investment to try and shape a future campaign
that would strike at both the green economy as well as tax andfiscal reform.
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She elaborated on the connection between the organization's economic program and
newfound commitment to tax and fiscal reform:
What's great is that the innovative financing strategiesfor the Green Retrofit program
is a possibility, but if we didn't have the federal stimulus dollars and this new market
that still needs to be shaped, then there is no money, and in fact there is going to be
less and less money when it comes to city, county, and state budgets. So it's something
we really need to do, something about taxes, bringing more revenue into cities and
states. It's no longer the case that the money's there and being put somewhere else.
There really are less and less resources for the kind of changes that we'd like to make.
In particular, SCOPE aimed to organize a statewide alliance to undo proposition 13, partly
by mobilizing 30,000 low-income voter households in Greater South Los Angeles, which
they had completed over a period of a year and half from 2010. Rather than viewing the tax
and fiscal reform as a departure or progression from its economic program, SCOPE
approached it as a foundational component of its ongoing work to restructure the local and
regional economy. Likewise, green retrofits was just one iteration of coalition building,
collective problem solving, and attempts to improve democratic accountability and control
around economic policy and planning of which more would follow. In the words of Ms.
Barbosa,
LA is a large urban city. It has a huge building stock. So that's why we've engaged
around energy efficiency. I don't think that just in and of itself, energy efficiency can
automatically be good paying jobs, an economic engine, etc. As we've seen in other
cities, it can be short term work, work for a smaller number of people than we'd really
like. But the potential is there. We certainly did not plan to and we won't always do
that. We will certainly move onto other potential areas, whether that's green
manufacturing, renewable energy... but we're not, we just didn't come together on the
energy efficiency tip.
For SCOPE, energy efficiency was just the tip of the iceberg.
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion
In this final chapter, we draw out theoretical and practical implications from our
comparative case studies on the potentials of economic democracy as a "recipe for
collective problem solving" in the economic sphere (Briggs, 2008; Dewey, [1927]1954).
Various planning scholars have put forth the idea of building progressive civil society
capacity in the economic sphere to broaden stakeholder control and accountability of
capitalist markets. Management scholars like Michael Porter and Mark Kramer have also
proposed "the big idea" of reinventing capitalism to create "economic value in a way that
also creates value for society by addressing its needs and challenges" (Porter and Kramer,
2011). Below, I list elements of their conceptual framework as a point of reference before
offering a critique based on the empirical evidence from my case studies. Following, I build
on DuBois' notion of double consciousness and Bakhtin's formulations on dialogic
exchange as well as draw from the case studies to lay out an alternative theoretical formula
for shared value creation that focalizes the perspectives and experiences of inner city
communities of color and considers terms of shared governance and collective problem
solving as well as issues of program longevity and scale.
6.1 Reinventing capitalism through shared value creation
6.1.1 Porter and Kramer's "big idea"
According to Porter and Kramer, "business is caught in a vicious circle" in that it
approaches "value creation narrowly, optimizing short-term financial performance in a
bubble while missing the most important customer needs and ignoring the broader
influences that determine their longer term success" (Porter and Kramer, 2011, p. 4).
Negative ramifications include compromised customer wellbeing, depletion of essential
natural resources and key suppliers, and economic distress of communities in which they
produce and sell. In turn, they advocate a solution that "lies in the principle of shared value,
which involves creating economic value in a way that also creates value for society by
addressing its needs and challenges" (Ibid.). They see three distinct ways to create shared
value, the first related to reconceiving products and markets to penetrate not only
developing countries but also poor urban areas in advanced economies, where the
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concentration of purchasing power offers substantial profit potential for companies. The
second has to do with redefining productivity in the value chain, which might entail
reexamining energy use and logistics, resource use, procurement practices, distribution
models, employment and work arrangements, and corporate locational policies. The final
component of shared value creation centers on building supportive industry clusters or
geographic concentrations of firms, related businesses, suppliers, service providers, and
logistical infrastructure. Each of these strategies "represents a new way of understanding
customers, productivity, and the external influences on corporate success. It highlights the
immense human needs to be met, the large new markets to serve, and the internal costs of
social and community deficits-as well as the competitive advances available from
addressing them" (Ibid., p. 15). Hence the co-authors outline an approach to capitalism that
appears to share some overlap with the modes of green economic and workforce
development embodied by the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and Los Angeles Green
Retrofit and Workforce Program in being long term, holistic, and socially and spatially
embedded. A final point of convergence has to do with their observation that innovation
often comes from the margins of society, Porter and Kramer noting, "Ironically, many of the
shared value pioneers have been those with more-limited resources- social entrepreneurs
and companies in developing countries. These outsiders have been able to see the
opportunities more clearly" (Ibid.). 86
A major point of divergence has to do with their conceptualization of the division of
labor and needed commitments on the part of business, which remains steeped in
philosophical liberalism. Acknowledging the importance of multi-sector partnership to
shared value creation, the scholars state, "The most successful cluster development
programs are ones that involve collaboration within the private sector, as well as trade
associations, government agencies, and NGOs" (Ibid., p. 4). Yet they also uphold the premise
of private sector primacy in asserting, "Companies must take the lead in bringing business
and society back together" (Ibid.). Where governments and NGOs purportedly "see success
solely in terms of the benefits achieved or the money expended" (Ibid.), they prescribe an
86 While they fail to delve any further, such observations interestingly accord with the notion of double
consciousness, or the capacity of marginalized groups to perceive multiple facets of a system including its
limits and constraints by virtue of experiencing their reality through their own eyes as well as being
conscious of the perspective of the dominant group.
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alternative whereby the former promote "well functioning markets" by highlighting
societal objectives and creating a level planning field for companies and the latter handles
"precompetitive issues" or the "softer" side of economic development work such as
improving public education, reducing gender or racial discrimination, upgrading
transportation infrastructure, and alleviating poverty as to boost the productivity of a
cluster or location. They also envision "forward thinking foundations" serving the role of
"honest brokers" that "mitigate power imbalances between small local enterprises, NGOs,
governments, and companies (Ibid., p. 13). In addressing an ostensibly hard-hitting
audience largely based out of business schools, they assure that "there is nothing soft
about the concept of shared value" (Ibid., p. 17), at least not for the business side of
collaborative partnerships. Further, their conception of shared value creation does not
require reexamination of personal values as they relate to market exchange and production
or redistribution of "the value already created by firms." Rather it simply entails expanding
the size of the pie, with companies absorbing profit increases and government and civil
society benefiting from the positive externalities (Ibid., p. 5). While Porter and Kramer
make passing reference to the power imbalances and oppositional interests at play in
developmental politics, they pay less attention to practical dilemmas such as to what extent
the co-production of economic value can render truly "shared" value if business remains in
the driving seat with government and civil society organizations relegated to support roles.
They further neglect the question of how corporations and communities might overcome
historically contentious dynamics and find common cause without working through
divergent values or issues of redistribution.
In short, Porter and Kramer move beyond the narrow limits posed by neoclassical
theory and related premises of the invisible hand of the market and methodological
individualism in contemplating the interrelations between corporate profits and social well
being and prescribing multi-sector collaboration around creating shared value in the form
of economic success and social progress. Still, their formulation on the ingredients and
procedures for collaborative partnership formation, while potentially lending itself to buy-
in from private sector interests by minimizing inconveniences, comes across as short on
logical consistency and practical effectiveness. Aside from overlooking the importance of
sharing power and working through divergent values and issues of redistribution, they
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approach the task of creating shared value with a sort of means-ends rationality premised
upon a process-outcome dualism that assumes that the methodical deployment of certain
inputs on the part of business will yield pre-set goals. Meanwhile, they consign the actual
process by which actors might forge collaborative partnerships and pursue shared value
creation to a black box. In what follows, I look to my case studies to illuminate the different
conditions and collective resources driving co-creation of shared value among
collaborative partners. Simply stated, a combination of field and organizational level
conditions, manifested as problematic situations; individual-level biographical and
situational factors; and available resources, appear to shape actors preferences and their
"ends in view" rather than the latter prefiguring the use of efficient means. In particular,
many of the field and organizational level conditions enabling agency grow out of historical
contingencies specific to a place including the particular trajectory of capitalist
urbanization and economic development as well as oppositional struggles as to underscore
the importance of understanding local history and institutional context. This in turn raises
the question of whether companies truly have what it takes to lead shared value creation,
which I explore more extensively by focusing on the varieties of capital deployed in the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and LA Green Retrofit and Workforce Program. On the
flipside, the deficiencies of business highlight the value-add on the part of civil society
actors with respect to driving economic projects that align successful economic and
workforce development with social progress.
6.1.2 Multi-level conditions enabling agency
Whether in Cleveland or Los Angeles, many of the participants in the respective
programs derived a sense of agency from problematic circumstances where routines no
longer sufficed and so, required reflection, creativity, and adaption. In Cleveland, anchor
institutions like University Hospitals felt compelled to participate in the improvement of
the surrounding neighborhoods in order to recruit and retain staff members, who brought
demands for public safety, urban livability/local housing, public transportation, and
environmental sustainability. They also faced legislative mandates related to health care
reform, which required greater attention to community benefits provided by publicly
subsidized institutions. As for the City of Cleveland, it grappled with the shortcomings of
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the privatist economic development model in terms of the high rates of poverty,
unemployment, and crime prevailing in many of it's neighborhoods, while the pockets of
economic progress and prosperity in the downtown and University Circle areas sustained a
base of commuters, who spent their money in the outlying suburbs where they resided.
Moreover, its participation in the Green Cities movement brought questions about how to
institutionalize sustainability with respect to the economy and shared wealth generation.
Like some of the largest anchor institutions in University Circle, the Cleveland Foundation
received a new executive director who restructured the organization's approach to grant
making and program administration. In addition, its accomplishments in reviving
Cleveland's downtown, stimulating the development of the local biomedical technology
sector, and improving the city's cultural and education institutions stood in stark contrast
to the economic and social crises faced by the east side neighborhoods. Where the
foundation had invested in affordable housing production in the area over several decades,
the housing and financial crisis had wiped out much of the gains, in turn underscoring the
need for an alternative approach to individual and community asset building. Finally, the
Democracy Collaborative had recently emerged from a conference with the Aspen Institute
with a charge to find practical applications for their anchor procurement/community
wealth building strategies.
In Los Angeles, the building trades came to the Apollo Alliance and resultant Green
Retrofit and Workforce Program in the midst of the economic recession, which had
especially negative impacts on Southern California's construction sector. But more
generally, many of the building trades unions were exploring comprehensive market
recovery and expansion strategies after falling victim to an employer-led anti-union
offensive in the early 1970s and losing significant union density, especially in the
residential sector (Milkman 2006: 92-93). While reluctant to speak directly to their
troubled histories of racial exclusion, they also struggled with the resulting problem of
declining membership as to require new approaches to member recruitment and retention.
Many of the environmental justice organizations also worried about the economic
recession and general trend of blue-collar job loss in LA's inner city as to reconsider their
traditional approaches of trying to shut down polluting industries and instead clean up
polluters and create green jobs. As for environmental organizations like the Sierra Club,
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they faced similar circumstances as the building trades in terms of declining organizational
relevance and power as a result of their aging white male membership, in this case
predominantly middle class, in a broader context of shifting demographics. The prevailing
culture and campaign foci further discouraged communities of color from joining the
organization. In the case of policy research and advocacy organizations like SCOPE, LAANE,
and CCA, the emergence of the national green collar jobs movement and temporary
availability of state, federal, and foundation funds for innovative planning and program
development, particularly around energy efficiency, helped rupture organizational routines
and peak their interest in operationalizing models of green retrofits and workforce
development. The relatively abstract and theoretical nature of discussions within national
progressive policy and planning networks regarding green jobs, along with the relative
openness of policy structures, further cemented their desires to get at the forefront of
defining green economic and workforce development standards and practices. Similarly,
SEIU 721 converged on the green economy in following policy discourse and trends around
expanding public sector employment and creating career paths for unskilled entry-level
jobs amidst continuing privatization and public budget deficit. The City Jobs Program
having created the vocational worker classification, the question now was how to create
linkages to formal job training and promotion opportunities in the area of construction and
building maintenance.
Aside from problematic circumstances and other situational imperatives
confronting their organizations, many of the interviewees referred to biographical factors
as shaping their predisposition towards alternative economic development initiatives like
the Evergreen Cooperatives and the LA Green Retrofit program. In Cleveland, India Pierce
Lee had a formative experience during her time working with the city's Empowerment
Zone in which she realized the minimal amount of gains accruing to the community from
corporate subsidies for job creation in the inner city. Steve Standley of University Hospitals
spoke of his dual identity as an artist and the fact that he had worked his way up in coming
from a working class family as shaping his commitment to racial inclusion in the politics of
job creation and distribution. As for longstanding Cleveland residents like Mayor Frank
Jackson and Medrick Addison of Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, they remarked on their
deep ties to the inner city Cleveland neighborhoods in which they grew up and their desire
215
to see their regeneration. Ted Howard, on the other hand, traced his engagement in the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and interest in community wealth building strategies
more generally back to his upbringing in Southern California where he gained hard lessons
about "corporate loyalty" while growing up in a working class family to become involved in
the open housing ballot campaign, antiwar movement, and a project about workplace
democracy. For John Logue and Gar Alperovitz, witnessing the closing of the Youngstown
Sheet and Tube steel mill in 1977 and its devastating effects on the city and its residents
left a deep impression that carried over into their work with the Ohio Employee Ownership
Center and Democracy Collaborative respectively. Hence for many of the above actors,
cities not only formed the backdrop of their biographical trajectories but also gave rise to
place-based attachments and commitments, which fueled their desire to improve urban
environments and their political economies. Moreover, for Ted Howard, John Logue, and
Gar Alperovitz, the university provided a setting to crystallize insights and lessons about
the hazards of laissez faire capitalism gained from definitive personal and professional
experiences and in turn build learning communities and networks to deepen and broaden
the potential for transformative policy and planning initiatives.
In Los Angeles, Mike Massey of PIPE identified as a major milestone in his
movement towards collaborative partnerships with nontraditional allies a series of seminal
experiences during the 1970s in which his union membership suffered betrayal at the
hands of employer organizations after partnering with them against environmentalists.
Kim Craft also touched on his personal background in explaining his participation in the
Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and promoting racial inclusion in the building trades more
generally. He referred to his upbringing in the coal mining hills of West Virginia, the forging
of interracial bonds with fellow soldiers while in the military service, and the barriers
posed by intra-union nepotism as he tried to join the building trades. Even after becoming
involved with the Green Retrofit program, he experienced an inspirational moment while
hearing an inner city youth speak at Dorsey High School about the need for viable work
opportunities among his peers and in his community. Similarly, SEIU 721's Jason Elias
traced his involvement in labor organizing, social movement building, and progressive
policy advocacy back to formative experiences growing up in a working class household in
LA's San Fernando Valley. In his case, attending a humanities high school and learning to
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think critically, as well as finding solace in a multiracial group of friends sharing
experiences of social marginality with respect to the dominant white majority, enabled him
to make the most of his teen years in what he found to be an "urban wasteland." He further
referred to student activism during his undergraduate years at UC Berkeley and graduate
studies in Michigan along with experience in community organizing as important events in
his personal and professional development. Likewise, LAANE's Cynthia Strathmann's early
insights on the structure of class stratification in the United States enabled her to see the
contradictions of individualist cultural ideology about hard work sowing economic
rewards, while her shifting racial status illuminated the inherent transience of social
categories and structures. She, Jason Elias, and Teresa Sanchez all spoke to a particular
quality about Los Angeles as a major urban node that brought together diverse people with
rich life experiences and enabled them to affirm their respective observations about the
falsity of dominant narratives about economic development and income and wealth
distribution and in turn co-create alternative policy and planning discourses as well as
related practical initiatives.
6.1.3 Varieties of capital and their uses
If problematic circumstances broke organizational routines and situational factors
and biographical trajectories predisposed individuals to supporting such initiatives, the
Cleveland Foundation and SCOPE, given their location within intervening spaces between
various sectors and issue areas, were essential to bridging different organizational
circumstances and biographical trajectories and establishing common cause among various
stakeholders. Both organizations received wide recognition as honest brokers, the
Foundation, from the private and public sector as well as civil society actors, and SCOPE,
from community, environmental, and labor organizations along with elected officials. Their
reputations followed a proven record of effective participation and leadership in coalitional
work, the former having provided financial administrative stewardship to wealthy donors
and convened high profile business interests around urban remaking projects over
numerous decades. As for SCOPE, their leadership in the form of extensive community
organizing and base building along with coalition building was integral to the success of the
City Jobs Program and comparable broad-based sectoral initiatives aimed at creating living
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wage jobs and career paths in the health care and entertainment industries. It also helped
that in the course of past policy initiatives, SCOPE had established a good working
relationship with Council President Garcetti and Councilmember Wesson in addition to
building an impressive network of inner city residents and voters ready to conduct door to
door outreach in their neighborhoods, make phone calls to elected officials, and attend
council meetings and other public events. Consequently the Cleveland Foundation played a
pivotal role in bringing together the anchor institutions of University Circle with the City of
Cleveland, community development and employee ownership practitioners, and university-
based policy innovation centers like the OEOC and Democracy Collaborative. In Los
Angeles, Vanna Tran of Worker Education and Resource Center, Inc. (WERC), Nona Randois
of the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (LAFLA), Bill Gallegos of Communities for a
Better Environment (CBE) attributed their initial involvement in the Los Angeles Apollo
Alliance to their longstanding relationship with SCOPE. Hence both wielded considerable
amounts of what Pierre Bourdieu calls "symbolic capital," referring to the "positive
recognition, esteem, or honor by relevant actors within the field" (Emirbayer and Johnson
2008: 12).87
On a more practical level, the Cleveland Foundation and SCOPE thoughtfully
convened disparate organizational actors under a concrete agenda of working together on
a mutually beneficial project, which would be collectively determined upon further
research, discussion, and negotiation. In the first year of the Greater University Circle
Initiative, the Cleveland Foundation convened the anchor institutions on a quarterly basis
to coordinate physical expansion and improvement projects. In the process, the partners
87 Bourdieu generally distinguishes between four forms of capital- economic, social, cultural, and symbolic.
The first two concepts are perhaps the most conventionally used, economic capital having to do with the
command over economic resources such as finance capital, and social capital referring to "the sum of the
resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 119)." (Joas and Knobl 2006: 387). On the other hand, Bourdieu evokes the term cultural
capital to refer to attitudes, knowledge, and other markers of bearing or advantage obtained by actors
through earlier processes of socialization. Cultural capital comes in three forms: embodied as long-lasting
dispositions of the mind and body, objectified in the form of cultural goods such as books and machines, and
institutionalized as academic qualifications or certificates of competence. Finally, symbolic capital is
"something of a generic term emerging from the interplay of the economic, social, and cultural types of
capital; all three 'original' capital types lay the foundations for an individual's overall standing, good
reputation, renown and prestige in society, thus determining his place in the hierarchy" (Joas and Knobl
2008: 379).
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gradually established mutual trust and rapport in addition to a shared understanding of the
conditions in the surrounding neighborhoods and purpose as far as finding additional
crosscutting issues around which to collaborate. In Los Angeles, SCOPE/LA also spent
about a year investigating strategies for green economic and workforce development and
connecting low-income communities of color to green jobs and career pathways as well as
meeting with potential partners to explore potential synergies with respect to issue or
problem areas, target demographics, theories of change, and collaborative dynamics.
These leading organizations additionally drew upon their extensive knowledge of
local institutional structures and politics to selectively summon the leadership of particular
partner organizations and the varieties of capital at the disposal of their respective
coalitions according to the stage of the program. In the LA case, SCOPE realized the
tendency for "symbolic authority often (but by no means always) [to attach] to the most
venerable establishments within the field rather than to the newcomers, challengers, or
upstarts" (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008, p. 12). Therefore, while preparing for the policy
campaign, they approached the Sierra Club to join the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and
thereby put its lengthy tenure and overwhelmingly professional white male membership in
the service of tempering potential suspicions among elected officials and other key decision
makers that might derive from the trailblazing nature of the initiative. In describing the
underlying process, Byron Gudiel stated, "The Apollo Alliance needed the name of a
mainstream organization. We lent the name and reputation and support." SCOPE further
invited the participation of the building trades unions, which were adept at preparing entry
level workers for lifetime careers through pre-apprenticeship and apprenticeship
programs and providing opportunities for journey level workers (Weil 2005). Still, where
the building trades stirred controversy in majority minority districts around Los Angeles
given their history of racial exclusion, the presence of partner community-based
organizations claimed greater public trust with respect to the prospect of generating gains
for residents of low-income communities surrounding green retrofit projects. Building
trades members such as Kim Craft of IBEW Local 11 referred to a previous campaign for
the CRA/LA Construction Careers and Project Stabilization Policy, which testified to the
complementarity and prospect for mutual gains inherent in forging a collaborative
relationship with community-based organizations. He recalled,
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We were at the CRA, [and our community partners] had 50 ministers from all over
South LA get up and say why we ought to have project labor agreements because
people need not just jobs but good quality careers. And what we've done, the building
trades as a whole got together and said any project we do in LA County under a PLA,
we willguarantee at least 30 percent local hirefrom that direct community.
In this case, community-based organizations were not only effective at convincing elected
officials and other decision makers to enact the PLA complete with a Local Hiring
Agreement but also left a deep impression on labor partners. This is not to say that the
unions did not bring their own social capital to the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance. In the
words of Bill Gallegos of Communities for a Better Environment, "They have a lot of
members, resources, and political influence. So they can be very decisive in a campaign at
the city or county or even statewide level. They can be a really decisive force for change. So
we see them as an important sector to build relationships with." Beyond the building
trades, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor was also a valuable political ally, the
organization's Economic Development Director John Choi stating:
Everything that we're able to do in terms of policy is generated from the political capital
that we have through our political program. In terms of electing folks into offce, we run
member programs where we have outreach to our existing union members throughout the
county, and we also do programs for the general public. We have an infrastructure, a
well refined and structured political program. We have the ability to make calls, raise
money, knock on doors, send out mail.. .because of all these things, we are able to
effectively reach out to and work with elected officials. So that gives us an ability to at
least get meetings.
In Cleveland, the Cleveland Foundation harnessed the status of the OEOC and Democracy
Collaborative as outsiders and "neutral" observers related to their base outside of
Cleveland in universities. In affording them an appearance of objectivity and rationality,
these qualities enhanced the responsiveness of the various stakeholders to the community
wealth building roundtable along with the pre-assessment, pre-feasibility, and market
assessment studies. In addition, they leveraged the financial capacity of University Circle
anchor institutions as embodied by their annual purchasing and procurement expenditures
to develop a strategy of import replacement, creating livable jobs, and community wealth
building. The Foundation further built upon the existing Neighborhood Connections
program, with relationships to community groups, to deepen and expand their community
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engagement strategy. Similar to the OEOC and Democracy Collaborative, UCLA Community
Scholars Program and the Construction Careers Academy at the Labor Center lent the LA
Apollo Alliance and their green jobs campaign, mostly through their affiliation with UCLA, a
renowned institution of higher learning and scholarly research. The university affiliation
and tendency to maintain an arms length distance from community organizing activities
(i.e. marginal field location) set LOSH and the UCLA Labor Center apart from the other
members of the Apollo Alliance. In part, this allowed them to uniquely further the
progressive policy campaign by providing research and policy analysis, spelling out
program details, and gaining buy-in from stakeholders under the guise of technical
neutrality.
Among the key difference between the uses of capital in the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative and the LA Green Retrofit and Workforce program, one had to do with the
orientation towards the private sector. Given their extensive experience setting urban
policy and economic development agendas in Cleveland (i.e. urban renewal, incubation of
the local bio-medical tech hub), the Foundation incorporated business professionals and
key institutional administrators into their coalition from the very beginning. At its core, the
Greater University Initiative was predicated on the notion of leveraging a series of physical
development projects (totaling billions of dollars) by private and not-for-profit anchor
institutions to develop catalytic strategies for the improvement of the surrounding
neighborhoods. Hence a critical ingredient was the financial resources at the disposal of
Cleveland's largest and most enduring organizations, the driving question being how to
create more integration between and Cleveland's best-resourced corporate or
organizational citizens and most marginalized communities. The Cleveland Foundation
additionally convened community development and employee ownership professionals in
the community wealth building roundtable to cull their expertise in the service of the
"economic inclusion" strategy. Following, they continued to bring in experienced business
professionals (e.g. Jim Anderson, Steve Kiel, Mary Ann Stropkay, Ron Jones, Robert Sorin,
Cliff Wood, Mary Donnell) to spearhead tasks including market assessment, business
planning, and operations management. While these "hired guns" temporarily lead the
development and operation of the cooperative businesses along with the network
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infrastructure, the worker owners continue to undergo training and leadership
development.
On the other hand, SCOPE convened twenty-five community, environmental, and
labor organizations under the banner of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance without including
business partners. The rationale was twofold: that the three sectors needed time to
establish a strong, working relationship and the aim of the coalition was to get the city to
take leadership in retrofitting its building stock and creating vital construction careers that
put Angelenos back to work beginning in the poorest neighborhoods as to render private
sector participation unnecessary. In hindsight, the initiative's core premise that the City
possessed economic capital to potentially invest in greening its building stock was far from
given, particularly in the face of public budget cuts. As elaborated by Uyen Le of the UCLA
Labor Center,
Just because the city wants to retrofit a thousand buildings doesn't mean they have the
resources. Theoretically, the city as an employer is in a unique position to leverage
other kinds of public sector dollars for these projects, which is why the focus is on the
city in the first place. There's more room to say what's in the public good and access
those kinds of resources. But the city's economic situation is mirroring what's in the
private sector. So that hasn't necessarily panned out.
Nor did the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance cultivate a meaningful partnership with the
General Services Department, the agency that would ultimately implement the Green
Retrofit and Workforce Ordinance, from the onset of the policy campaign, rather focusing
its efforts on winning commitments from the mayor and key city council members. Of
course, Apollo Alliance's primary policy aim, which built upon lessons from past sectoral
campaigns, was to enact the ordinance and place the onus of carrying out the entire
program on the city. Its primary safeguard for ensuring the implementation of the policy
would stay true to the intent of its initial architects and advocates was to legislate a system
of democratic governance, complete with a publicly appointed Program Director seat and
Advisory Committee. Similarly, the Community Scholars largely focused on research and
spelling out the technical dimensions of the policy rather than relationship building.
Subsequently, the Program Director and Green Retrofit Advisory Committee made a more
concerted effort to establish a working relationship with the General Services Department
and bring in business partners in order to obtain the private investments necessary to
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intensify the scope and scale of the program. However, by then, the program was already a
year into implementation, and the General Services Department, while assuming primary
responsibility for administering the green retrofits of city buildings, did not share the same
level of commitment or excitement with respect to the program. To their credit, the
Program Director and Green Retrofit Advisory Committee, mostly consisting of civil society
actors whose specializations range from workforce development to building science, have
made major strides in working with consultants to issue Qualified Energy Conservation
Bonds, set up a Special Revenue Fund along with a system to measure and verify energy
savings, and take other steps to establish long-term financing mechanisms, partly through
the private sector.
6.1.4 Local contingencies
Some of the striking differences between the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and
LA Green Retrofit and Workforce Program originate from historical contingencies specific
to the local contexts, including the particular trajectory of capitalist urbanization and
economic development as well as oppositional struggles. We just touched on the two
initiatives' divergent orientations towards the private sector. Additionally, the problem
focus of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative was defining markets, businesses, and a
sustainable economic model, while the LA Apollo Alliance focused on a policy campaign
around which to organize and mobilize its constituency, and even the implementation
phase centered on navigating internal city politics and institutional structures. The tools for
analysis in Cleveland included feasibility studies, business plans, and market assessments,
while the LA Apollo Alliance engaged in political analysis and strategized around policy
campaign development. The methods and mobilizations in Cleveland largely took place
behind the scenes in contrast to Los Angeles, where they were more up front and apparent.
The critical drivers of the economic and workforce development strategy in Cleveland were
both private and not for profit institutions, where as in Los Angeles, it was the public
sector. Finally, in both cases, unanticipated challenges arose in the process of program
implementation, but the key player taking leadership and assuming accountability varied
between the Foundation in Cleveland and the Program Director within the Office of the
Mayor in Los Angeles.
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With respect to the historical factors underlying some of these differences, in
Cleveland, the leading role of the Cleveland Foundation in Evergreen and the Greater
University Circle Initiative more generally goes back to the enormous concentrations of
wealth created by the shipping, mining, iron and steel, manufacturing, and oil industries
and relative stability and cohesiveness of the city's economic and political elites, who
supported the institutional fortunes of the Cleveland Foundation. The vitality of University
Circle and its anchor institutions can also be traced to the deeply embedded tradition of
noblesse oblige in Cleveland by which the city' first families endowed a series of cultural
and educational institutions including the Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland Play House,
Cleveland Orchestra, and Cleveland Institute of Music in the city's uptown district during
the early decades of the 21st century. The Cleveland Foundation had a record of working
with business professionals and key institutional administrators in past urban
revitalization projects. In terms of the absence of involvement on the part of grassroots
organizations and labor unions representing inner city communities of color, historical
factors include the cooptation of an independent, vital black civil sphere by political
machines, the demise of the neighborhood-based community organizing movement and
replacement by a network of professionalized community development corporations
specializing in low-income housing production, along with the absence of a strong labor
movement with a connection to inner city communities of color.
With the LA Green Retrofit and Workforce Program, the leadership of the
community-labor-environmental coalition and the City can be traced back to the important
role played by tourism and real estate speculation in the historical development of the
Southern California economy, which concentrated employment and unionization in the
transportation, construction, services, and government sectors traditionally affiliated with
the AFL (Milkman, 2006, p. 32). In turn, AFL affiliates experimented with community
unionism amidst dispersed spatial patterns of employment, with frequent anti-union
offensives and labor casualization efforts helping further such nontraditional labor
organizing strategies. Mass immigration after the 1965 immigration reform act, which
brought in large numbers of immigrants particularly from Latin America with prior
organizing experience was another critical factor in the reinvigoration of the labor
movement. Where the racial structure in Cleveland was more of a black white dichotomy,
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in LA, the presence of Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Pacific Islanders led to a
situation where Latinos assumed a more favorable position with respect to the mainstream
labor movement as to mediate the incorporation of immigrant newcomers and their
movement repertoires. If the Watts Rebellion in 1965 precipitated the initial convergence
of the labor movement and the community development movement (Soja, 2011),
insufficient government response to the 1992 uprising seeded community-based efforts at
racial reconciliation and transforming the structural conditions leading to pervasive
poverty, unemployment, and violence in the inner city. Among the organizations
established during this period, SCOPE and LAANE, both of which combined policy research
and advocacy with coalition building among various community and labor partners (as well
as environmental partners in due time), would play a leading role in the LA Apollo Alliance
and other progressive economic and workforce development initiatives. Then Proposition
187, a ballot initiative intended deny the use of public resources including schools and
hospitals to undocumented immigrants, sparked Latino voter registration and
mobilization, which together with grassroots labor organizing and unionization, helped
bring progressive economic policy victories at the city level that set political and
institutional foundations for the Green Retrofit Program.
6.1.5 Discussion
Referring back to Porter and Kramer's conception of shared value creation, our
cases demonstrate that the private sector is not alone in possessing leadership capacity to
bring business and society back together; rather, community and civic organizations offer
unique assets that might enhance the scope and scale of shared value creating efforts,
particularly when carefully combined with private sector resources. Beyond commanding
positive recognition and other symbolic resources as well as extensive social networks,
organizations like the Cleveland Foundation and SCOPE possess significant cultural capital
in having good knowledge of local institutional structures and politics. Therefore, they can
effectively summon leadership from partner organizations and employ the varieties of
capital at the disposal of their respective coalitions to advance policy and program goals in
ways that might be less feasible for companies and other private sector interests with less
knowledge of local history and institutional arrangements. In addition, the broad reaches of
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civic coalitions into different communities (and the power and resources that come along
with that) potentially translate into a certain level of democratic responsibility and
accountability. Where a corporation might be entitled to maximize shareholder value from
quarter to quarter, non-profit community and civic organizations typically have broader
mandates and longer time horizons. In the case of university-based centers of policy
innovation, to the extent they maintain an arms length distance from community and civic
politics while engaging in research and policy discourse with an eye towards developing
practical applications serving a public purpose, they appear well poised to facilitate data
gathering, critical reflection, and dialogic exchange processes informing economic policy
and program design. Thus civil society leadership of shared value creation, rather than
succumbing to impasse as a result of deliberative processes, appears to lend itself to
conversations about divergent values among different stakeholders and issues of
redistribution. Thus clarifying the terms of collaboration can in turn promote mutually
beneficial outcomes, given the role of hegemony and the structure of opportunity attached
to uneven resource spreads and power dynamics in only worsening existing inequities in
the absence of focused attention and redress (and thus constraining the sharing of co-
created value). At the same time, the private sector offers considerable value to green
economic and workforce development initiatives by progressive coalitions in the form of
business expertise and financial capital among others. Where future efforts at coalition
building and shared value creation will likely follow Evergreen and the LA Green Retrofit
program, the Cleveland case stands as an example of how civil society actors might play a
leading role in building collaborative partnerships with business professionals and
institutional administrators that are truly beneficial to all parties involved. In turn, the LA
case symbolizes an iterative attempt at civic organizing, mobilization, discourse, and
debate that sharpens the capacity of community and civic organizations to frame and carry
out prescriptive economic programs and better equips them for future attempts at shared
value creation with public and private sector partners. We examine this issue in further
detail in the following section.
As far as the actual process by which actors might forge collaborative partnerships
and pursue shared value creation, our account of multi-level conditions enabling the
Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and LA Green Retrofit and Workforce Program stretches
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neoclassical economic theory to its descriptive and analytical limits. The premise of
rational choice theory whereby actors choose courses of action that best allow them to
maximize utility or profits fail to hold. Far from weighing means and ends, actors appeared
to respond to problematic situations that broke routine functioning, with whatever
available means guiding ensuing reflection, creativity, and adaptation. Even in cases where
interviewees referenced field level conditions (i.e. the economic recession, economic and
political restructuring, emergence of social movements, and demographic shifts along with
high degrees of racial stratification, economic inequality, and social polarization stemming
from privatist urban policy and economic development practices) as enabling action, they
couched them in terms of practical dilemmas posed at the organizational level. Moreover,
given the continuity of human activity, previous goals of action such as the City Jobs
Program and the Vocational Worker Category, in the case of Los Angeles, became means to
achieve "ends in view," or a civil service career ladder for green building maintenance and
construction. Aside from the preexisting program and occupational category, past "ends"
such as the precedents set by the campaigns around Community Benefits Agreements and
Project Labor Agreements on the part of community-labor coalitions, comprehensive
market recovery strategies by building trades unions, and political power consolidated by
minority communities over numerous decades also helped actors "expand the scope for
possible goal setting" to "discover" policy goals (Joas, 1997, p. 154). Likewise, in Cleveland,
the relationships cultivated between various University Circle anchor institutions and the
Cleveland Foundation through the initial stages of the Greater University Circle Initiative
later became the means for pursuing an anchor-based strategy for community wealth
building. Nor did individual-level conditions enabling agency confer with the rational
choice expectations whereby homo economicus is a self-interested, outcome driven
individual with set preferences of which he or she is aware. When probed about factors
motivating their engagement in the respective green workforce and economic development
initiatives, a number of the interviewees referred to seminal experiences, whether related
to their childhood upbringing, experiences of betrayal by corporate employers, or
participation in various social movements, crystallizing awareness or moral outrage at
present contradictions or tensions in the social order. Hence beyond serving purposes of
self-interest, their work demonstrated an inclination to cooperate and connect with
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different others, which appeared as fundamental to their personal tendencies and values as
any individualistic impulse. Further, some articulated place attachments to Cleveland and
made references to Los Angeles as an urban node that brought together diverse people
with rich life experiences and enabled them to affirm their respective observations about
the falsity of dominant narratives about economic development and income and wealth
distribution and in turn co-create alternative policy and planning discourses as well as
related practical initiatives. In doing so, they highlighted the nature of cities and urban
economies as not simply agglomerating utility and profit maximizing actors and firms but
rather providing vehicles for reciprocal exchange, interdependence, complementarity, and
political society.
Beyond these shared overlaps, the cases also illuminate the locally contingent
nature of shared value creation as a practice. Evergreen and the LA Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program were marked by a series of differences including their orientations
towards the private sector, problem foci, tools for analysis, methods and mobilizations,
drivers of green economic and workforce development, and the entities handling
unanticipated challenges arising in the process of program implementation. In turn, some
of these differences could be traced back to the historical trajectories of capitalist
urbanization and economic development and oppositional struggles in Cleveland and Los
Angeles; so could many of the field and organizational level conditions identified by
interviewees as enabling or propelling their engagement in the respective initiatives. Thus
from the theorists perspective, this not only undermines the argument that companies and
other private sector interests, which might possess less knowledge of local history and
institutional arrangements than civic and community organizations, should necessarily
lead multi-sector-based efforts at shared value creation; it further challenges the basis of
universalistic prescriptions offered by those like Susan Fainstein, which are grounded in a
dualistic understanding of processes and outcomes. As indicated by the cases studies, such
dualisms, along with the general guiding principles or analytical frameworks that
accompany them, have little practical applicability for actors engaged in shared value
creation at the local level given the transient, complex, and historically contingent nature of
societal conditions, complete with their inherent tensions and contradictions. Rather,
historical and institutional factors appear to integrally shape the terms of collaborative
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partnership along with their ensuing policy and program accomplishments. Hence, in
theorizing shared value creation or economic democracy, planners might instead tease out
which strategies result from what sets of contingencies to conceptualize learning and
movement building processes towards greater collective economic problem solving or
democratic control and accountability of markets. In other words, even when players have
similar goals (like prioritizing low income inner city residents in job creation and economic
development) their history, culture, biography, and situations cause them to move in very
different ways (trajectories) that embody blind spots. This is inevitable given human fallibility
and the fact that environments are never identical. Rather than trying to formulate ideal processes
and ideal outcomes that will supposedly generate similar results, an alternative is for scholars to
help actors compare their trajectories with others doing related work, become aware of the
natural tendency for work to proceed with blind spots, and address these blind spots. This is
different from a mechanistic application of models from one place to another (replication)
because it entails addressing personal identities and local cultures.
6.2 Race, place, and economic democracy
6.2.1 An alternative analytical framework for shared value creation
Zooming out from the mechanics of collaborative partnership formation and shared
value creation, I now turn to the substance of challenging the neoclassical hegemony in the
practice of urban policy and local economic development. In particular, I focus on the
practical opportunities and challenges presented by race and place in activating civil
society-based efforts towards economic democracy. In their "Creating Shared Value,"
Porter and Kramer frame the imperative for shared value creation in terms of the capitalist
system being "under siege" (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Their argument is that as
businesses have pursued an approach to value creation that optimizes short-term gain
while neglecting their social embeddedness and factors related to long run viability, they
have elicited protective measures on the part of government and civil society that
undermine competitiveness and economic growth. Likewise, this dissertation builds on the
premise that the contemporary American economy is undergoing severe crisis. However, in
this case, the problem is not so much the diminished legitimacy of business or the
presumed tradeoffs between economic efficiency and social progress, but rather centers on
229
the gap between the potential for democratic control and accountability of capitalist
markets and the present reality (whereby American workers see the dissolution of their
hard earned retirement savings at the hands of pension fund managers and private
financiers, record levels of income and wealth inequality, oligarchic influences shaping
economic policy and regulations, falling employment standards, dissolution of labor market
institutions such as labor unions, and rupture of internal labor markets and career paths).
Therefore, where Porter and Kramer's approach to pursuing shared value creation for the
purpose of "reinventing capitalism" and "unleashing waves of innovation and growth"
upholds private sector primacy and neglects cultural-ideological consideration such as
those relating to economic and social values and distributional questions, I prescribe an
alternative method of recourse that goes to the deepest root of the problem, namely the
issue of race as it relates to capitalism and democracy. Borrowing from DuBois' notion of
double consciousness, I emphasize the transformative potentials inherent in tapping into
the capacities of inner city communities of color and other historically marginalized groups
to perceive multiple facets of the economic system including its limits and constraints by
virtue of experiencing reality through their own eyes as well as being conscious of the
perspective of the dominant group. Additionally, I incorporate Bakhtin's considerations of
dialogic exchange to contemplate what sorts of governance structures might best
encourage a plurality of voices, styles of discourse, and points of view among civil society
actors and their partners along the lines of economic collective problem solving. In
rejecting the "top down" vs. "bottom up" dualism prevalent in planning accounts of
distributional issues, I protect against potential idealizations of any particular section of
society by highlighting the importance of coalition building and multiple bases of
knowledge and expertise operating in concert. In addition, I interrogate the prevailing
segmentation of community organizing and democratic power building from economic
programs as spheres of engagement for civil society actors and "bottom up essentialism" or
"grassroots glorification" that limits community and civic groups from broadening their
approaches to coalition building and urban problem solving to encompass different bases
of knowledge and expertise. Hence we not only problematize the reification of the economy
on the part of civil society actors but also the reification of organizing and movement
building repertoires, whether through institutional inertia or narrow ideological views and
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boundaries (e.g. exclusive focus on collective bargaining by labor organizations at the cost
of more comprehensive market recovery strategies that might increase the percentage of
work undertaken by contractors operating under a union agreement). Finally, I explore
questions of program longevity and scale, particularly in the face of a protracted economic
recession, federal and state budget cuts, election cycles, and the political economy of
philanthropy.
6.2.2 Race and space as diagnostic mechanisms
The historical analyses conducted in Part One of the dissertation illuminated how
race and racism played a historical role in managing the tensions and contradictions
between capitalism and democracy at the local level. Both Cleveland and LA's modern
economies relied on extensive public subsidies and other interventions on the part of
government to fuel processes of expansion. In turn, their thriving industries gave rise to
great fortunes along with legitimization crises related to inequitable distributions of gains
and daily experiences of alienation and degradation borne by the vast majority of
democratic citizens whose taxes and labors sustained the economic order. Still most chose
to embrace a cultural ideological stance of racial separatism, maintaining systems of racial
stratification and privilege and seeking personal redemption through fleeting material
achievements and condemnation of lazy and undeserving "others" rather than forming
alliances with workers of color to challenge the capitalist system. Where racial minorities
disproportionately absorbed the negative externalities of capitalism, including undesirable
jobs, unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation and public health hazards, and
degenerated building stock and other physical assets, they prolonged "a larger legitimacy
crisis of democracy" (Thompson, 2008, p. 201). At the same time, conditions of racial
discrimination and subordination also triggered campaigns and movements for racial
justice and equality, not all of which necessarily challenged privatist urban policy and
economic development. For instance, efforts ranging from building an independent ethnic
civil sphere and economy to boycotts and picket lines protesting racist white owned
businesses demanded minority inclusion in jobs distribution and wealth creation but failed
to challenge capitalist modes of production and class stratification. In the aftermath of the
civil rights movement and urban uprisings in the 1960s, local electoral politics became a
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dominant channel for racial empowerment, and African Americans, in particular,
experienced a series of political victories in electing black mayors across major American
cities. Yet such developments failed to generate sustained material gains for poor inner city
residents of color, with black elected officials in many cases partnering with local growth
interests to champion privatist urban policy and economic development.
In time, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and the LA Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program used race as a starting point for addressing core urban economic
problems and posing alternative modes of economic production and exchange. In
Cleveland, the Greater University Circle Initiative and its ensuing "economic inclusion"
component in the form of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative began by carving out a
spatial target consisting of six low-income, disproportionately African American
neighborhoods immediately surrounding the thriving University Circle complex. Similarly,
in Los Angeles, SCOPE and other members of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance explored the
question of how green economic and workforce development might benefit LA's inner city
communities of color, largely located in South Los Angeles, along the Harbor Gateway
corridor connecting downtown Los Angeles with the LA and Long Beach Port complex.
More specifically, the anchoring organizations-the Cleveland Foundation and SCOPE-
problematized and explicitly sought to redress the historical marginality of area residents
with respect to the processes and gains of local and regional economic development,
particularly over the past several decades. In Cleveland, the Foundation focused on the
economic disparities and social polarities between the thriving cultural, educational, and
health care institutions of University Circle and most residents of Glenville, Hough, Fairfax,
Buckeye-Shaker, Little Italy, and the eastern part of East Cleveland. In LA, SCOPE and the
Los Angeles Apollo Alliance referred to the structure of regional economic inequality and
the fact that "even before the current crisis in global capital, the housing market, and
government deficits, inner city residents were struggling to keep food on the table,
maintain a roof over their heads, and get quality medical attention" (Lee and Ito, 2009, p.
2). They pointed to the soaring poverty rate in South Los Angeles, which totaled two times
the county average, given the tendency of area residents to work in low wage, low skilled,
less stable industries and occupations (i.e. maids and housekeepers, construction laborers,
gardeners, cooks, childcare workers and personal/home care aides), along with the fact
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that half of adults ages 25 and older in the area lacked a high school diploma. Apollo
Alliance members like Byron Gudiel and Bill Gallegos additionally evoked the example of
Silicon Valley to question whether the emerging green economy might draw on public
resources to generate benefits for a small section of society that is disproportionately
white, affluent, and based in the suburbs or create a variety of jobs, trainings, and
education opportunities for poor people of color.
In Cleveland, operationalizing the "double consciousness" of the Greater University
Circle inner city communities illuminated business and market development opportunities
attached to the procurement capacities of the local anchor institutions. In the case of
University Hospitals, incorporating a black community representative into the board of
directors helped bring to light the shortcomings of the hospital's existing procurement and
purchasing approach (with respect to construction), which started a chain of conversation
and steps that led to the procurement strategies at the center of the "Cleveland Model."
Further, as the Evergreen leadership team partnered with Towards Employment to
conduct focus groups and outreach sessions with Greater University Circle residents, they
gained a second sight into the mechanics of program design such as the need to make
special health care benefit arrangements to accommodate Medicaid structures. Following,
job solicitations by 500 applications for the dozen openings at the Evergreen Cooperative
Laundry illuminated the dire need for good jobs and alternative approaches to economic
and workforce development (meaning those resulting in shared wealth creation rather
than conferring with privatist models) in Greater University Circle. Then, as the workforce
was hired and businesses went into operation, the daily challenges faced by worker owners
and probationary workers including limited math skills, the lack of a driver's license,
inflated housing costs, the need to pay fines and child support, and parole issues
underscored the importance of creating effective worker support systems and
incorporating personal and leadership development. In Los Angeles, viewing green
economic and workforce development from the perspective of low-income inner city
communities of color helped unveil LA City's untapped potentials as an employer of last
resort and owner of a large inventory of urban building stock in need of energy efficiency
upgrades, the lack of training and advancement opportunities for entry level workers in
civil service construction and maintenance, and the historical exclusion of workers of color,
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particularly African Americans, from the local building trades and the importance of their
future inclusion to institutional preservation.
Spatial thinking and discourse facilitated attention to racial inequities in urban
policy and local economic development as well as overlooked opportunities around shared
value creation. As the conservative resurgence over the past several decades has been
accompanied by the proliferation of a free market or "laissez faire racism," the United
States has seen a rise in "persistent negative stereotyping of African Americans, a tendency
to blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in socioeconomic standing, and
resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate America's racist social conditions and
institutions" (Bobo et al., 1997). In California, Proposition 209 "prohibits the state, local
governments, districts, public universities, colleges, and schools, and other government
instrumentalities from discriminating against or giving preferential treatment to any
individual or group in public employment, public education, or public contracting on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin" (State of California, 2012). Following
its passage in 1996, Proposition 209 inspired Republican legislators in the state of Ohio to
submit constitutional amendment proposals modeled after the anti-affirmative action
measure but failed to pass political muster. Still such events along with a slew of anti-
affirmative action lawsuits have caused elected officials and other policy decision makers
across the country to err on side of caution in pursuing targeted hiring. Given the spatial
manifestations of racial discrimination and stratification in the United States, including
overrepresentation of low-income communities of color in the urban core, many have
turned to local hiring provisions or set-asides for "disadvantaged workers" on publicly
subsidized construction projects. Thanks to concerted policy organizing and advocacy
efforts by the local progressive community-labor coalition, a number of departments in the
city of Los Angeles observe local hiring targets, which prioritize Angelenos whose
residences fall within a particular distance from a given construction site or are located in
select zip codes throughout the city with high unemployment rates, as well as
"disadvantaged workers," defines as those having a household income of less than 50
percent of the Area Media Income or facing at least one of the following barriers to
employment: being homeless; being a custodial single parent; receiving public assistance;
lacking a GED or high school diploma; having a criminal record or other involvement with
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the criminal justice system; or suffering from chronic unemployment or underemployment.
Likewise, Cleveland's Fannie M. Lewis Resident Employment Law requires 20 percent of
the work hours performed on publicly subsidized construction projects to be reserved for
City of Cleveland residents, and 4 percent of that 20 percent to be reserved for low-income
Clevelanders. While neither the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative or LA Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program formally deployed such measures, their architects and advocates
strategically drew upon more race-neutral rhetoric about spatial inequities to solidify
public support for their efforts at racial mediation.
6.2.2 Dialogic exchange
A key difference between the two cases, which we touched on earlier, had to do with
the ways in which advocates went about the process of forging collaborative partnerships
and co-creating shared value. In Cleveland, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative grew out
of the leadership provided by various middle class professionals, the vast majority of whom
were not native to the targeted neighborhoods, including staff from the Cleveland
Foundation, the OEOC, Democracy Collaborative, and major anchor institutions, as well as
"experts" in community development, employee ownership, and other areas of relevance to
community wealth building. Residents of the targeted neighborhoods only found
engagement in the initiative during the recruitment and screening phase, which took place
four years after the launch of the Greater University Circle Initiative and almost three years
after the Community Wealth Building Roundtable in Cleveland. As the Evergreen
Cooperative Laundry and Ohio Cooperative Solar launched in October 2009, there were
clear demographic differences between the workforce and the Evergreen leadership team
and founding CEOs. Jim Anderson and Steven Kiel planned to lead the respective companies
for the first three years while keeping an eye out for successors within the ranks of the
worker owners and offering leadership training to enable them to eventually step in as
maintenance CEOs. In addition to cultivating internal leadership, the Evergreen leadership
team prioritized efforts to build a cooperative model of shared governance and decision-
making. Besides participating in weekly meetings, employees received training on how to
elect coworkers into the cooperative, cooperative leadership skills, and how to elect
members to the board of directors as well as serve as a board member. Worker owners like
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Medrick Addison took the place of Towards Employment in helping lead recruitment and
hiring. In the case of the Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, the process of resolving the
conflict between the temporary manager and worker owners appeared to have
strengthened the relationship between the "rank and file" and the leadership team, at least
from the perspective of India Pierce Lee. As for OCS, it completed the transition over to
"indigenous" leadership in hiring Cliff Wood, a resident of one of the targeted
neighborhoods with over thirty years corporate management experience, while the
laundry prepared to make a similar leadership shift. The addition of Ron Jones, an African
American entrepreneur and corporate executive who lived right outside of Greater
University Circle, as the acting president and CEO of the Evergreen Cooperative
Corporation, brought progress on setting up the cooperative organizational structure but
also helped shift the racial dynamic among the ranks of the Evergreen leadership. The
commencement of the network organizing strategy as part of the community engagement
component further propelled the transition of the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative from an
initially top down orientation to ownership and control by residents from some of
Cleveland's poorest and historically marginalized neighborhoods.
In Los Angeles, beginning in 2005, SCOPE organized South LA residents and tapped
into their social networks and political power to conduct surveys, raise public visibility
around the issue of green collar jobs, and gain the attention of elected officials in order to
set the stage for a vital policy campaign. Following, the data collected and discussions
conducted through multiple iterations of community surveys found incorporation into the
content of the LA Apollo Alliance's policy proposal to the LA city council. As the campaign
reached its final stage, Community Scholars convened to research and elaborate policy
content for the Green Retrofit and Workforce Ordinance to accord with the overarching
vision of the LA Apollo Alliance. In the process, the class brought together into a direct
working relationship additional policy constituencies including members of the building
trades and community and environmental organizations. As far as the degree of
simultaneous expression, complete with mutual engagement, contradiction, contention,
and debate, which transpired over the two quarters, interviewees like Kim Craft expressed
a sense of hesitancy to fully express his concerns over the terms of policy implementation
amidst the general optimism that pervaded the classroom environment, particularly
236
emanating from the graduate student participants. With respect to the mechanics of
ordinance enactment, elected officials and other city leaders, despite their support of the
core principles at the heart of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance campaign, were hesitant to
legislate specific measures obligating the city to undertake a certain volume or
combination of green retrofits or create targeted employment opportunities. Program
implementation brought additional changes, as the General Services Department was slow
to assume responsibility, initially of assembling the inventory of buildings to be retrofitted
and working with the incoming Program Director and other policy advocates to design the
Green Retrofit Career Academy. Meanwhile the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance transitioned to
playing a more auxiliary role, as the City carried out layoffs amidst budget crises, the result
being the diversion of the Green Retrofit program towards serving worker re-assignment
purposes as opposed to those of community hire, with little discretion exercised on the
part of the program's grassroots constituency. Although, in the aftermath of the events,
some interviewees justified that many of the reassigned workers represented the targeted
neighborhoods and communities and the Program Director fielded questions at public and
community meetings about the temporary hiring freeze and consequent change in the
program's ability to proceed with community hiring as originally planned. The Green
Retrofit Career Academy and 15-project pilot faced continued challenges, in part due to the
General Services Department's initial indifference towards the program and the time
needed to establish a collaborative partnership between the department and the Green
Retrofit Advisory Committee. Still, the latter was internally cohesive and collaborative and
enjoyed a productive working relationship with the Program Director and with SCOPE and
the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance. Besides "Lobby Day" in which SCOPE mobilized its base to
advocate the creation of a Special Revenue Fund and continuation of the Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program, its regional analysis and community organizing on the issue of tax and
fiscal reform continued to serve broader goals of restructuring the local and regional
economy towards greater democratic control and accountability.
According to the planning scholar Xavier de Souza Briggs, debates about democracy
and public problems over the past generation have favored "bottom up" approaches,
displaying skepticism about the "quality and legitimacy of solutions proposed by trained
experts, higher status groups, or those with special access to power, such as bureaucratic
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insiders in government, business, or nongovernmental organizations" (Briggs, 2008, p.
308). However, whether transformative planning projects are top- or bottom- led is less
significant than whether those who are initiating change are taking into consideration the
stances and motivations of different others and "whether there are productive routines for
getting things done together across the sectors and across levels of decision making and
power" (Ibid.). Upon initial glance, the Evergreen Cooperatives Initiative appears to be
governed by a "top down" structure and the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce
Program, by one that is "bottom up." Yet even as staff from the Cleveland Foundation and
other "grass tops" initiated the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, they focused on the
economic and social conditions facing the residents of their target neighborhoods in
developing the anchor-based, green workforce and economic development, community
wealth building initiative as to operationalize the "double consciousness" of the latter
group. Further, the initiative transitioned towards a model of shared governance and
decision-making by worker owners, making concerted efforts to institutionalize a culture
of shared ownership as well as deepen community engagement. As for the Los Angeles
Apollo Alliance, they began with the "grassroots" in conducting community surveys and
pursuing public education on the topic of green economic and workforce development.
However, as the policy campaign met victory, the initiative shifted towards more "grass
tops" leadership on the part of the General Services Department and the Mayor's Office,
with the Community Scholars, community-labor activist turn Program Administrator
Teresa Sanchez, and the Advisory Committee, some of whose members derived from the LA
Apollo Alliance, playing a mediating role.
The fact that the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative originated as a "top down" effort
did not necessarily make it less democratic than the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program in the sense of enabling transparent and inclusive processes of
collective problem solving (Briggs, 2008). For instance, where the Evergreen leadership
team handled the conflict between the temporary manager and worker owners at the
Evergreen Cooperative laundry through open dialogue with the latter group and
counterbalancing uneven power dynamics within the cooperative business, the diversion
of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program towards purposes of worker reassignment
failed to incorporate as much group discussion and collective trouble shooting on the part
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of its community constituency. Moreover, as touched on earlier, the Cleveland Foundation
made a point of tapping into different bases of knowledge and expertise in pursuing the
"economic inclusion" component of the Greater University Circle Initiative. It incorporated
business professionals and key institutional administrators into the coalition from the very
beginning in addition to culling the expertise of community development and employee
ownership professionals in the community wealth building roundtable and bringing in
experienced business professionals to spearhead tasks including market assessment,
business planning, and operations management. On the other hand, SCOPE brought
together 25 community, environmental, and labor organizations under the banner of the
Los Angeles Apollo Alliance to establish common cause and shared civic capacity among
sectors that had previously stood on opposing sides with respect to issues of development
and gains distribution. Among various Apollo Alliance chapters, Los Angeles was
exceptional in excluding the business sector; nor did they include the General Services
Department in the coalition. Certainly, the focus of the Apollo Alliance policy campaign on
the public sector and the importance of building a trustful and productive working
relationship between the three civil society sectors are unquestionable. That the LA Apollo
Alliance would build on past sectoral campaigns undertaken by SCOPE and other
community, environmental, and labor partners also unsurprising and perhaps highly
sensible. On the other hand, one might play devil's advocate to contemplate instances of
reification with respect to the private sector on the one hand and organizing and
movement building repertoires on the other. For the civil society advocates presently
engaged in the implementation of the Green Retrofit and Workforce program, they are
effectively negotiating the terms of effective mutual engagement and shared value creation
with the General Services Department and private sector partners. In part, such a move
relates to the practical necessities of establishing a self-sustaining program, including the
Enterprise Energy Management Information System (EEMIS) for energy efficiency
measurement and verification purposes, special revenue fund where monetized savings
can accrue and then feed into a revolving loan fund to get through all city buildings in need
of retrofits, and a Civil Service Apprenticeship to ensure green workers have a career path
in the building trades that goes beyond retrofitting citywide buildings. As for those LA
Apollo Alliance members whose participation in the Green Retrofit and Workforce program
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dissipated upon the passage of the ordinance, they appear less poised to overcome
institutional inertia including ideological and normative patterns segmenting community
organizing and democratic power building from the administration of economic programs,
the latter in partnership with nontraditional but complementary allies. While taking into
consideration the inevitability of campaign or issue fatigue and necessities of
organizational maintenance, which render sensible the decision of SCOPE and the LA
Apollo Alliance to transition to an auxiliary role with the passage of the ordinance, an
alternative might be to set a larger table that includes a broader base of knowledge and
expertise from the get go to co-create and synergize community organizing, democratic
power building, and economic programs.
6.2.3 Program impacts
With respect to the substantive outcomes of the respective initiatives, the results
might initially appear modest when measured by the number of jobs created or amount of
income and assets accumulated by participants, especially in light of the considerable costs.
While the start up costs for the three initial businesses of the Evergreen Cooperative
Initiative amount to about $20 million (although to their credit, the leadership team largely
relied on tax credits and low cost, patient capital), the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative has
so far created less than 50 jobs for worker-owners and probationary workers (not
including managers and executives). Likewise, the Los Angeles Green Retrofit Program has
budgeted $26 million for the entire pilot phase (also largely financed by low cost, patient
capital in the form of QECB), encompassing the initial set of 15 buildings and a subsequent
set of 52 buildings. At the time of this writing, the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program has twenty workers left after twenty transitioned back to their old jobs
with the City. Therefore one might ask whether the benefits of such programs justify their
costs or more fundamentally, if program impacts are even quantifiable or measurable by
traditional indicators such as the number of jobs created. For one thing, two companies
that produce the same number of jobs and revenue might vary significantly in terms of
their approach to hiring and workforce arrangements as well as their level of place
attachment. From the perspective of Tracey Nichols, Cleveland's Director of Economic
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Development, the companies' deeper ties to Cleveland communities render Evergreen a
sound economic investment for the City. In her words,
One of the things in economic development is that you help develop a company and
then ten years later, they're like, 'We don't have any more economic benefits; where do
we go now?' And in some cases, they'll up and move, because they don't have any real
ties to the community. It occurred to me, an employee owned cooperative has ties to
the community. It's unlikely that every member is going to say let's move to Arizona.
It's possible, but far more unlikely than a company where an owner just decides to
move.
In speaking to the broader benefits of Evergreen, Ms. Nichols also underscored the net
savings in social welfare service costs realized by the City through its investment in
Evergreen, stating:
You have to realize, we may have invested in this operation, but we would have
invested in these people anyway, even if it were indirect. We have a lot of safety net
organizations here in Cleveland. Urban communities have higher numbers of returning
felons than other communities. If I lived in rural Lime and I committed a felony, they
wouldn't send me back there but here, because we have all the halfway houses, parole
officers, all of that. So people come back here and when they get through their parole,
although there is a lot of recidivism, when they're done, they stay here. Now they're
here in the city, they have to find a place to live. So when they end up in the homeless
shelters, we're paying for them. We have a lot of dollars spent on that. If they end up at
Metro Hospital, we pay for them out of county taxes. If they go to a food kitchen, we
pay for them. And you have to realize, if ex-felons can't find an opportunity to start
over, we're going to pay for them one way or another.
Extending this logic to the situation confronting Los Angeles, one might imagine that had
the 40 city employees simply been laid off, the result would have exacerbated
circumstances of high unemployment and the demand for social services in the inner city
neighborhoods where many of them reside. Further, going back to the point about the long-
term benefits of investing in locally rooted companies, city departments and other agencies
of local government count among the most place-based purchasing and procuring agents as
well as employers in this day of hyper globalized modes of economic production.
Another set of program impacts has to do with addressing the historical trajectories
and patterns of racial discrimination and segregation in the two cities. Earlier we discussed
the centrality of racial separatism and individualism as American cultural ideological
traditions helping manage the tensions and contradictions between capitalism and
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democracy at the local level. In turn, the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative is forging webs of
interdependence and mutuality between the city's anchor institutions, which are the
beneficiaries of generations of prosperity of Cleveland, and the neighborhoods, which
absorbed the worst of industrialization and urbanization from the 1800s. In Los Angeles,
the Apollo Alliance brought together the building trades with various community,
environmental, and labor organizations with deeper ties to inner city communities of color.
In the case of IBEW Local 11's Kim Craft, he spoke to how participating in the LA Apollo
Alliance and the ensuing green jobs campaign yielded a revelatory, transformative
experience with respect to South LA residents. Recalling a speech given by an inner city
young person of color at the Green Economy Forum at South LA's Dorsey High School in
April 2008, Mr. Craft reiterated the valuable takeaway, "Everybody here is just like me;
they just want an opportunity to show what they can do. They just want to provide a roof
over their kid's heads." In other words, he began to relate to the tribulations and
aspirations of those previously conceived as disparate within the dialogic spaces provided
by the LA Apollo Alliance and the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program.
Beyond such contributions to the surrounding locales and targeted inner city
neighborhoods, the respective green economic and workforce development initiatives
additionally offer viable models for people and places grappling with similar problems
across the country. In the case of Evergreen, the "Cleveland Model" has inspired similar
efforts at anchor-based shared wealth creation in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Washington
D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Richmond, California; and Amarillo, Texas among others. Where the
recent foreclosure crisis wiped out much of the gains produced by the affordable housing
production model prevailing in the community development field over the last few
decades, Evergreen offers a fresh new approach to neighborhood revitalization by way of
community wealth building and empowerment. It further contributes to the American
movement for employee ownership and shared capitalism, which tends to be dominated by
white, middle class concerns such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans and questions of
economic efficiency and competitiveness to the general exclusion of considerations such as
job creation and social inclusion. More specifically, it offers an innovative model that
connects firm level efforts towards shared capitalism with broad-based coalition building,
racial reconciliation, and green economic and workforce development to both deepen and
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widen the potential impacts of employee ownership, particularly in urban areas including
America's "forgotten" cities. Therefore, moving forward, worker cooperatives might
generate greater traction among progressive civil society actors and others undertaking
work along the lines of transforming privatistic urban policy and the capitalist economy.
In the case of the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce Program, the deep, race
and place-based approach to shared value creation led to an unprecedented effort to create
a direct linkage between an entry-level position represented by a SEIU, a service sector
union with a disproportionately minority, immigrant, and female membership, and a career
in the building trades, the latter comprising one the most visible and largest sections of
America's labor aristocracy with its disproportionately white, male, suburban membership.
As described previously, SEIU has stood at the helm of the community-labor alliance that
made Los Angeles the center of labor movement resurgence from the 1990s. On the other
hand, the building trades abandoned the local progressive movement in the 1950s to do
business with the city's growth coalition for over half a century before rejoining with
community, environmental, and other labor organizations in recent years to win a series of
collective policy campaign victories around project labor agreements with targeted hiring
programs. These programs incorporate community hires into building trades
apprenticeship programs, and separately, SEIU 721 represents a number of civil service
feeder classes to the building trades that typically supplement the work performed by
skilled journey workers without providing the training or advancement opportunities
inherent in a building trades apprenticeship. However, the Civil Service Apprenticeship
growing out of the Los Angeles Green Retrofit and Workforce Program signals the first
attempt at creating formal training and advancement opportunities for entry-level workers
represented by SEIU 721 in the course of performing green retrofit work on city-owned
buildings. While LA/OC Building and Construction Trades Council, the City Council, and
other key decision makers and stakeholders have yet to finalize the terms of the Civil
Service Apprenticeship, it therefore represents an important milestone for community
unionism and the American labor movement. Where the unionization rate in the U.S.
presently sits at a 70-year low (at 11.8 percent in 2011 compared to almost 14 percent in
1998 and a peak of 35 percent in the mid 19SOs), the impending retirement of white baby
boomers along with the growingly minority majority demographic, particularly in
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American urban areas, exerts considerable pressure on the building trades to integrate and
innovate for the purpose of organizational survival and relevancy in the coming years.
Among the persisting problems is that of African American underrepresentation, as
remarked by Nona Randois of the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles:
One of the issues we're seeing and trying to address in our work is the
underrepresentation of African Americans in the building trades. Latinos have broken
in somewhat, but African Americans are struggling to get in the door and once they're
in, continuing to get work All these different Community Benefit Agreements and
Project Labor Agreements we've been working on throughout the city are very much
intended to bring in underrepresented people and people of color into the building
trades. I don't know if it's too early to see the results or what, but we just haven't seen
as much progress as we'd like to see in terms of African American representation in the
building trades or on these projects.
While it remains to be seen whether the LA Green Retrofit and Workforce Program will
effectively spin off new jobs, it contributes to the broader aim of improving racial diversity
in the building trades by building institutional bridges between the building trades and
public sector employers and unions, which have a better record on black inclusion.
Moreover, along the lines of an earlier point made by Daniel Villao of the California
Construction Academy, the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and the Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program incorporated a new contingent of thought leaders into the local policy
and planning arena on union innovation. Where the LA County Federation of Labor and
LAANE hitherto played an invaluable role in driving community-labor coalitions and
particularly improving conditions in the lower wage, less skilled sections of the labor
movement and improving Latino union density and leadership more generally,
organizations more attentive to low-income, inner city, African American communities and
their interests such as SCOPE and the California Construction Academy were pivotal to this
iteration of green economic and workforce development. Hence some of the most
resounding effects of Evergreen and the LA Green Retrofit program might result from their
recasting worker cooperatives and labor unions as community-based institutions that
further economic democracy by creating shared wealth, regenerating local economies, and
activating collective economic problem solving in the workplace as well as at the local and
regional level. And for all the challenges related to operationalizing effective collaborative
partnerships and shared governance as well as spinning off a sizeable number of living
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wage, career path jobs, it is questionable whether either set of program advocates could
have undertaken the institutional innovations that they did had they not tapped into the
"double consciousness" of poor inner city communities and race as a diagnostic, dialogic,
and democratic power building mechanism.
6.2.4 Longevity and scale
Finally, in contemplating how to address the paradox described at the outset, which
is the gap between the democratic potentials inherent in market democracy and the reality,
we consider issues of longevity and scale. Given the respective coalition building and
planning processes for the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative and LA Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program began in 2005, both programs are only about seven years out. In that
time, which also overlapped with the housing and financial crisis along with the Great
Recession, the two initiatives have managed to plant their institutional foundations,
Evergreen having set up the cooperative network structure under the Evergreen
Cooperative Corporation and launched its third business and the LA Green Retrofit
program having enacted an ordinance, found a home in the mayor's office along with a
Program Director and Advisory Council, and entered the second phase of the pilot project.
While the number of jobs created and income/revenues generated thus far remain
relatively modest, considerations of longevity and scale have found incorporation into
program designs for maximum potential impact. In Cleveland, the Evergreen leadership
team conceived of the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation (ECC) as the holding company
that would act as an umbrella organization for the cooperative businesses along with the
cooperative bank, R&D entity, and land trust. To insure against cooperative attempts to exit
the Evergreen network, ECC will maintain a 20 percent equity state in each of the
businesses. Additionally, the land trust will acquire land and lease them out to businesses
in order to protect against temptations to "demutualize" as well as potential business
failure related to operational costs. As for the cooperative development fund, it is designed
to provide low interest, long-term financing for cooperative start ups as well as identify
new lines of business. Among the actual businesses themselves, each firm will allocate 10
percent of its retained earnings in the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund to invest
in new products and start-ups. Therefore, while the initiative presently relies on significant
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philanthropic and public funding, these are being leveraged as long-term investments that
will yield a financially vital and independent cooperative complex as well as generate
thousands of jobs in Greater University Circle, which in turn trigger multiplier effects and
regenerate the local economy. Further, where the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative
attributes a large part of its early successes to the phenomenal level of commitment and
leadership demonstrated by the Cleveland Foundation, University Circle anchor
institutions, and the City of Cleveland, the community engagement strategy is intended to
enhance a sense of ownership and creativity on the part of Greater University Circle
residents with respect to the task of advocating and launching similar community wealth
building initiatives. As the network organizing strategy unfolds in parallel with the
cooperative self-governance and leadership training among Evergreen worker owners, the
idea is that the social and political dynamics of target neighborhoods will shift towards
greater civic participation, democratic control, and accountability. In short, the community
engagement strategy stands as a core component of cultivating Evergreen and its
neighborhood constituents' political power and independence apart from the Cleveland
Foundation and the University Circle anchors, which is hardly a zero sum equation but may
rather enhance the terms and dynamics of their reciprocal exchange as well as sense of
interdependence, complementarity, and political society. The abandonment of Cleveland's
community organizing movement (1975-1985) by foundations in the aftermath of the
former's clash with local corporate leaders (along with the defunding of Mayor Stokes'
community programs in the aftermath of the Glenville shootout) stands testament to the
importance of inner city communities of color and other historically marginalized groups
maintaining an independent, democratic power base. As concerns the task of building
citywide and other bases of political support for the likes of Evergreen, in the words of Bill
McIntyre of the OEOC, "the good news is that both the Democrats and Republicans like
employee ownership." The more important question has to do with commanding the social
and political capital necessary to compel support on the part of elected officials and other
public decision makers.
In Los Angeles, members of the Apollo Alliance knew from past policy campaign
experience that simply proposing a citywide green retrofit program to the City would fail to
ensure its successful implementation, while legislating the ordinance might seal a deeper
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level of commitment through implication of democratic accountability. Yet simply
relegating the responsibility of ordinance implementation to the General Services
Department rendered the risk of program cooptation by managers and bureaucrats
unaware of or unconcerned with the original aims of the Los Angeles Apollo Alliance and
other policy advocates. Here, the creation of the Program Director seat along with an
Advisory Committee, both publicly appointed (on the recommendation of the LA Apollo
Alliance), promoted democratic control of the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program. The
administrative location of the Program Director in the Office of the Mayor further
heightened visibility of the program within the City, eased the process of forging
collaborations across departments, and provided access to key decision making points. At
the same time, tying the position to the mayoral administration jeopardized the program's
longevity, given Mayor Villaraigosa's extended term would expire in 2013, and mayoral
appointees typically vacated their posts along with the mayor. Therefore program
advocates with bureaucratic administrative expertise in City Hall explored payroll options
that would enable the Program Director to survive the election cycle. Built-in program
features such as the energy efficiency measurement and verification system, special
revenue fund, revolving loan fund, and Civil Service Apprenticeship further promoted fiscal
independence and self-proliferation of the initiative. The integration of popular education
into the LA Apollo Alliance's policy campaign and the Green Retrofit Career Academy
additionally enhanced political economic efficacy on the part of South LA residents,
organizers and activists, and program participants.
For Program Director Teresa Sanchez and other members of the Los Angeles Apollo
Alliance, the Green Retrofit and Workforce Program represents only the beginning as far as
potentials for green economic and workforce development. Ms. Sanchez stated,
The goal really is to generate more green economic activity in LA. We have plans for a
green tech corridor. The idea is that the public sector can lead on this stuff and do
something of scale. Obviously there are many contractors and vendors that do business
with the city in the process of implementing this program, so the more work we
generate, the more investment will come into LA in terms of the manufacturing and
suppliers that can come into LA. We just had a discussion with the General Services
Department and the city attorney about purchasing policies and figuring out what we
need to do, whether its legislative, to advantage local businesses and suppliers.
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Larry Frank spoke to a number of green, civil society led, shared economic value creation
initiatives already underway within the city. These include a recently negotiated Project
Labor Agreement between the LA/OC Building Trades (with the help of community,
environmental, and labor partners) and the LA County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, which requires that 40 percent of the work hours performed on most MTA
projects will be done by people who live in economically disadvantaged communities
across the county (Weickel, 2012), along with the collaboration between the Coalition for
Clean and Safe Ports, an alliance of labor, environmental, and community welfare groups,
and the Port of Los Angeles to undertake infrastructure expansions and energy efficiency
improvements in a way that benefits surrounding inner city, low-income communities. Still,
many of these prospects are contingent on the public sector's continued leadership, which
in turn depends on the fiscal health of federal, state, and local governments. Hence SCOPE
has turned to community organizing, voter mobilization, and coalition building for the
purpose of tax and fiscal reform. As with the Evergreen Cooperative Initiative, such an
approach synergizes collective problem solving in the civic and political realm with civil
society-based efforts at shared value creation in the economic realm. Likewise, Clare Fox of
the California Construction Academy emphasized the importance of community organizing
and democratic power building to reinforce progressive, civil society led efforts at shared
economic value creation, stating:
Something the green jobs movement will need to face in terms of the question of
building power is whether this is just about getting people employed and getting jobs
or is it about changing the way power works in this country and wealth distribution
happens in this country? I think that gets a little confusing along the way when you
have a campaign and then an ordinance, you have a policy, you want to get it done and
say, 'We did this.' You want to have victories along the way. That's really important.
And you know this policy can be transformative in peoples' lives. But somewhere along
the road of policy implementation, the risk is to get bogged down in the minutiae of
implementation, and lose sight of the spirit of movement building that drove the
ordinance in the first place. The key is to always balance the perspective of practical
implementation with deep social transformation.
Her colleague Uyen Le elaborated on challenges related to funding availability and the
practicalities of organizational maintenance:
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Most foundations don't do anything to fund movement building, so it's hard to get
enough resources and capacity to build that up. This is why it's in spurts. When you're
organizing for a campaign, you have steps, a clear goal, an end time, and it's boom, lets
go! That's a totally different organizing strategy than a movement building organizing
strategy, whereyou build trust, build relationships, brainstorm with each other about
what are the goals and the outcomes, and what is this vision we have and our long-
term plan. It employs totally different competencies, requires a whole different set of
commitments. And it requires different time frames and resources. There's less
immediate quid pro quo type thing. There's less of that. Folks are like, 'If we pass the
ordinance, we'll retrofit a thousand buildings.' That's a big motivator for people to
keep going to the meetings. But if we're like let's build this better world together, all of
us- I'm not saying that's all what movement building is, a lot of it is this shared vision,
this trust, long-term thing-that's much harder to get at.
While the unique relationship between Evergreen and the Cleveland Foundation has
provided the former with access to philanthropic dollars for network organizing, although
for relatively neutral purposes of civic engagement and neighborhood improvement,
independent community and civic organizations pursuing a more radical approach to
community organizing and democratic power building lack such funding opportunities. Yet
their capacity to make policy demands and frame alternative approaches to economic and
workforce development hinge on the continuation of such activities.
Aside from built-in program features, leadership development, popular education,
grassroots organization, and democratic power building, what of program replicability in
amplifying the impacts of initiatives like Evergreen and the LA Green Retrofit and
Workforce Program for the purpose of furthering democratic control and accountability of
capitalist markets? In the case of Evergreen, the Democracy Collaborative is providing
outreach and advice to civic leaders and other local stakeholders intent on extending the
lessons of the "Cleveland Model" to their locale. The initiatives are uniquely tailored to each
place but the idea of placing inner city communities at the center of local economic
development and shared wealth creation and building collaborative, multisectoral
partnerships with anchor institutions and other local stakeholders is gaining wide traction.
As for Los Angeles, being part of the Apollo Alliance brand (or the Blue-Green Alliance,
following the 2011 merger) offers connectivity with a nationwide network of like
organizations and multi-sector coalitions. Going back to my theoretical approach, which
incorporates Locke and Thelen's contextualized comparison method; analytical framework,
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which builds upon DuBois' notion of double consciousness and Bakhtin's formulations on
dialogic exchange; and empirical evidence from the two case studies, I would argue that the
concept of replicability, despite making for neat theorization with respect to the project of
social transformation, carries minimal relevance or applicability in actual practice. While
the theorist might draw conceptual distinctions between process and outcome and offer
prescriptions along either end, in actuality, planners and other social actors operate in
historically and locally contingent circumstances and define and redefine their scripts for
action in the field of practice. Hence formulas like the "Cleveland Model" or the "Apollo 10
Point Plan" are perhaps most useful as provisional guiding posts and tools that are best
revisited and revised as people find their own way. On the other hand, cities, as staging
grounds for capitalist urbanization and economic development and racial stratification but
also places that bring together diverse groups of people within close vicinity and relations
of interdependence-both willful and unwitting, offer a range of local assets for their
inhabitants to understand and address specific dilemmas. Granted, the extent to which
actors create inclusive, transparent, but also flexible spaces to overcome their respective
conceptual limitations, weave together different issue areas, approaches, and resources,
and thereby enhance democratic governance and accountability can highly vary. Therefore
in alternatively conceptualizing economic democracy as a learning continuum as opposed
to an idealized process or outcome, I invite practitioners to put to test the practical utility
of double consciousness and dialogic exchange in context. This entails acknowledging the
inevitable condition of human narrowness and fallibility but nevertheless learning from
comparative cases why different groups pursue different paths while looking internally
(within one's own personality and local culture and institutional context) to contemplate
whether one's own path is too narrow and driven by internal forces or external pressures
and in turn develop strategies for redress including personal and cultural transformation
as well as structural and organizational change.
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Appendix I. Map of Greater University Circle (Cleveland, OH)
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Appendix 2. Map of South Los Angeles (CA)
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